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Legal witnesses are perceived to be a crucial part of international criminal tribunals’ and 
courts’ responses to mass human rights violations, not only in contributing to a legal 
determination of guilty or not guilty being reached but also to produce a collective 
memory of the atrocities. However, this common claim in the transitional justice legal 
scholarship fails to fully understand the nature of memory. Memory construction entails 
fragments of individual and collective memories combining into contingent and 
contestable narratives of the past, and it is for this reason that the thesis challenges the 
claim that international criminal tribunals and courts are able to produce a collective 
memory of atrocities. 
Taking the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as its case study, 
this thesis differs from the majority of legal transitional justice studies researching courts 
and tribunals, which have worked within traditional legal frameworks. The originality of 
this thesis is that it offers a conceptually driven and empirically grounded analysis of 
archived ICTR documents, and interview transcripts of ICTR staff from the University of 
Washington (UoW) archive, relating to the selection of witnesses. In order to show the 
limitations of legal memory the thesis constructs an original conceptual framework using 
Giorgio Agamben’s concept of ‘witness’ and Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical insights on 
'memory’. Accordingly, the research argues for the need to understand witnessing as non-
instrumental: a contingent and multi-layered discursive process. It is the discursive 
formations within a discourse of witnessing that constitutes the conditions determining 
the subject position of witness. Therefore, what the witness subject remembers is a 
constellation of fragments of the past, which are formed within the contingent conditions 
of discourse. 
The arguments advanced by the thesis contribute towards discussions on the role 
of witnesses and how the past is remembered during transitional periods, by highlighting 
the need for the study and practice of transitional justice to fully understand how 
theoretical insights can make visible the complexities and contours of the legal 
construction of the past. The thesis thus contributes to specific analysis of witnessing and 
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This thesis investigates the way the past of societies undergoing political transition is 
remembered, and how processes of witness testimony at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up conditions for individual memories of human rights 
violations to be collectively understood. The central question this thesis asks is: How do 
legal witnesses of human rights violations contribute to memory production in transitional 
post-conflict societies? Witnessing at tribunals entails individuals externalising memories 
of violations. This is commonly construed within the transitional justice legal scholarship 
as an opportunity for individuals to ensure their memories are entered into an historical 
record (Byron 2008; Groome 2011; Keydar 2019; Klinkner and Smith 2015; Osiel 2000). 
Yet this predominant understanding of witness testimony fails to comprehend the nature 
of memory. Memory construction entails fragments of individual and collective 
memories within a contestable and contingent framing of the past (Assmann 2012), and 
it is for this reason the thesis challenges the claim that international criminal courts and 
tribunals are able to produce a collective memory of atrocities. Scholars who make this 
claim include Osiel (2000), Keydar (2015, 2019), (Douglas 2001). Even though the 
scholarship indicates the need for alternatives to trials to understand a society’s past 
during transitional periods (Clark 2012; McEvoy 2007; Murphey 2018; Waldorf 2010), 
international legal frameworks continue to dominate debates on how transition ‘should 
be’ (Dixon and Tenove 2013; Klinkner and Smith 2015; Sikkink 2011). This thesis agrees 
with Turner (2016) and Zunino (2018) in calling for a more nuanced and critical 
understanding of legal and human right norms during transitional periods, and takes a 
cautionary position in understanding law’s ability, or possible inability, to mediate social 
change following mass atrocities. 
 This project differs from the majority of legal transitional justice studies 
researching tribunals/courts, which have worked within traditional legal frameworks 
(Combs 2010; Gahima 2013; Groome 2011; Keydar 2019; Sikkink 2011). Specifically 
the thesis’s critiques are located within the legal scholarship advocating the restorative 
justice turn in international criminal law. Advocates of this ‘turn’ seek new meaning and 
scope as to what international criminal law is and for (Kendall 2015, 357-359). 
Throughout this thesis when reference is made to the legal transitional justice scholarship 
it is specifically those advocating the restorative justice ‘turn’. The originality of this 
thesis is that it offers a conceptually driven and empirically grounded analysis of archived 
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ICTR documents, and interview transcripts of ICTR staff from the University of 
Washington (UoW) archive, relating to the selection of witnesses. These archived 
materials have been analysed in order to better understand the condition and possibility 
of the ‘witness’(es). This project argues that the public construction of individual internal 
memories into an authoritative legal memory should have limited application in how 
transitional justice discourses shape the future of transitioning communities. Crucially, it 
contributes to the discussion on the role of witnesses and how the past is remembered 
during political transition, by highlighting the need for the study and practice of 
transitional justice to fully understand how theoretical insights can make visible the 
complexities and contours of the legal construction of the past. The thesis thus contributes 
to specific analysis of witnessing and memory, but also the broader transitional justice 
scholarship. A conceptual framework is offered by this research, which could be used in 
future research to look at other international legal processes of witnessing such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) deployed during periods of transition. 
Taking the ICTR as its case study, this conceptually led thesis analyses the 
construction of legal memory and the discursive conditions of the ‘witness’, through 
developing an original conceptual framework. Discursive conditions are understood here 
to mean the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, 
and resisted by writing and speaking (Foucault 1972). Accordingly, the thesis’s 
framework uses Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of the ‘witness’ and Paul Ricoeur’s 
concept of ‘memory’ (Agamben 1999; Ricoeur 2004). Agamben’s (1997) understanding 
of witnessing is concerned with the ethical implications of positioning the survivor of 
mass violence as the witness, accounting for the trauma suffered by others. Agamben’s 
concept of ‘witness’ focuses on the concentration camps at Auschwitz. This thesis takes 
Agamben’s conceptual insights and applies them to a new context, the ICTR. For 
Agamben, witnessing entails speaking in proxy for those who are the true witnesses, the 
individuals who experienced the trauma but did not survive.  Thus, the speaking witness 
cannot be the true complete witness; rather the witness who survived is the witness of the 
witness (Agamben 1997, 33). Agamben posits the witness in a lacuna between legal 
judgment that is absent of truth and the ethical category of truth and justice, often 
naturalised as being bestowed upon the witness (Agamben 1997, 23-27). According to 
Agamben’s understanding, the essential structures that are the conditions for the 
subjectification of the individual human ‘being’ are constituted as the subject of witness. 
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This allows for an understanding of what witnesses are. However, Agamben’s concept of 
‘witness’ does not include a substantive theory of memory. Therefore, the thesis will turn 
for this to Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ‘memory’.  
Ricoeur (2004) understands memory to be fragmented, unable to render the 
temporality of historical knowledge. He insists that memory is not capable of revealing 
unequivocal or uncontaminated facts about the past. As such, Ricoeur perceived 
remembering to be comprised of two parts: embodied and external. Embodied or 
‘inwardness’ refers to individual memories, what individuals have encountered and done 
(Ricoeur 2004, 40-45). Remembering is also external, entailing ‘community’, in that 
communal memories are what derives a sense of ‘we’ – plural – that offers a sense of 
shared experience. It is through remembering in and with ‘community’ that individuals 
gain a sense of a shared experience, which forms a ‘life in common with-others’ (Ricoeur 
2004, 54). This thesis’s conceptual framing of witness memories expands existing 
transitional justice paradigms, which remain under-theorised since the emergence of the 
transitional justice scholarship in the late 1980s (Clark 2012). This is particularly the case 
for the entwined relation of memory and transitional justice. Thus, the thesis’s conceptual 
framework enables a more nuanced understanding of the scope, and limitations, in which 
historical accounts of the past, produced through legal determinations of ‘the truth’, can 
make a contribution to the wide-reaching transitional justice aspirations of facilitating 
‘justice’ and ‘peace’ (Dixon and Tenove 2013; Klinkner and Smith 2015). To do this, the 
thesis employs a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis which focuses on how 
forms of representation and convention in writing and speaking produce specific 
historically located meaning and knowledge. To show the contingent nature of legal 
memory, the thesis analyses ICTR archived court documents relating to the selection of 
witnesses and interview transcripts of ICTR personnel taken from the UoW online 
archive. The documents the thesis analysed were taken from the online ICTR archive 
include statutes and rules of procedure and evidence, indictments, witness statements and 
summaries of witness statements, pre-trial briefs, motion and motion decisions and 
judgments. It is from a Foucauldian poststructuralist position that this thesis engages with 
the data and original conceptual framework. This project will inform contemporary and 
future debates on the role of witnessing in the context of legal constructions of memory 
and historical truth-telling during political transition. 
In summary, this thesis’s original contribution is that it offers an original 
conceptual framework for understanding the construction of witness memories at the 
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ICTR. The conceptual offerings of the thesis extend current understandings of legal 
witnessing and memory in the legal scholarship which has remained under theorised. 
Moreover, the limited existing theoretical approaches have largely been saturated within 
traditional legal frameworks. Alongside the original conceptual framework, the thesis 
also engaged with an analysis of empirical data, namely archive material relating to the 
selection of witnesses at the ICTR. The decision for this conceptual led thesis to engage 
with empirical material is to acknowledge that conceptually led transitional justice 
research should be in dialogue, and engaged, with empirically grounded analysis (Sharp 
2019, 21) 
 
 The transitional justice legal scholarship is central to this thesis and the arguments 
it advances. Therefore before the significance of the project and its contributions are 
outlined it is necessary to define and explain the thesis’s understanding of transitional 
justice. 
 
Defining Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice is a multifaceted ‘field’, however there is a dominant framing of what 
transitional justice is, what it aims to achieve and how it ‘should’ achieve its aims (Turner 
2016; Zunino 2018, 3). This norm or dominant discourse of transitional justice has created 
a paradigm of the context transitional justice operates in and what counts as legitimate 
approaches (Zunino 2018). This dominant discourse of transitional justice can be 
described as follows. It is in the end of the cold war period, from the late 1980s Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay into the 1990s Sierra Leone, Rwanda, South Africa, that the term 
transitional justice as a field of academic scholarship first emerged (Teitel 2003). 
According to Teitel the academic field of transitional justice emerged during the late 
1980s, which was explicitly related to a seismic shift in international politics during this 
period. Specifically, the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and capitalist (west) versus 
communist (east) proxy wars, posed important questions for the succeeding regimes – 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central Africa (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2003, 71). In particular, 
how would those new to power bring-about accountability and foster peace and 
democracy in the countries where the proxy east versus west wars had occurred (Teitel 
2003)? The seismic shift in international politics culminated in 1989 with the end of the 
Cold War. Many of the ‘proxy wars’ had been ‘supported by international power politics’ 
(capitalism versus communism) and thus were directly affected by the Soviet collapse 
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(Teitel 2003, 71). The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent demise of 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe was perceived by many to be 
the beginnings of a global ‘liberal’ movement (Fukuyama 1989).1 Importantly, the newly 
liberated states were tasked with the challenge of conceiving how to administer justice 
and build democracy. That being, the core principles of the existing model of transitional 
justice, ‘accountability through international law’, and its relevance to the post-Cold War 
period were increasingly being questioned (McEvoy 2007). This is what Teitel is 
referring to in suggesting within ‘phase II’ of transitional justice ‘the rule of law [was] 
equated with trials by the nation-state to legitimate the successor regime and advance 
nation-building’ (Teitel 2014, 54). According to Teitel, the orientation towards nation-
building projects was a shift from transitional justice solely holding previous regimes 
accountable for mass atrocities to incorporating rule-of-law values, such as ‘peace’ and 
‘reconciliation’ (Teitel 2014, 54). This shift to include aspirations for healing an entire 
society, through ‘rule-of-law values’, was the inclusion of diverse post-conflict processes, 
which had ‘previously been treated as largely external to the transitional justice project’ 
(Teitel 2014, 55). In short, the end of the Cold War, and collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
presented new questions for the transitional justice project (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2003). In 
particular, how could transitional justice mechanisms achieve justice and peace-
reconciliation, whilst still upholding the rule-of-law? In other words, there was a growing 
call for transitional justice through the rule-of law to bring about accountability for past 
atrocities, whilst taking into consideration the context-specific needs of transitioning 
states, in order to move from ‘illiberal rule to liberal democracy’ (Teitel 2014, 76).  
The focus for transitional justice scholars to understand the context-specific needs 
of transitioning societies was a central debate within the transitional justice scholarship 
during the post-cold war period (Hayner 2011, Roht-Arriaza 2006, Teitel 2003). The 
scholarship orientated towards consideration of how a template – ‘tool kit’ – of 
transitional justice legal and non-legal mechanisms could facilitate reconciliation and 
peace (Clark 2012). This ‘tool kit’ approach comprised diverse legal and non-legal 
mechanisms: national trials, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparation, 
‘traditional’ justice mechanisms, forgiveness and healing rituals (Hayner 2011; Roht-
 
1 In his provocative 1989 conceptual essay ‘The End of History’ Francis Fukuyama argued the end of the 
cold-war and fall of the Soviet Empire was the beginning of a global liberal democracy. Influenced by 
Hegelian understanding of history Fukuyama’s central thesis was ‘that liberal democracy may constitute 
the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as 
such constituted the “end of history”. See Fukuyama (1989); also see: Fukuyama (1992). 
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Arriaza 2006). The crux of a ‘tool kit’ approach to periods of transition was the perception 
that for newly liberated states to transition to ‘democracy’ required the inclusion of 
restorative justice component(s) (Roht-Arriaza 2006, Teitel 2003). Inasmuch as, the 
common advocacy for the future of newly liberated states entailed understanding, 
constructing, the ‘truth’ of past atrocities. This can be seen in Teitel pointing out that in 
the aftermath of the Cold War ‘the main purpose of transitional justice was to construct 
an alternative history of past abuses’ (Teitel 2014, 56).2  
For example, following the end of apartheid rule in South Africa, the South 
African government chose to create a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (TRC) 
(Verdoolaege 2008). This included perpetrators being given amnesty for crimes they 
committed in exchange for telling the truth of past abuses.3 A further example of the 
transitional justice discourse shifting from the exclusivity of accountability through 
international law to understanding the context-specific needs of transitioning societies is 
illustrated in the Rwandan gacaca courts (Clark 2010, 2014). The gacaca courts, based 
upon a ‘traditional’ Rwandan reconciliation process, facilitated accountability through 
gacaca being legislated in Rwandan law as a legal institution, whilst concurrently giving 
victims/survivors of the genocide the opportunity to tell the community of their 
experience of violations (Clark 2010; Doughty 2015; Palmer 2015). Slogans such as ‘The 
Truth Will Heal’ were a common sight during the existence of the gacaca courts – 2002-
2012 – (Clark 2014). In short, the need to understand the context-specific needs of 
transitioning societies questioned the extent to which accountability in isolation was 
appropriate in order to transition newly liberated states to a ‘liberal democracy’ (Teitel 
2003). Thus a position emerged within the transitional justice scholarship advocating the 
use of multiple mechanisms (the ‘tool kit’) in order to facilitate accountability and help 
reconcile an entire society. However, legal and human rights norms continue to 
significantly orientate and shape how transitional justice processes ‘should be’ (Sikkink 
2011; Dixon and Tenove 2013). These norms define the paradigm in which transitional 
justice mechanisms determine the ‘correct’ approaches and the perceived success or 
failure of these approaches (Turner 2013, 198). The significance of legal and human rights 
 
2 For discussion on transitional justice mechanisms in Latin America, see Anita Ferrara (2014), Elin 
Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri Suhrke (2005). 
3 Verdoolaege argues that the South African TRC constructed a ‘reconciliation discourse’ which had long 
lasting implications on the recovery of South African society. See: Verdoolaege (2008). Also see Moon 
(2006). For a more general discussion on Truth Commissions and Amnesty see Jeremy Sarkin, who 
suggests caution should be taken when considering the South African TRC as a template for other 
transitioning societies. See: Sarkin (2004, 2015). Also see: Hayner (2011). 
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norms, particularly in shaping the perceived importance of legal witnesses will be 
unpacked in Chapter 1 and is a theme running throughout this thesis. 
 This dominant framing of transitional justice, summarised above, has been 
convincingly argued by Zunino as a discourse of transitional justice (Zunino 2018). 
Zunino defines a discourse of transitional justice as entailing ‘characteristics at its core 
which have framed existing accounts of the history of transitional justice determining 
which responses are recognised as relevant and which are ignored’ (Zunino 2018, 231). 
A discourse of transitional justice is a ‘distinct discursive space’ with six core 
characteristics: comparative, technical, teleological, liberal, multilevel and state-centric 
(Zunino 2018, 22-23). The comparative characteristic is transitional justice’s reliance on 
comparative method to contrast a range of responses to different contexts that have 
experienced past systematic periods of violence. Technical refers to transitional justice’s 
strong legal and apolitical orientation. This orientation has ‘developed a community of 
legal experts in international criminal law that regard it as a self-contained system with 
its own logic’ (Zunino 2018, 109). Transitional justice is teleological in the sense it is 
directed at achieving a specific set of goals. International criminal court and tribunals 
founding documents set varying goals for them, such as the ICTR will contribute to 
reconciliation and peace in Rwanda (Zunino 2018, 109). Liberal is the liberal imprint 
embedded in international criminal justice, ‘especially in the dimension of foregrounding 
violations of civil and political rights and instances of physical violence’ (Zunino 2018, 
110). Multilevel is the way in which different transitional justice mechanisms operate and 
are influenced by the international. Notwithstanding the strong influence of the 
international, state-centric characteristic is the ‘’heavy involvement of states, while less 
so than national prosecutions, international criminal justice is state-centric (Zunino 2018, 
111).  
According to Zunino, it is these six characteristics that have established the 
parameters for most discussions on transitional justice and in doing so has resulted in 
certain mechanisms and processes being given preference (Zunino 2018, 58). It is 
Zunino’s understanding of transitional justice as discourse that this thesis adopts. As a 
discourse, transitional justice entails two components, the practices of transitional justice 
with its origins in the aftermath of the Second World War and a discourse in scholarship 
(Zunino 2018, 3). Zunino argues that a discourse of scholarship on transitional justice 
significantly shaped the origins of the practice of transitional justice being located within 
the Nuremberg trials (Zunino 2018, 171-172). Nuremburg was chosen as the origins of 
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the practice of transitional justice because it reflected many of the core characteristics 
during the emergence of a discourse in scholarship, particularly the scholarships legalistic 
orientation (Zunino 2018, 172). Understanding transitional justice as a discourse is 
suitable for the purposes of this thesis in two particular ways. Firstly, it helps identify 
how legal and human rights norms have become a dominant position within the 
scholarship on transitional justice, and as a core feature within transitional justice 
practices, such as international criminal tribunals and courts. Secondly, it foregrounds the 
‘importance that language, concepts and tropes have in [the transitional justice] 
phenomenon’ (Zunino 2018, 9). In short, it puts front and centre the importance of 
analysing discursivity in our research into transitional justice processes. This thesis being 
interested in a discourse of witnessing at the ICTR is, like Zunino’s discourse of 
transitional justice, focused on understanding the discursive conditions and practices that 
shape our understanding of post-conflict phenomena. Therefore, transitional justice 
understood as discourse provides a useful frame of reference for this thesis to unpack the 
‘language, concepts and tropes’ which determined at the ICTR the individuals who can 
be a witness subject and what knowledge of past rights violations they can talk about. 
 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
To enable the project’s research question to be answered - ‘How do witnesses of human 
rights violations contribute to memory production in transitional post-conflict societies?’ 
- the project will ask the following subsidiary research questions: 
 
(i) How is the subject position of ‘witness’ discursively created? (The way social 
power relations produce identities and specific historically located meaning).  
(ii) In cases of mass human rights violations, how does the construction of 
memory at the ICTR frame the manner in which violence is remembered?  
(iii) Does positioning memory within the discursive construction of witness mean 
memory becomes fixed and rigid? 
 
Context 
In answering these subsidiary questions, the project’s original conceptual 
framework of witness memories will add to existing legal transitional justice frameworks 
of witnessing (Combs 2010; Osiel 2000, Klinkner and Smith 2015; Klinkner and Howard 
2019), which lack consideration of the discursive and contingent nature of memory. 
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During transition, witness testimony given in court is often perceived to contribute on an 
individual level by enabling witnesses to come to terms with the past (Kim 2013, 40; 
Klinkner and Smith 2015) and at a collective level through the compilation of witness 
testimonies facilitating a collective memory of mass violations (Groom 2011; Keynar 
2019; Osiel 2000). Groome argues that, on an individual level, there is a need to position 
individual victims of mass human rights violations at the centre of legal responses to 
atrocities, transitioning victims from passive sufferers of violence to active participants 
in processes of redress (Groome 2011). Moreover, Combs (2010) argues that witness 
evidence provided at tribunals differs substantially to evidence provided in non-
transitional contexts, suggesting the legal ‘rules of procedure’ should provide judges with 
more discretionary power when interpreting witness evidence. Combs claims, in the 
context of the ICTR, witness evidence given by Rwandans was often untrustworthy 
(Combs 2010).4 Osiel (2000), emphasising the collective benefits of witnessing, points to 
a more far reaching paradigm for witness memories, stating that witness testimonies can 
construct a coherent collective memory of atrocities, providing victims and societies 
affected with a collective narrative of past events (Osiel 2000). However, Combs and 
Groome’s framing of witnessing does not account for how legal constructions of the 
witness(es) perpetuate into the wider transitional justice discourse. Moreover, Osiel’s 
advocacy for a collective legal explanation of the past negates the discursive contingency 
of legal memory.  
 A recurrent understanding of witnessing is provided from a human rights 
perspective. Dixon and Tenove (2013), Klinkner and Smith (2015), and Kim (2013) 
frame witnessing within a wider human rights project. Central to this perspective is an 
assumed normative process of advocacy for universal human rights (Dixon and Tenove 
2013, 3-4; Klinkner and Smith 2015). This places a strong emphasis on human rights 
violations not being forgotten but remembered, and victims having the ‘right to [tell] the 
truth’ of their experience (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 11-12). With its objectives informed 
by ‘human rights discourse’, this perspective perceives victims as being given a voice to 
remember the violations they suffered as a human right in itself (Klinkner and Smith 
2015, 11). However, this human rights discourse on witness memories fails to 
comprehend the discursive and contingent nature of memory. This is because there exists 
 
4 Eltringham has challenged Combs’s claim that Rwandan witnesses at the ICTR were untrustworthy, 
arguing that Combs fails to fully understand how ‘legal culture’ was a significant impact on witness 
testimonies (Eltringham 2019). 
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a fundamental principle within normative human rights discourse that individual victims 
of rights abuses have a universal right to agency in legal proceedings (Klinkner and Smith 
2015, 11-12).5 This normative human rights discourse often leads to ‘faith-based’ rather 
than ‘fact-based’ prescriptions (Clark 2012, 12). As such, this suggests that expectations 
of human rights advocacy are often too high, which exemplifies the need to examine the 
discursive conditions of legal witnessing in which the subject of ‘witness’ is constituted 
and the manner in which legal memory becomes fixed and rigid. 
 There is a smaller, although persuasive, body of work that has looked more 
critically at witnessing in international criminal tribunals and courts (Dembour and 
Haslam 2004; Viebach 2017; Wilson 2011). It is these scholars that the thesis works with 
and contributes towards discussions on how international criminal tribunals and courts 
shape understandings of atrocities. For example, Viebach’s critical work has shown, 
through testimonies of witnesses in the Seromba trial at the ICTR, the way narratives of 
trauma are told are much more restrictive than how survivor testimonies were told at the 
Rwandan Nyange memorial site (Viebach 2017). Viebach argues there is a perpetual 
strain between what survivors say on the witness stand and whose stories are silenced 
(Viebach 2017, 68). Dembour and Haslam (2004) argue, in the context of the ICTY, that 
these trials are not equipped nor is it their purpose to produce a collective memory via the 
testimonies of witnesses (Dembour and Haslam 2004). The Krstic trial had the effect of 
silencing rather than hearing the stories of witnesses (Dembour and Haslam 2004, 175). 
While these works provide useful insights into how the courtroom and its actors shape 
what witnesses can say on the witness stand, what is also very important, and has received 
less scholarly attention, is the extent to which the processes before witnesses give their 
testimony in court contribute to who can be a witness and what stories they can tell. This 
thesis focuses specifically on the legal processes before witnesses testify in court, and the 
important role these processes have in shaping and restricting who can speak at the ICTR 
and what they can speak about. Specifically, minimal scholarly attention has been given 
to the role conceptual insights could have on casting light upon how international criminal 
institutions construct witness identities and memories of past horrors, and it is this context 
that is the central focus of the thesis.  
 Therefore, notwithstanding the benefit of international criminal proceedings, this 
research argues legal institutional (re)production of memory needs to be understood 
 
5 See Mutua 2013. 
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within the scholarship on transitional justice not as a ‘product’ or ‘thing’ (Osiel 2000; 
Groome 2011; Keydar 2019). Instead, memory needs to be viewed as process, which is 
multidimensional and transient. Significantly, to specify agency is vital (Winter 2006, 3) 
as it prioritises answering the central questions on the legal construction of memory, that 
being: who remembers, when, why and how? Accordingly, the research proposes a need 
to depart from an instrumental understanding of witnessing: the witness conceived as a 
pre-existing self-evident subject, through which previously ‘hidden’ or ‘suppressed’ 
memories can to a greater or lesser extent be recovered (Combs 2010). Accordingly, the 
research argues for the need to understand witnessing as non-instrumental: a contingent 
and multi-layered discursive process. It is the discursive formations within a discourse of 
witnessing that constitutes the conditions determining the subject position of witness. 
Therefore, what the witness subject remembers is a constellation of fragments of the past, 
which are formed within the contingent discursive conditions of discourse.  
Thus, this thesis makes a conceptual contribution, showing that it is only by 
understanding the discursive conditions that constitute the witness and the manner in 
which constructions of memory become fixed and rigid that we can understand what is at 
stake during processes of witnessing. Specifically, remembering events such as mass 
violations of human rights requires understanding such events as comprising a shared 
experience. It is through ‘community’ and ‘with-others’ (Ricoeur 1984, 2004) that 
individuals construct meaning of experiences of the past, in which networks of social 
relations are enacted and re-enacted amongst individuals and groups. Accordingly, legal 
witnessing as a modality for legal memory is absent modes of remembering which are 
able to encompass ‘community’ and ‘with-others’ (Ricoeur 1984, 2004), as is argued in 
Chapter 5. This brings into question the way in which international legal proceedings 
shape transitional justice discourse, which informs the diverse processes of societal 
transition. The latter part of the thesis explores what else is produced through the 
discursive conditions and practices at the ICTR. This exploration is made in Chapter 7 by 
considering the fragments of memories within the archive material and the potential for 
this material to aid memory production in Rwanda. Here, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that whilst the thesis’ understanding of memory as something constructed and plural is 
very useful for the discussions in Chapter 7 and the central thrust of the thesis’ arguments, 
however this frame of memory does not advocate that all uses of the past should be 
permitted, specifically in the context of genocide denial and revisionism (see Chapter 7). 
Genocide denial in Rwanda, and many other post genocide contexts, by the architects of 
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the genocide and their supporters continue to present significant challenges and brings 
distress to survivors and the families of victims (Melvern 2020). Genocide denialists 
attempt to intentionally distort and/or manipulate past events in order to fit their warped 
and abhorrent narrative (Melvern 2020, 5). However notwithstanding this, experiences of 
the past will always entail plural understandings, and crucially the thesis’s conceptual 
framework extends our understandings of how plural fragments of the past are 
constructed. In summary, by showing what is at stake during legal witnessing and the 
manner in which legal memory is constructed, it is only then are we able to gain a fuller 
understanding of the scope, and  limitations, in which historical accounts of the past, 
produced through legal determinations of ‘the truth’, can make a contribution to the wider 
transitional justice aspirations of facilitating ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ (Dixon and Tenove 
2013; Klinkner 2015): transitional justice discourse engages in shaping the future of a 
given community, in which legal outcomes influence the framing of articulations of the 
past.  
 
Research Data and Method 
The recent completion of the ICTR mandate (2015) and its perceived success is 
significant to how we understand future processes of transitional justice, as there is a very 
real possibility that witness memories, through testimony, will be seen to have been 
central to the ICTR model (Byron 2008; Gahima 2013; Kendall and Nouwen 2016). 
Furthermore, the ‘legacy debate’ surrounding the contribution the tribunal archives 
should have to transitional periods are often construed as providing a historical legal 
record of the ‘facts’ of the atrocities committed (Ketelaar 2012). Such historical records 
of the legal ‘facts’ often orientate around a linear constructed narrative of mass violations 
(Ketelaar 2012; Redwood 2017) which can condense the complexities of past violations 
into an overly simplified account of the past and present. As such, through a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis of archived legal documents and interview transcripts, this project 
foregrounds the fragmentation of individual and collective memory whilst concurrently 
pointing out the contingent nature of constructions of the past and present. The data to be 
analysed is taken from the publicly accessible online archived judicial documents from 
the ICTR and UoW archived interview transcripts with ICTR personnel including Judges, 
prosecution and defence counsels, investigators and registrar. All ICTR material is 
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written/transcribed in English and French.6 The documents from which a close discursive 
reading was conducted have been taken from two ICTR cases, Emmanuel Rukundo and 
Ildephonse Nizeyimana These two cases were selected for two primary reasons: the 
Nizeyimana case relates to the Butare area in Rwanda which was where some of the most 
extensive and prolonged violence occurred, and the length of the two cases accounts for 
a significant time period of the ICTR’s lifespan and has resulted in an extensive collection 
of legal documents (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 for case details). The analysis focused 
primarily on these cases in order to identify the patterns and themes within the data, 
although the analysis also engaged with documents relating to other ICTR trials to 
identify if a similar pattern of discursivity is evident. All data was uploaded to NVivo, 
which was used to manage the data and as a platform for the analysis. 
The method used for analysing the data was Foucauldian framework for a 
discourse analysis (Foucault 1972). The method aimed to identify the discursive 
conditions within a discourse of witnessing. Discursive conditions are the way social 
power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by writing 
and speaking. This method analyses language and the way in which text and talk produces 
specific historically located meaning and identity (Foucault 1972). Accordingly, the main 
things the analysis aims to identify in examining language – statements – are: 
 
I. Repeatability of statements;  
II. Conditions which constitutes the subject position of witness;  
III. Positions and authority from which subjects can speak; 
IV. Formation of objects of knowledge.   
 
Throughout the analysis chapters (4-7) the discussions and arguments developed are 
centred around Foucauldian discursive conditions and practices. This continual use of 
these terms should not be read as a repetition in the discussions, rather they are central to 
this thesis investigating how witness memories are constructed at the ICTR. Specifically, 
the way in which the subject position of witness and objects of knowledge they describe 
are constituted is directly related to the interconnected relationship of statements (series 
 
6 During some of the ICTR cases legal counsels brought motions arguing that the opposing counsel had 
not translated witness statements into both of the tribunal’s working languages. It was common that when 
investigators gathered witness statements from Rwandans they would be written and/or recorded in 
Kinyarwanda. the most commonly spoken language in Rwanda.  
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of signs). Therefore it is necessary for the analysis to explore the variety, or layers, of 
discursive conditions within the legal documents relating to the selection of witnesses.  
 Whilst archival data provides a very useful source for this thesis investigating 
processes of memory construction at the ICTR, it is necessary to acknowledge that the 
archival data, like all data, has limitations. Archival data is not capable of revealing a 
complete account of past events or able to reveal a ‘complete truth’ of historical suffering. 
However, as is argued throughout this thesis, accounts of the past are always contingent 
and contestable and thus inevitably contain gaps (see Chapter 3, 7). Archival material 
offers a particularly useful source of data for the thesis investigating the processes at the 
ICTR in which knowledge of the past is constructed. Accordingly, this data and method 
of analysis shows within processes of testimony how forms of representation and 
conventions in text and talk produce historically located identities and knowledge. 
Therefore, the intention of selecting the documents housed in the archives of the ICTR 
and UoW is to show that this data highlights how the discursive conditions of legal 
witnessing constructs the subjects (witnesses) and knowledge of transitional justice into 
a rigid and authoritative account of past atrocities. 
This thesis, positioning its argument within the legal transitional justice 
scholarship, acknowledges international legal processes of witnessing are only one of 
numerous modes of witnessing during transitional periods. Witnessing during transition 
is multidimensional which can include: Truth Commissions, regional and local trials, 
traditional justice and healing processes. Each of these different modes of witnessing 
provides potential insight for how societies attempt to make sense of and recover after 
mass atrocities. However, the legal scholarship as a dominant presence in post-conflict 
debates has produced a set of norms that purport the benefit, indeed the necessity, of legal 
witnessing as a key component for successful transition (Groome 2011; Keydar 2019; 
Osiel 2000; Skikink 2011). Thus, this thesis is an enquiry that questions labels and 
assumptions in arguing there is a need for alternative conceptual understandings of what 
it is witnesses are and what they can do in international tribunals and courts. 
This thesis is one interpretation of witnessing and the legal construction of 
memory at the ICTR. There will be other understandings of witnessing at international 
tribunals and courts and this thesis makes no claim to offer a normative prescription of 
how legal witnessing ‘should be’. Therefore, it is not the purpose of this thesis to reach a 
more ‘true’ or complete understanding of legal witnessing during transitional periods. 
However, this thesis does offer one alternative understanding, which casts the 
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phenomenon of legal witnessing in a new a light and offers one alternative understanding 
of the way in which witnesses remember. 
 
Structuring the Argument 
The thesis’s argument is developed across seven chapters. Chapter 1 locates 
memory and witnessing within the broader literature on transitional justice and 
specifically the scholarship on international criminal trials. It discusses the origins of the 
legal scholarship on transitional justice, and importantly, how these origins have been 
influential in the way in which the contemporary legal transitional justice scholarship 
perceives legal and human rights norms as fundamental to successful transition (Turner 
2016; Zunino 2018). Beginning with the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials the chapter 
highlights the existence within these two trials of the inherent relation between universal 
human rights and memory work. Particularly the need to remember mass violations of 
human rights through legal processes since the end of World War II became common 
practice in how the international community responds to mass atrocities. From this, the 
chapter traces the discourse of transitional justice scholarship, particularly the legal 
scholarship, foregrounding that witnessing and remembering violations have become an 
embedded and fundamental component for the way in which transitional justice perceives 
the successful transition of a given society. The chapter concludes by arguing that while 
it is common within the legal scholarship for advocacy for trials to contribute to a 
collective story of past atrocities, this advocacy fails to comprehend the contingent nature 
of memory and the crucial role international criminal institutions, and legal actors, have 
in the construction of witness memories.  
Chapter 2 constructs an original theoretical framework using the concepts of 
‘memory’, (Ricoeur) and ‘witness’ (Agamben). The thesis’s framework uses a ‘toolkit’ 
approach to theoretical insights, in which particular conceptual components are brought 
together as a conceptual lens to cast new light on a given research problematic (Foucault 
1977). Unpacking the nexus of the concept of ‘witness’ foregrounds Agamben’s central 
contention:  the paradox between what he defines as the true complete witness, the victim 
who experience the full horror of trauma and did not survive, and the survivor who is 
bestowed with the ethical obligation of bearing witness, speaking in proxy for the ‘true 
witness’ (Agamben 1999, 25-37). Agamben’s concept of ‘witness’ contributes to the 
philosophical foundation of the thesis’s framework in arguing that witnessing is a non-
instrumental, contingent and multi-layered practice (Agamben 1997). The remainder of 
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the chapter discusses the thesis’s engagement with Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ‘memory’. 
The insights offered by Agamben and Ricoeur provide a philosophical framework for an 
investigation which attempts to better understand the extent to which memory constructed 
through legal witnessing at the ICTR is able to contribute to the wide-reaching aspirations 
of transitional justice.  
In Chapter 3 the thesis’s poststructuralist methodology and engagement with data 
is unpacked. The chapter begins by summarising the data to be analysed, including: rules 
of procedure and evidence, indictments, motion and motion decisions, pre-trial briefs and 
judgments and interview transcripts of ICTR staff. Importantly for the research in 
analysing interview transcripts and ICTR legal documents is discursivity. Discursivity is 
understood here to mean the way in which language constitutes meaning and knowledge 
that then become accepted social practices, on which serious claims to truth and falsity 
are made (Foucault 1991). The concluding part of the chapter outlines how a Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse will be used to analysis the discursive conditions of witnessing 
within the archived ICTR legal documents relating to the selecting of witnesses. 
Chapter 4 starts discussing the analysis of the data. The chapter explores the 
discursive conditions that constitute the witness as the subject position of discourse. 
Particular consideration is given to the relation between the discursive construction of the 
‘witness’ and the right to truth, which is legislated in human rights law and purported by 
advocates as being a key component during legal redress for mass atrocities (Funk 2015; 
Groome 2011; Klinkner and Smith 2015).  
Developing on from the previous chapter’s focus on what witnesses are, Chapter 
5 focuses on what memories witnesses can talk about. The chapter considers the way in 
which memories of genocidal violence are constructed at the ICTR. In particular how the 
diverse individual experiences of violence during the genocide against the Tutsi is 
constructed and shaped by law during the legal processes (pre-trial and trial) at the ICTR. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that the discursivity of legal practices at the ICTR acts 
to camouflage the absence of memories relating to the wider complexities of genocidal 
violence. 
Chapter 6 advances two related points, firstly that analysing the discursivity of 
motions and motion decisions shows the crucial role ICTR legal actors, legal counsels 
and judges, have in the construction of legal memory. Secondly, drawing upon the thesis’s 
conceptual framework and the analysis from Chapters 4-5, a critique of and challenge to 
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Mark Osiel’s advocacy for legal collective memory is made, and an alternative conceptual 
frame is offered.  
Extending the arguments made in Chapters 4-6, Chapter 7 explores a potential 
way legal witnesses could contribute to the plurality of memory in post-conflict societies, 
which crucially is not rigid and fixed within the tightly controlled discursive conditions 
of legal proceedings. It is proposed that fragments of witness memories contained in the 
ICTR archive have the potential to contribute to the post-genocide memory ecology in 
Rwanda. It is argued that proposing that fragments of witness memories contained in the 
archive can aid memory production in Rwanda requires a conceptual reorientation in how 
we think about legal memory. Specifically, we need to re-orientate our understanding of 
legal memory away from court proceedings and instead zoom-in on the legal archive, and 
material it houses. Therefore this final analysis chapter offers an alternative way of 
thinking about transitioning societies’ relationship with legal memory. The chapter is one 
way not to be limited by law’s need for singularity and progress, and therefore puts front 




Chapter 1 – Memory, Witnesses and International Criminal Institutions 
 
Introduction 
This chapter situates memory and witnessing in relation to post-conflict transition, 
discussing how remembering trauma is understood within both the broader literature on 
transitional justice, and specifically the scholarship on international trials. This includes 
outlining the perceived role memory has in international criminal trials – 
Nuremberg/Eichmann, ICTR, ICC – mandated with human rights objectives (Klinkner 
and Smith 2015; Osiel 1997). The chapter argues that while it is common within the legal 
scholarship for advocacy for trials to contribute to a collective story of past atrocities, this 
advocacy fails to comprehend the contingent nature of memory and the crucial role 
international criminal institutions, and legal actors, have in the construction of witness 
memories. 
The chapter begins by discussing how memory, particularly the recalling of mass 
violations of human rights since the end of World War II became common practice in 
how the international community responds to mass atrocities. Specifically, this chapter 
details the Nuremberg trials and the trial of Eichmann as the origins of transitional justice 
discourse and, importantly, pointing out within these two trials the inherent relation of 
universal human rights and memory work. From this, the chapter unpicks the emergence 
of a discourse of transitional justice scholarship (1980s) and the embedded human rights-
memory relation (Teitel 2003). Accordingly, tracing the legal scholarship on transitional 
justice shows witnessing and remembering violations, specifically within international 
trials, have become an embedded and fundamental component for the way in which 
transitional justice perceives the successful transition of a given society.  
Yet, within the legal scholarship, memory is commonly perceived to be a thing 
which can be recovered through witness testimony in trials, in order to reveal previously 
hidden accounts of the past, thus contributing to a collective understanding of mass 
human rights violations. This legal construction of the past commonly informs the manner 
in which the transitional justice discourse shapes the future of a transitioning community. 
However, this predominant understanding of witness testimony fails to comprehend the 
nature of memory. Legal memory entails the construction of fragments of individual and 
collective memories within a contestable and contingent framing of the past (Assmann 
2012). Furthermore, in the transitional justice literature the focus has been on affording 
agency to victims, giving them a voice to remember their experiences, and through the 
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act of witnessing a collective narrative detailing the complex reasons for the violations 
can be constructed (Blants 2013, 41). As such, this thesis analyses the subjectivity of 
witnessing in international tribunals (ICTR) and the manner in which individuals are 
constituted as the subject of witness(es) (Agamben 1997).  
 
Origins of the Practice of Transitional Justice: Nuremberg and the Exceptional Use 
of International Law 
This section locates the origins of transitional justice within the Nuremberg trials, 
highlighting the ‘exceptional’ use of international law by the international community to 
address the atrocities of the Second World War (Zunino 2018). The section details the 
origins of the practice of transitional justice which emerged as a term to explain the 
exceptional use of the law during periods of political change (Teitel 2003). The 
Nuremberg trials, then, act as a recognisable symbol of the post War origins of transitional 
justice which, according to Teitel, reflects the accomplishment of international law (Teitel 
2003, 70). However, this section notes a criticism of the practice of transitional justice in 
the context of Nuremberg, particularly in starting to position the thesis’s argument within 
the literature and debates. This criticism relates to the establishment of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and an obligation to remember. The Declaration, the 
agreement to establish a minimum standard of rights for all human beings, was not only 
the beginning of international law to address mass violence and conflict but also a 
commitment to a moral obligation by the signatory nations to the Declaration to remember 
the human rights atrocities that preceded it. Following Teitel, the origins of transitional 
justice are the ‘exceptional’ and ‘international’ use of law in the post-World War II 
period. It can also be seen to directly encompass memory work. In that, memory, the need 
to remember the failures of societies in order to ensure the suffering of the world wars 
were not repeated, becomes a legally embedded obligation of the international 
community, and, a criticism of the Nuremberg trials not providing victims with the 
opportunity to recall the experiences of the atrocities.7  
According to Teitel the origin of transitional justice is the creation of the 
international Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War (Teitel 2003). The Nuremberg tribunal included the trials of 24 
leading members of the Nazis (Teitel 2014). Following Teitel, the Nuremberg Trials are 
 
7 Witnesses were called at Nuremberg although witness evidence was used as supplementary to the vast amount of documentary 
evidence presented by the prosecutor (Jackson 1993, Douglas 2001) 
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marked by a seminal moment in international law. That being, the Allied powers creating 
an international tribunal to try the ‘main’ perpetrators of the Nazi atrocities established, 
for the first time, international law which had a legal mandate to prosecute individuals for 
crimes committed by a state against its own citizens (Teitel 2003, 70). Prior to the creation 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal international law had been unable to penetrate the sovereignty 
of states. States were perceived as being responsible for administering the rule of law for 
violations of international justice committed within its territory. Accordingly, the creation 
of international law for the Nuremberg Trials marked a ‘critical turn away from prior 
nationalist transitional response’ towards international policy thought to be guaranteed by 
a universal application of international law (O’ Sullivan 2017; Teitel 2003 73). In short, 
the creation by the Allied powers of a set of international law for the Nuremberg Trials 
had legal primacy over national justice, which marked an important turn to the 
international. The post Second World War move to international law ‘created the sense 
that the relevant subject of transitional justice was an international legal response 
governed by the law of conflict’ (Teitel 2003, 73-74). 
The creation of international law at Nuremberg was indeed a seminal moment 
within the origins of transitional justice, although Allied powers had been in dialogue 
regarding the potential of international law following the conclusion of World War One. 
The justice discourse during this interwar period entailed defining ‘unjust war’ and a 
paradigm of ‘justifiable punishment by the international community’ (Teitel 2003, 72). 
This initial consideration of an international legal paradigm for ‘unjust war’ is most 
evident in relation to the Paris Peace Conference 1919 and the Treaty of Versailles 
(Taylor 1993, 14-15). The Allied powers agreed that the war crimes committed by the 
German Empire should be held accountable to the rule of law. In March 1919 a 
commissioned report, stemming from the Paris Peace Conference, charged ‘Germany and 
her allies with extensive violations of the laws of war’ (Taylor 1993, 15). Although, 
conflicting political objectives of the Allied powers curtailed the implementation by the 
international community of international law. However, whilst the Versailles Treaty did 
not lead to the creation of international law to try Germany and her allies, Mettraux points 
out, ‘the decision to punish [Nazi] crimes… was born of the failure to do so after the First 
World War, a bitter lesson not lost on the Allied Powers.’ (Mettraux 2013, 6). 
On the 8th August 1945 the Allied powers8 signed the London Agreement, 
 




bringing into existence the International Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg (Heller 2011, 
123; Mettraux 2013, 6). In signing the London Agreement the Allied powers had 
established an international criminal tribunal which was prescribed with ‘mostly a new 
set of rules and principles’, which were to be applied to ‘exceptional events’ (Mettraux 
2013, 6). The crimes under the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal included: Crimes 
Against Humanity, Crimes Against Peace, and War Crimes. Here a point of note, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to include ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ encompassed 
inhumane acts committed ‘against civilians, whether or not in the context of the war’ 
(Taylor 1993; Teitel 2014, 41).9 The embryonic reach of international law, stemming for 
the London Agreement, to include inhuman acts against civilians serves as a central 
legacy of Nuremberg (Mettraux 2008; Teitel 2014, 42). Importantly, the significance of 
the London Agreement is stated by Mettraux, that this achievement ‘was the creation of 
a genuinely international body of criminal law capable of universal application’ 
(Mettraux 2008, 7). In one regard, the London Agreement was motivated by what was 
perceived by many in the international community to be the irrelevance to which 
‘international law had been reduced by the war’ (Mettraux 2013, 7). The perceived 
irrelevance of existing international law led to a ‘rare legislative moment’ (Mettraux 
2013, 7). The overriding view of the international community was that as there was no 
adequate law to punish the crimes of the Nazis an international body of criminal law 
needed to be made (Mettraux 2013, 7, Taylor 1993, 33-38). 
Here a noteworthy point: international law created for Nuremberg was, at the time, 
not universally advocated, particularly evident in Karl Jaspers’s (1947) concerns for the 
retroactive creation of international law by the victors of war.10 Specifically, Jaspers was 
troubled by the creation and employment of international law to be applied retroactively 
to Nazi crimes. A central problematic for Jaspers was the way in which the ‘victors’ of 
the Second World War – Allied powers – were permitted to decide the legal paradigm in 
which their enemy – the Nazis - would be held legally accountable (Jaspers 1947, 151-
160). For Jaspers, judgment for the crimes committed by the Nazis should be ‘passed only 
in accordance with a law which was already in existence prior to the commission of the 
 
9 Crimes Against Humanity included: ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population’ or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds ‘whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.’ (Nuremberg 
Charter in Teitel 2014). 
10 Karl Jaspers was a German Philosopher whose seminal work attempted to understand to what extent 
the German people should feel guilt and responsibility for the atrocities carried out by the Nazis: see 
Jaspers (2000); for a general discussion the philosophical works of Jaspers: see Thornehill (2002). 
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act’ (Jaspers 1947, 155). In other words, the Nazis should be held legally accountable, 
though, specifically for crimes that came under the law prior to the act(s) being committed 
(Jaspers 1947, 155). Yet for Jaspers, at Nuremberg it was the ‘victors’ who ‘now 
pronounce the judgment (with retroactive force) in accordance with laws which the 
victors themselves have drawn up’ (Jaspers 1947, 155). In short the ‘victors’ of the Nazi 
war created a set of new rules, which for Jaspers, had the potential to establish a perturbing 
precedent whereby ‘victors’ of conflict would be permitted to define the legal 
accountability of their enemy. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of World War II the 
international community overwhelmingly supported the creation of ‘new’ international 
law to be established as a universal response to mass violations (O’ Sullivan 2017, 59; 
Teitel 2014). 
One important implication of this body of criminal law and its ‘universal 
application’ was its jurisdiction to prosecute individuals (O’Sullivan 2017, 61). The 
Tribunal’s Charter set an inaugural legal precedent; law that allowed for the legal 
determination of individual responsibility for crimes committed against the citizens of a 
state. This can be seen in the IMT judgment stating that ‘crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’ (Nuremberg 
Judgment 1946). Accordingly, the Tribunal’s Charter explicitly granted power to 
international law to supersede state sovereignty, in that, no longer was it possible for 
persons who violated international law to gain impunity in the name of sovereignty 
(Taylor 1993, 612-618). Having legal jurisdiction to bring individual accountably for 
Nazi crimes allowed Nuremberg prosecutors to refute defense claims that international 
law permitted liability for states, not individuals (Taylor 1993, 612-618). The legal 
substance supporting individual accountability is directly related to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, founded on ‘mostly new’ international law (Drumbl 2007).  
In summary, what becomes evident from the Tribunal’s marked turn away from 
state responsibility to individual responsibility for mass violations is the ability of 
international law, by relation the international community, to surpass the sovereignty of 
states. In other words, the Nuremberg trials are a seminal moment, a shift from the 
national to international through the creation of international law. International law from 
the Nuremberg trials onwards is not only the creation of an international ad hoc tribunal, 
but also importantly, a paradigmatic shift to the exceptional and international use of law 




The symbolic representation of Nuremberg and Human Rights 
A shift to an international legal response for violations of international law is an 
important component in understanding the origins of the practice of transitional justice 
Discourse (Zunino 2018, 138).11 However, the Nuremberg trials also serve as a powerful 
symbolic and moral representation of international justice which are fundamental to both 
the origins of transitional justice and many of the epistemological assumptions evident in 
the discourse of transitional justice scholarship. Symbolically, the Nuremberg trials are 
not only testament to the international community’s ability to create a body of new 
criminal law to bring individual accountability, importantly, it also acts as a ‘symbol of 
justice’ (Drumbl 2011, 23; Mettraux 2013, 11-12). That being, the philosophical 
underpinnings of Nuremberg, the universality of international rule of law, was ‘a symbol 
of man’s resistance to its own inhumanity’ (Mattraux 2013, 13). The international 
community’s paradigmatic shift to international tribunals and international law as the 
primacy of international justice, can be read as an attempt to mark international law’s 
‘monopoly on violence’ (Felman 2002, 2). In doing so, international justice was not just 
punishment for violations of international law committed by the Nazis, but acted ‘as a 
marked symbolic exit from the injuries of a traumatic history: as a liberation from 
violence itself’ (Felman 2002, 1).  
Understanding transitional justice as discourse (Zunino 2018), as this thesis does, 
it is worth noting here that Nuremberg being located as the origins of the practice of 
transitional justice and the primary response to the violence of the Second World War is 
a restrictive understanding. As Zunino argues, a discourse of transitional justice locating 
Nuremberg as its origins has acted as a process that includes and excludes, through which 
the transitional justice scholarship emphasis elements of Nuremberg that fit within the 
positive narrative of international criminal justice and marginalise elements which do not 
align or possibly contradict this narrative (Zunino 2018, 151). As Zunino insightfully 
foregrounds, while a few transitional justice scholars have critiqued Nuremberg, such as 
Teitel (2014), they still emphasis Nuremberg as a positive contribution to transitional 
 
11 Zunino argues that as a discourse of the origins of the practice of transitional justice being located at 
Nuremberg was created by the scholarship of transitional justice during its emerging in the 1980’s in 
order to give the scholarship a ‘historical foundation’ (Zunino 2018, 131). In particular, ‘[a]dvocates of 
international criminal justice used the example of Nuremberg to generate support for international courts’ 
(Zunino 2018, 141). Transitional Justice having its ‘historical foundations’ within international criminal 
justice helped justify the primacy of international criminal courts within the transitional justice 
scholarship (Zunino 2018, 140-141). 
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justice’s legal foundations. Thus, ‘for the discourse [of transitional justice], [Nuremberg] 
is primarily a symbol of legalistic transitional justice’ (Zunino 2018, 151), which has 
resulted in transitional justice phenomena that are not strongly legalistic being dismissed. 
For example ‘the fact that the [Tokyo trials] IMTFE was more openly political and less 
legalistic than [Nuremberg] can explain why the Tokyo trial lags far behind in terms of 
being considered the origin of transitional justice’ (Zunino 2018, 151-152). Nuremberg 
as the origins of transitional justice created a dominant narrative that the most suitable 
transitional justice response to violence was international criminal trials. This dominant 
narrative in the transitional justice discourse has marginalised other responses to the 
violence of World War Two being widely discussed, such as the trials conducted by the 
Soviet Union and Germany’s reparation ‘scheme’ (Zunino 2018, 156). Nevertheless, 
Nuremberg continues to be understood as the origins of transitional justice and as the 
‘historical foundations’ of the scholarships legalistic orientation.  
Thus Nuremberg’s significance extends beyond its contribution to a body of 
international law, it constitutes a historically symbolic moment, a universal symbol of 
justice itself (Drumbl 2011, Teitel 2014).12 That being, Nuremberg actualised, through 
the successful prosecution of the ‘main’ perpetrators, a much ‘needed sense of justice and 
comfort to the millions who had suffered from the crimes of the Nazi regime’ (Minow 
1998). As such, the symbolic representation of Nuremberg set a precedent, whereby 
international law serves as the primary and dominant measure, for justice, as well as 
accountability, following periods of mass violence (Drumbl 2011, 24). From Nuremberg 
onwards, the symbolic importance of the tribunal has formed the foundations for how the 
legal approach to transitional justice understands and responds to mass atrocities (Drumbl 
2011, 24-26; Teitel 2003).   
Nuremberg as a seminal moment in international law and the origins of 
transitional justice relates explicitly to another historical rupture in the aftermath of World 
War Two, namely the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Declaration, the 
agreement amongst the 50 signatory nations for a universal standard of rights for all 
human beings,13 is directly attributable to the creation and perceived success of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal (Taylor 1993). The Declaration was signed in Paris on 10th 
December 1948. In signing the declaration:  
 
12 For a critical discussion on Nuremberg as the origins of transitional justice see Zunino (Zunino 2018, 
150-158).  




the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom (Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights 1948, Preamble). 
 
Here, it is worth noting that a chief architect and draftsman of the Declaration on Human 
Rights and a key figure in actualising the Nuremberg Tribunal was French jurist Rene 
Cassin (Winter 2006, 2013).14 Cassin’s work in preparing Nuremberg ‘further deepened 
his commitment to the principle of transnational jurisdiction in cases of gross violations 
of human right’ (Winter 2006, 116). Cassin’s commitment to creating the Declaration and 
protecting human rights for all ‘humanity’ is evident in his own words spoken in Paris in 
December 1948, ‘our declaration is the most vigorous, the most essential of protests of 
humanity against the atrocities and oppression which millions of human beings suffered 
throughout the centuries and more particularly during and between the two last world 
wars’ (Cassin in Winter 2006, 116). Cassin continued, the Declaration is essential ‘in 
order to proclaim that the practical consecration of the essential liberties of all men is 
indispensable to the establishment of a real international peace’ (Cassin in Winter 2006, 
116-117). 
The creation of a universal standard of human rights, and the Genocide 
Convention of 1948, was an acknowledgement by the international community of its 
failure to protect the rights of millions of individuals during the Holocaust (Ehrenfreund 
2007). According to Ehrenfreund (2007) there ‘can be no question that these declarations 
and conventions flowed from the Nuremberg experience’. Indeed, through the London 
Charter establishing the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ a ‘new law was born 
protecting human rights for all’ (Ehrenfreund 2007, 123-125). In the context of the origins 
of transitional justice, the direct lineage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Nuremberg was not just the creation of a legislative document, but also perceived by 
many – survivors, human rights activists – as the begin of a new world order for the 
protection of human rights (Ehrenfreund 2007, 123-125). As such, the commonly held 
optimism in the aftermath of the Second World War assumed ‘Nuremberg and its progeny 
would surely improve the human condition’ (Ehrenfreund 2007, 125). This is what Jay 
 
14 Cassin’s influence in creating Nuremberg Tribunal and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights – 
see Jay Winter 2006. Whilst Cassin was a leading force in the drafting of the declaration, there were a 
number of individuals who contributed to its creation – see Winter 2006, Huyseen 2011, Jackson 1993. 
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Winter (2006, 116) is referring to in stating, that in establishing a new international order 
founded upon the acknowledgement that ‘traditional’ understandings of absolute 
sovereignty needed to be ‘revised in those areas where domestic injustice and 
international order overlapped’. Chief among them was the domain of human rights’ 
(Winter 2010, viii). However, Winter points out that, rather than to improve the ‘human 
condition’, the notion of an international order of human rights is instead best understood 
as a ‘normative statement of a standard against which to measure the behaviour of the 
states in which we live’ (Winter 2010, viii). The Declaration understood as a ‘normative 
statement’ is helpful here, inasmuch as it positions human rights not as a new order 
founded on a notion of protecting ‘human rights for all’. Rather, as a vision emerging at 
terrible time that ‘offered survivors of war a glimpse of a better world’ (Winter 2010). 
Yet, as noted by Winter: ‘we live in an age in which human rights claims provide a 
grammar of transformation, but no assurance whatsoever that transformation will actually 
occur or endure’ (Winter 2010, viii). Nonetheless, a discourse of a new international order 
of human rights dominated the aftermath of the Second World War and beyond. In short, 
the Declaration on Human Rights emerged at a dark moment for humanity, which had 
‘tragedy and failure written all over it’ (Winter 2010, 102). And yet, this ‘dark utopia’, 
born out of the horrors of Nazi occupation was able to transcend it (Winter 2006, 101-
105). 
The Declaration on Human Rights was founded upon a notion that the injustices 
of the Holocaust needed to be addressed, and was also an acknowledgement by the 
international community not to forget but remember the atrocities committed (Winter 
2006). Memory work (remembering) is inseparable from the international institutions 
(Nuremberg) and declarations (Human Rights) created in response to the atrocities of the 
Second World War (Winter 1999, 26-30). Remembering and creating a record of the 
atrocities of the Second World War attempted to encapsulate the drama and suffering 
narrated through the Nuremberg Tribunal (Winter 1999, 6). In that, the suffering of the 
victims of the Nazi crimes needed to be remembered and recorded, and to be told to future 
generations to deter future atrocities and conflict (Huyseen 2011). Whilst the Declaration 
did not include remembering as a right, yet, ‘that right is everywhere in it’ (Winter 2010, 
viii). As Winter points out, the Declaration was a ‘memory document, a set of principles 
framed because of a historical catastrophe which pre-ceded it’ (Winter 2010, vii). The 
Declaration as a ‘memory document’ was intentionally victim-orientated, and specifically 
a moral obligation for the international community to remember the horrors and struggles 
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endured by victims (Winter 2006). This is what Huyseen (2011, 611) is referring to in 
stating the dignity and fate of victims ‘must be preserved in memory, all the more so since 
it was the express aim of the masters of the genocide to obliterate all memory of their 
victims’. Here, it can be suggested that remembering (memory work) and the creation of 
a minimum standard of human rights (Declaration) are twinned (Huyseen 2011, 607). 
They both are occupied with the violations and protection of basic human rights. Both 
remembering and human rights must engage with the past in order to address violations 
and protect rights. Remembering and human rights in pursuing the public recognition of 
past wrongs are also future orientated, as they ‘imagine a better future for the world’ 
(Huyseen 2011, 607). In this sense, the inherent relation of remembering and the Human 
Rights Declaration can be understood as a moral commitment by the international 
community to establish a historical record of Nazi atrocities.  
 The importance of establishing a record of the Nazi atrocities was posited by 
Nuremberg Chief Counsel to the Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson. For Jackson, a central 
function of the Nuremberg Tribunal was to provide humanity with an unassailable record 
that the Nazi atrocities did happen and that its orchestrators had been held accountable. 
As noted by Jackson in his opening address at Nuremberg, ‘if we can cultivate in the 
world the idea that aggressive war-making is the way to the prisoner's dock rather than 
the way to honours, we will have accomplished something toward making the peace more 
secure’ (Jackson 1945, 227). Though, concerned that a record which relied on the 
testimonial accounts of victims-witnesses might be seen by the accused as equivocal, 
Jackson insisted that the record which was to establish the crimes committed by the Nazis 
would primarily consist of documents that had largely come from the Nazis’ own 
archives’ (Mettraux 2013, 9).15 According to Mettraux ‘[t]he most important thing about 
Nuremberg is that it created the record of Nazi aggression and inhumanity, and set 
precedents that changed the world’ (Mettraux 2013, 139). Here an important point of note, 
particularly in relation to the origins of the practice of transitional justice and a criticism 
of Nuremberg. The record established at Nuremberg being based mostly on 
documentation, intentionally so, rather than the testimonials of victims, gave rise to the 
concern that this legal record was absent of the voices of victims. Whereby, a record of 
the crimes committed by the Nazis that lacked the individuality of the voices of its 
victims, was perceived to continue the silencing of victims enacted by the Nazis during 
 
15 For discussions on Robert Jackson as chief counsel to the prosecution see: Raful 2006, Mettraux 2008.  
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the war (Felman 2002). Thus, the ‘witnesses at Nuremberg played a largely supplemental 
role to the evidence supplied by documentary evidence, [however,] the opposite was the 
case’ in the Eichmann trial (Douglas 2001, 105). 
This criticism of Nuremberg lacking the memories of the victims was supported 
by the prosecutor at the Eichmann trial Gideon Hausner.16 For Hausner, whilst 
Nuremberg’s approach of a ‘few witnesses and films of concentration camps horrors, 
interspersed with piles of documents’ was ‘efficient and simple’. It ‘failed to reach the 
hearts of men’ (Hausner in Douglas 2001, 105). Hausner insisted, if the sole purpose of 
the Eichmann trial was a conviction: 
 
it was obvious enough to let the archives speak; a fraction of them would have 
sufficed to get Eichmann sentenced ten times over. … I knew we needed more 
than a conviction; we needed a living record of a gigantic human and national 
disaster (Hausner in Douglas 2001, 104-106). 
 
Therefore, the origins of the practice of transitional justice Nuremberg was indeed a 
seminal moment which established a body of international law to respond to exceptional 
events which set a precedent which reached far beyond the Nuremberg Trials (Drumbl 
2011, 24). However, in the aftermath of the trials at Nuremberg a growing criticism was 
that the tribunal had failed to establish a platform on which victims’ memories of the 
Holocaust could be entered into a historical record. In short, the origins of the practice of 
transitional justice are the ‘exceptional’ and ‘international’ use of law, discussed above, 
in the post-World War II period. It can also be seen to directly encompass memory work. 
In that, memory, the need to remember the failures of societies in order to ensure the 
suffering of the world wars were not repeated, becomes an embedded obligation of the 
international community and a criticism of the Nuremberg Trials not providing victims 
with the opportunity to recall the experiences of the atrocities. 
 
Eichmann: Law and the need for witnesses to remember 
This section, drawing directly on the work of Shoshana Felman (2002), will foreground 
the trial of Otto Adolf Eichmann was a site of the interwoven relation of international law 
and remembrance. It is at the Eichmann trial in 1961 that the inherent nature of law and 
 
16 Otto Adolf Eichmann, who served as a Colonel in the Gestapo (Secret Police) during the Second World 
War, was successfully prosecuted by the Supreme Court in Jerusalem for being directly involved in the 
genocide and was sentenced to death in December 1961. For a critical discussion of the Eichmann trial 
and its influence on universal jurisdiction see O’ Sullivan (2017) 
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memory in transitional justice is evident in practice. The Eichmann trial, unlike 
Nuremberg, facilitated the testimony of dozens of victims of the Nazi violations as part 
of the prosecutor’s evidence. The trial of Eichmann was the deliberate employment of 
both exceptional use of international law and remembrance, which were thus both 
challenged to address the causes and consequences of the historical traumas of the 
Holocaust. This interwoven emergence of law and memory work from the Eichmann trial 
onwards established a precedent; a new paradigm for how the international community 
responded to mass atrocities. In short, the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials mark the 
origins of transitional justice (Zunino 2018), within which emerged the exceptional use 
of law by the international community, and a moral precedent to remember.  
The trial of Otto Adolf Eichmann took place in 1961 at the Supreme Court in 
Jerusalem. Eichmann was successfully prosecuted for directly participating in the 
genocide carried out by the Nazis and was sentenced on the 15th December 1961 to death 
(Arendt 2006). Eichmann, during the Second World War, had served as Lieutenant-
Colonel in the Gestapo (Secret Police) of the Third Reich (Powderly 2013, 34). The 
Gestapo formed part of the Reich Main Security Office, ‘which was primarily concerned 
with the realization of the Final Solution’ (Powderly 2013, 34). The ‘Final Solution’ was 
the term used by the Nazis to refer to their plan to exterminate the Jews (Arendt 2006, 
84). Eichmann specifically had directed (1942-1945) Section IV B(4) which was the 
division responsible for the infrastructure facilitating the transportation of millions of 
Jews to concentration/death camps in Eastern Europe. Though, despite Eichmann 
functioning as an important component within this mechanism of the Nazi operations he 
was deemed by the Nuremberg Tribunal not to have held a significantly senior role to 
merit being prosecuted at Nuremberg (Arendt 2006, 35). However, whilst Eichmann was 
not indicted by Nuremberg, transcripts and the final judgment during the Nuremberg trials 
did make explicit reference to the important role he played in the genocide plans of the 
Nazis (Arendt 2006, 35):   
 
A special section of the Gestapo office of the RSHA under Standartenfuehrer 
Eichmann was set up with responsibility for Jewish matters which employed its own 
agents to investigate the Jewish problem in occupied territory.… A special 
detachment from Gestapo headquarters in the RSHA was used to arrange for the 
deportation of Jews from Axis satellites to Germany for the ‘final solution. 
(Nuremberg Judgment 1946). 
 
Following his arrest Eichmann was charged with 15 counts that were drafted upon 
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‘offences under the law [which] were broadly derived from existing instruments relevant 
to international law’ (Powderly 2013, 35). In contrast to Nuremberg, the trial of Eichmann 
included testimonies of dozens of victims of the Nazi atrocities (Arendt 2006, 223-225). 
Here in relation to the origins of the practice of transitional justice, it will be suggested 
that it is within the trial of Eichmann that the interwoven relationship of the exceptional 
use of international law and remembering (memory work) are evident in practice. As will 
be discussed below, the trial of Eichmann set a precedent whereby the international 
community’s response to mass atrocities was the employment of international law and 
remembering (memory work), which endured into the second half of the twentieth century 
and beyond.  
It is the inclusion of victims of the Nazi atrocities as witnesses during the 
Eichmann trial where international law and by relation international trials establishes for 
the first time a legal space for individual memories of trauma to be publicly externalised 
(Felman 2002). Necessary to foreground here, whilst international law significantly 
influenced the legal process of the Eichmann trial, in particular the universal jurisdiction 
of international law, the trial was however based upon Israeli national law: the Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborator Punishment Law (NNCPL) (1950) (O’Sullivan 2017). As Wieng 
(2007) points out, the decision by the State of Israel to try the crimes committed by the 
Nazis was in part resulting from the Jewish people being the explicit target of the Nazi 
regime. Whilst the trial of Eichmann was entrenched in international law couched in the 
internationally accepted terms of the Genocide Convention, and though applied under 
universally recognized principles of jurisdiction, ‘it is deeply personal and has been 
coloured by the State’s history and pre-history’ (Wieng 2007, 103). Considering the State 
of Israel did not exist during the Holocaust,17 the Israeli law of 1950 provided an 
important linking point for the Jewish people between the crimes committed and the State 
of Israel, specifically in the absence of a territorial connection (Wieng 2007, 103).  
It was the creation of the 1950 NNCPL, which was the legal basis upon which the 
Eichmann trial was founded. The NNCPL, though created by the State of Israel, had direct 
correlations with the Nuremberg Charter, specifically the crime of ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ and the definition of genocide as stated in the 1948 Genocide Convention 
(Wieng 2007, 104).18 The crime of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention 
 
17 The state of Israel was created in 1948.  
18 Article 1 (7) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law states the Crime Against Humanity 
‘means any of the following acts:  murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and 
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significantly informed the creation of ‘crimes against Jewish people’. Article 2 of the 
Convention defines Genocide as ‘any of the following acts [committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group]’ (Article 6 
1948).19 One important distinction from the crime of genocide was its counterpart in 
NNCPL explicitly states Jewish people as the victims, whereas the Genocide Convention 
does not. Notwithstanding the Eichmann trial being constituted within national Israeli 
law, international law at the time was highly influential, as has been the Eichmann trial 
on international law in particular its response to mass atrocities (O’ Sullivan 2017). 
The contribution of the Nuremberg Charter and Genocide Convention to the 
drafting of the NNCPL was perceived at the time, and still is by some scholars, as a 
positive example of the universal jurisdiction of international law.20 According to the 
District Court of Jerusalem the NNCPL definition of crimes represented a violation of 
international, as well as Israeli national law (Inazumi 2005, 64). For Inazumi the universal 
jurisdiction of international law at the Eichmann trial specifically stemmed from absence 
of an international criminal court (Inazumi 2005, 64). Accordingly, universal jurisdiction 
does not restrict states’ authority to try these crimes, rather ‘it requires the organs of each 
State to try suspects because the jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes against international 
law is universal’ (Inazumi 2005, 64). 
The Eichmann trial and the NNCPL (1950), which was founded in principles of 
international law, created a space for internal individual memories to be publicly 
externalised. More specifically, this legal space is where the private sphere interacts and 
becomes inseparable from the public sphere. As Felman points out, within the Eichmann 
trial the ‘stereotypical division between the public and the private requires a rethinking, 
[in] particular, of the relationship between what is presumed to be private trauma and 
 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, 
religious or political grounds’ (Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law 1950). Article 6 (C) 
defines the ‘Crime Against Humanity’ as: ‘namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions 
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan.’ (Nuremberg Charter 1945). 
19 As such :(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
20 O ‘Sullivan has argued that debates on Universal Jurisdiction are centred on a binary with each side of 
the binary reinforcing a dominant narrative of universal jurisdiction leaving little room for alternative 
understandings (2017).  
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what is presumed to be collective, public trauma’ (Felman 2002, 5). Accordingly, the 
employment of NNCPL for the Eichmann trial was the inaugural endeavour by law to 
translate into ‘legal-conscious terminology’ the masses of incoherent private memories 
inflicted during the Holocaust into a coherent collective memory (Felman 2002, 5). In 
short, the Eichmann trial, by project and design, sets out to articulate and establish a 
collective memory of the traumas suffered by the victims of the Holocaust, which up until 
then had largely remained private (Felman 2002, 5-7). 
The legal space created by the trial of Eichmann was the deliberate attempt 
through law (NNCPL) to transform a mass of incoherent private memories into one 
collective memory (Felman 2002, 7). Whereby, giving a public legal stage to render 
previously ‘silenced individual traumas of the survivors’ into the public and legal 
consciousness (Felman 2002, 7). The previously supressed, hidden traumatic memories 
of ‘the bearers of the silence’, through law, were given a space to externalise and uncover 
‘secrets and taboos’ of the Holocaust (Felman 2002, 7). In doing so the trial of Eichmann 
was also a ‘legal process of translation of thousands of private, secret traumas into one 
collective, public and communally acknowledge one’ (Felman 2002, 124). Law 
facilitating the construction of a collective story of the Holocaust created consciously and 
meticulously an ‘unprecedented public and collective legal record’ (Felman 2002, 7). 
This legal record of ‘mass trauma formerly existed only in the repressed form of a series 
of untold, fragmented private stories and traumatic memories’ (Felman 2002, 7).  
According to Felman, memory through the testimony of victims at the Eichmann 
trial is an inaugural narrative event, which is itself ‘historically and legally 
unprecedented’ (Felman 2002, 123).21 For Felman, this narrative event is not the rehearsal 
of pre-existing stories of victims. Rather, the legal space and language of the Eichmann 
trial produces the victim’s story for the first time, and, produces it as a legal act of 
authorship of history (Felman 2002, 126). Helpful here in understanding Felman’s 
argument is her repositioning of Hannah Arendt’s influential understanding of the 
‘banality of evil’ (Arendt 2006), specifically, in the context of foregrounding the 
Eichmann trial as the origins of the interwoven relation of law and memory work. In short, 
Arendt, who wrote substantially on the Eichmann trial, wanted to understand how 
Eichmann could be so banal in carrying out his deplorable acts (Felman 2002). Felman 
suggests, rather than seeing the Eichmann question as a question of psychology, as Arendt 
 
21 Also see Caruth (2017) 
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did, instead the Eichmann question should be understood as legal and political. In that, 
‘[h]ow can the banality of evil be addressed in legal terms and by legal means?’ (Felman 
2002). For Arendt (2006), the Eichmann trial serves as an illustration of law’s inability to 
tell the story of the traumatic memories of the Holocaust. Conversely, and importantly 
here, Felman highlights that the inability of law to tell the story of the Holocaust is ‘not 
external to this story: it is the story’s heart’ (Felman 2002, 159). That being, the Eichmann 
trial foregrounds how the innate impossibility to ‘tell the story’ of the sufferings of the 
Holocaust is itself an ‘integral part of the history and of the story of the Holocaust’ 
(Felman 2002, 159). In other words, the legal process is incapable of telling the horrors 
of the Nazi atrocities, and yet, this is precisely what the law must produce: a historical 
legal account of the Holocaust (Felman 2002, 158-159). The function of the trial, in 
essence, ‘becomes precisely to articulate the impossibility of telling through the legal 
process and to convert this narrative impossibility into legal meaning’ (Felman 2002, 
159). Felman’s argument is insightful, inasmuch as it foregrounds how international law 
(trials) provides the legal space to give a public voice to victims in which law constructs 
the fragmented mass of private memories into a temporal authoritative legal narrative of 
past atrocities. 
Memory work at the Eichmann trial also served another important function: 
memory as change. For Felman, it is law changing the victim’s status to that of 
prosecution witnesses which authenticates their, witnesses’, story as a legitimate 
authorship of history (Felman 2002, 127). ‘Victims, through law constructing their status 
as a “witness”, are empowered by their new role not as victims but as prosecution 
witnesses within the trial’ (Felman 2002, 127). Thus, as Felman astutely argues, it is the 
act of externalising memories, constituted by the status of prosecution witness, which 
transforms the ‘silent’ victim into an active agent within the process of legal redress 
(Felman 2002, 125). Therefore, importantly, ‘victims’ were bestowed with agency within 
the legal space of the Eichmann trial to externalise their memories, which is legitimised 
by their status as prosecution witnesses (see Chapter 4). It is the transformation to the 
legal status of witnesses where ‘[v]ictims were thus for the first time gaining what as 
victims they precisely could not have: authority-historical authority, that is to say, 
semantic authority over themselves and over others’ (Felman 2002, 125). In short, 
memory at the Eichmann trials serves as a symbolic marker. Whereby, those who 
externalise their traumatic memories are no longer the hidden and suppressed ‘bearers of 
silence’, rather active participants in the legal authorship of a traumatic history (Felman 
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2002, 125).          
As has been outlined in the above discussion, the interconnectedness of 
international law and memory are central to the origins of the practice of transitional 
justice. However, as the following sections show, within the scholarship on transitional 
justice there has been a significant lack of critical engagement with memory work, 
particularly within the milieu of international legal institutions. In the context of 
Nuremberg and Eichmann as the origins of the practice transitional justice, there has been 
cautionary dialogue, albeit marginal, on the limitations of international trials to produce 
a collective account of mass atrocities. It was German philosopher Karl Jaspers who 
questioned the way in which the Nuremberg trials were at risk of collectivising German 
guilt (Jaspers 2000). Importantly for Jaspers was the concern of the potential reach of the 
Tribunal to produce indiscriminate condemnations of the German people for the crimes 
committed by the Nazis (Jaspers 2000, 11-19). Moreover, in the context of the Eichmann 
trial Hannah Arendt (2006) warned of the impossibility of the trial to adequately tell the 
story of horrors of the Holocaust. Indeed, Felman (2002) in repositioning Arendt’s 
question on the ‘banality of evil’ insightfully adds to Arendt’s work in arguing the 
impossibility of law to tell the traumas of the victims is a fundamental part of the story of 
the Holocaust.  
 
A Discourse of Transitional Justice Scholarship: From International Justice to Local 
Justice Via International Norms  
 
The dominant framing of the transitional justice literature frames the emergence 
of the field at the end of the Cold War period where countries emerging from authoritarian 
rule and conflict were tasked to address past wrongs, and promote liberal democratic 
principles like the rule of law (Zunino 2018, McAuliffe 2013). Questions about individual 
and societal healing, forgiveness and reconciliation were added to transitional justice 
debates that had until then largely centred on legal priorities of accountability through 
criminal trials and addressing impunity. A ‘tool kit’ approach to transitional justice 
developed, advocating a mix of legal and non-legal mechanisms (truth commissions, 
customary justice, memorialisation and commemoration, traditional healing rituals) with 
particular emphasis on understanding the needs and priorities of the societies effected by 
conflict/authoritarian rule (Murphey 2018, 576; Zunino 2018, 27). This can be seen in 
Shaw and Waldorf arguing for transitional justice to re-orientate the ‘local’; the local 
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becomes the ‘shifted center from which the rest of the world is viewed’ (Shaw and 
Waldorf 2010, 6). In turn, the ‘local’ moves from the margins to front and centre of 
approaches to transitional justice (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). According to Shaw and 
Waldorf, transitional justice is frequently marked by ‘disconnections between 
international legal norms and local priorities and practices’ (Shaw and Waldorf 2010, 3). 
Shifting the ‘local’ to the centre, for Shaw and Waldorf, provides transitional justice with 
a more informed approach to the specific needs of affected societies, through ‘adapting 
customary law processes and by involving local NGO’s and local elites’ (Shaw and 
Waldorf 2010, 5). 22 Thus, by understanding the priorities of individual societies during 
transitional periods it increases the likelihood of transitional justice mechanisms being 
effective (Shaw and Waldorf 2010, 3-18). 23 
Following a similar line of thought to Shaw and Waldorf, McEvoy highlights that 
international law is a powerful ‘practical and symbolic break with the past’ that attempts 
to facilitate legitimacy and accountability during transition (McEvoy 2007, 417). Though, 
importantly, McEvoy stresses the way in which ‘law as a dominant symbol for successful 
transition 'thins out' the complexities of life in conflicted societies’ (McEvoy 2007, 417-
418). That being said, law’s predominance sets normative objective priorities that 
underpin processes of tribunals, national courts, and local justice mechanisms. Thus, 
McEvoy argues that transitional justice risks decoupling itself from the complexities and 
needs of a given society in which it attempts to engage (McEvoy 2007, 417-418). Thus, 
emphasising the need for transitional justice to better understand what ‘justice’ means to 
individuals and communities who have been directly affected by mass atrocity.  
McEvoy, Shaw, and Waldorf have highlighted the importance in considering how 
‘local’ and non-legal processes can help societies confront past violations. However, a 
discourse of transitional justice continues to be orientated towards the ‘international’ (K 
Clarke 2009, Zunino 2018). In that, the transitional justice scholarship is both explicitly 
interconnected with international politics (Bell 2009; Simpson 2007) and often orientates 
towards international legal mechanisms and international human rights law as the 
primacy of transitional justice (Dixon and Tenove 2013, Turner 2016).24  
 
22 See Sage and Woolcock, in Tamanaha 2013, 3-21; Nagy 2008. For a discussion on legal Pluralism: also 
see Merry 1988. 
23 For discussion on evaluating transitional justice: see Ainley 2015. 
24 International politics influencing transitional justice being orientated towards the ‘international’ can be 
understood, in part, by a rupture in international politics, namely the September 11 th terrorist attacks in 
New York in 2001 (Hazan 2010; Keen 2006). According to Hazan, the terrorist attacks in New York were 
a break in transitional justice mechanisms, whereby the so-called ‘war on terror’ (WoT) used locally 
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The scholarship’s understanding of the ‘local’ is shaped by the ‘international’ in 
a particularly important way, namely international legal norms. In short, legal norms are 
a set of ‘western’ legal values that espouse the existence of a standardised framework of 
criminal law which functions as a universal paradigm for the international community 
(Teitel 2014, 56). That being, a standardised framework has the capability to be 
universally applied to a given transitioning society as a means to measure the 
success/failure of a ‘local’ transitional justice mechanism. It is often assumed by legally 
orientated scholars that the employment of legal norms is a crucial component for 
societies affected by mass human rights violations in transitioning to ‘democracy’. Legal 
norms ‘uphold the rule of law’ which is essential in building democracy where the rule 
of law has previously been used for illegal ends by the ousted regime (Teitel 2014, 96; 
Stover and Weinstein 2004). Yet, it can be suggested there is an important contradiction 
within the legal transitional justice scholarship in the context of the ‘local’. Scholars who 
advocate transitional justice to focus on the context specific – ‘local’ – needs of a 
transitioning society – Shaw and Waldorf – measure the success of a given ‘local’ 
mechanism through the lens of international legal norms.  
To illustrate, the contradiction between advocacy for the ‘local’ and international 
legal norms is evident in the work of Waldorf on the Rwandan gacaca courts (Waldorf 
2009, 2011). Waldorf, as discussed earlier, argues for transitional justice to move away 
from international norms and position the ‘local’ at the centre of approaches to transitional 
justice (Waldorf 2010, 3). However Waldorf, in reaching his conclusion that gacaca is a 
‘failed’ legal mechanism, assesses the gacaca process in the context of whether it has 
complied with international legal norms (Waldorf 2010). 25 For Waldorf: 
 
[f]rom the beginning, it was clear that gacaca would depart radically from 
international norms for fair trials, most notably the right against self-incrimination 
and the right to defence counsel. Gacaca courts were not excused from those 
standards by virtue of their supposedly ‘traditional’ nature. (Waldorf 2010, 195). 
 
In contrast to Waldorf’s assessment of gacaca is Clark. Clark contends that orthodox legal 
interpretations of gacaca as a failed institution, such as Waldorf’s, do not fully engage 
with gacaca’s legal status: 
 
orientated approaches to transitional justice, specifically, when it fitted the strategic goals in countering 
the WoT. See Keen 2006; Hazan 2010. 
25 For alternative arguments on gacaca: see Clark 2010, 2014; Doughty 2015; Karbo and Mutisi 2008; 




The Gacaca Law states that gacaca has been established to ‘achieve justice and 
reconciliation in Rwanda’ and is designed ‘not only with the aim of providing 
punishment, but also reconstituting the Rwandan Society that had been destroyed 
by bad leaders’. The Gacaca Law thus enshrines reconciliation and restorative 
justice as key objectives of gacaca (Clark 2010, 348-349). 
 
Aligning with the vein of Clark’s argument, Allen and Macdonald highlight international 
legal norms during periods of transition, ‘even when the focus is on local realities, [are] 
imbued with normative agendas about what law and justice should look like’ (Allen and 
Macdonald 2015, 280). Here, insightfully, Allen and Macdonald argue, it is specifically 
because of normative agendas on how law ‘should be’ during periods of transition that 
‘highlights a disconnect between international legal norms… and locally legitimate 
processes of justice, [and] accountability’ (Allen and Macdonald 2015, 285). Thus, 
transitional justice advocacy for the ‘local’, such as Waldorf’s, often assesses the success 
of a ‘local’ mechanism through the lens of international legal norms. As such, it is these 
normative legal agendas that shape the practices and discourse during periods of political 
transition (B Jones 2015, 293).  
In the context of the contemporary scholarship on transitional justice human rights 
advocacy is the unequivocal belief in the necessity for ‘international judicial responses to 
human rights violations’ (Clark 2012, 7).26 Indeed, unequivocal support for judicial 
responses to mass human rights violations is reflected in the claim of Sikkink, that 
‘transitional countries in which human rights prosecutions have taken place are less 
repressive than countries without prosecutions’ (Sikkink 2011, 26). Thus, as Turner’s 
critical appraisal of transitional justice highlights, ‘the promotion of the rule of law 
through international human rights norms underpins the entire discourse of transitional 
justice’ (Turner 2013, 199). Here, turning to the literature on critical human rights helps 
to identify the core assumptions, such as those of Sikkink, which are central to human 
rights advocacy within the legal transitional justice scholarship.  
Kennedy, in his critical assessment of human rights, notes that human rights 
advocacy has grown into a system of engrained norms, which support the endeavours of 
the international human rights movement (Kennedy in Dickinson and Murray 2012). 
 
26 International human rights law as a dominant discourse within the transitional justice legal scholarship 
is explicitly related to the international human rights movement (IHRM), which emerged during the Cold 
War period (Moyn 2018; Zunino 2018). As Neier points out, rather than one seismic event as the origins 
of IHRM, instead, many events ‘led to the emergence of the human rights movement’ principally because 
of their correlation to the politics of the Cold War (Neier 2012, 4). 
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Related to Kennedy’s point on human rights as a system of engrained norms, Ignatieff 
argues that for human rights advocates the functioning of ‘human rights are to define a 
higher realm of shared moral values that will assist contending parties to find common 
ground’ (Ignatieff 2003, 21). Ignatieff’s argument highlights that when a human rights 
claim is made, it is understood by human rights advocates to be non-negotiable: 
‘[c]ompromise is not facilitated by the use of rights claim language’ (Ignatieff 2003, 20). 
Human rights are a binary value, either supported by those who value humanity or 
opposed by those who do not (Mutua, 2001). Accordingly, when a human rights claim is 
‘introduced into a political discussion’ it acts to conclude the discussion, specifically in 
favour of whom ever has made the rights claim (Ignatieff 2003, 20). As summarised by 
Ignatieff, ‘Human rights has become [a] major article of faith… It is has become the 
lingua franca of global moral thought’ (Ignatieff 2003, 53). The importance of 
highlighting human rights claims as being perceived by advocates as being of the highest 
moral value is that many scholars of transitional justice are also human rights advocates. 
Crucially, transitional justice legal scholarship straddles awkwardly between ‘analysis 
and advocacy as many academics and practitioners engage in both processes’ (Clark 
2012, 7). This bestriding of analysis and advocacy has often led to ‘faith based’ rather 
than ‘fact-based prescriptions’ (Clark 2012, 7).   
The reverence of human rights advocacy has influenced the perceived importance 
of international human rights law in the transitional justice scholarship (McEvoy 2007). 
International human rights law acts as a universal standard which can ‘provide guidance 
on the necessary course of action’, which is external to the parties involved in transition 
(Turner 2013, 200). Importantly, it is the framing of international human rights law, by 
legal scholars and human rights advocates, as being capable of transcending political and 
social conditions that provides its legitimacy as ‘neutral’ (Turner 2013, 201). That being, 
for advocates of human rights the domestic rule of law, before and after mass human 
rights violations, succumbs to political conditions whereby those in power use the rule of 
law for their own political ends. It is the conception of international human rights law as 
not being constrained by political conditions which is key to legal approaches in the 
transitional justice scholarship (M. Clarke 2009). The perception of international human 
rights law as ‘neutral’ is succinctly captured by Clarke: 
 
[The] growth of international law movements, have tended to argue that human 
rights and rule of law activism are paramount because their calling is derived from 
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a transcendent truth, that they carry with them an ultimate set of principles for 
humanity, or that the justice they derive from international adjudication is founded 
on fairness and judicial diversity (M. Clarke 2009, 8). 27 
 
Accordingly, by transcending domestic law and its inherent entanglement with politics, 
international human rights law is regarded ‘as a key source of democratic legitimacy’ 
(Turner 2013, 201). In other words, legal approaches to transition have sought to re-
orientate the root of ‘legal legitimacy from the domestic order to the international’ (Turner 
2013, 200). However, the peculiarity of transitional legal approaches – human rights law 
– particularly its perceived capability to surpass political and social conditions is best 
understood as a figment. As Turner insightfully argues, ‘[f]ar from existing independently 
from history, politics and morality, transitional justice bears within it traces of all of these 
influences’ (Turner 2013, 203). Nonetheless, international human rights law continues to 
be positioned by legal approaches to transitional justice as external to political and social 
conditions, thus constituting itself as universally mandatory for successful transition to 
democracy (Turner 2016; Zunino 2018).  The understanding of international human rights 
as providing transitional justice with a ‘neutral’, and standardised law is the ‘application 
of human rights law to respond to past human rights abuses’ (Turner 2013, 204). In other 
words, within the legal transitional justice scholarship it is the perception that the only 
way to respond to mass atrocities is human rights law, which is universally applicable to 
all situation where human rights have been violated (Turner 2016, 198-204). Thus, during 
periods of transition law and the employment of international human rights law is 
understood as the means, possibly the only means, for achieving justice (Turner 2013, 
199). In one sense, transitional justice scholarship aiming to ‘address past failings of law 
by replacing it with law’, is situated on a paradox (Turner 2016, 199) whereby it is the 
assumed primacy of international human rights law, and its universality, to have the 
capacity to make sense and respond to mass violations of international human rights law 
(Turner 2016, 199). Crudely put, during periods of transition international human rights 
law perceives itself as the unequivocal remedy to its own demise.  
 Important here is the argument of McEvoy, who succinctly summaries the 
perceived authority human rights norms have during transition: 
 
contemporary transitional justice discourses would suggest that human rights talk 
lends itself to a 'Western-centric' and top-down focus; it self-presents (at least) as 
 
27 Also see: Ignatieff 2003. 
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apolitical; it includes a capacity to disconnect from the real political and social 
world of transition through a process of ‘magical’ legalism. (McEvoy 2007, 421) 
 
One important effect of this is human rights defines how transitional justice makes sense 
and legitimises processes which engage with addressing mass atrocities. More 
specifically, it is international legal and human rights norms by which transitional justice 
mechanisms are evaluated and gain their legitimacy (O’ Sullivan 2017, 125). As Turner 
points out, the effectiveness in which all transitional justice initiatives deliver ‘justice is 
defined in international law and action in transitional contexts came to be legitimated by 
the label of transitional justice’ (Turner 2013, 198). Thus, legal and human rights norms 
set the paradigm for what constitutes successful transitional mechanisms. Crucially, this 
paradigm concurrently acts to include and exclude legitimate knowledge of transitional 
periods, whereby, legal and human rights norms are the means, indeed the only means, to 
understand periods of transition. This is what Turner is referring to in stating, ‘[w]here 
one concept or one way of seeing the world is placed at the centre of meaning and 
prioritised over all other ways of thinking, the effect is to marginalise or exclude all other 
ways of interpreting meaning’ (Turner 2013, 198). As such, transitional justice, defined 
by legal and human rights norms, homogenises the way in which periods of transition are 
comprehended. This homogenising perceives that there is one, indisputable, 
understanding of justice through which past atrocities can be understood and addressed. 
Thus, this singular understanding of justice acts to carve a paradigm of legitimacy for 
transitional justice mechanisms, which importantly, comes at the cost of withdrawing 
heterogeneous meaning during periods of transition. This is reflected in Turner arguing, 
it is ‘[p]recisely because of the inevitable disagreement over the meaning of justice in 
transitional societies, law steps in to replace politics as the basis for authoritative 
decisions’ (Turner 2013, 205). As a result of law colonising what constitutes legitimate 
meaning, alternative understandings of justice are marginalised from the debate (Turner 
2013, 199-201). For example, the Rwandan gacaca courts, discussed earlier, have been 
labelled as a ‘failed’ process by much of the legal scholarship, precisely for not falling 
within the legal paradigm of legitimate approaches, even though many Rwandans 
interpret gacaca in different ways (Thorne and Viebach 2019).28 Moreover, the recently 
 
28 See Clark (2010). Thorne and Viebach have argued that reports on gacaca produced by human rights 
organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), constructed knowledge of gacaca as a failure 




proposed peace agreement for the Colombian civil war – spring 2016 – between FARC29 
and the Colombian government was harangued by Human Rights Watch for the inclusion 
of amnesty over universal judicial accountability as part of the transitional process.30 
Thus, the transitional justice scholarship in dealing with the past and as a legitimating 
source for a democratic domestic future is founded upon the ‘assumption of the capacity 
of law to mediate social change’ (Turner 2013, 198-199; Bell 2009, 15-16). 
 
International Criminal Tribunals and Courts: Witnesses and Testimonial Evidence  
This section discusses the role of witnesses and rules of procedure of testimonial 
evidence in international criminal trials in general – ICTY, Extraordinary Chambers for 
the Courts in Cambodia (ECCC), and ICC – and at the ICTR in particular. The section 
begins by summarising current debates within the literature on transitional justice and 
international trials, which primarily have focused on the role of witnesses in relation to 
procedural legitimacy: whether the use and role of witness(es) during trials works within 
the rules of procedure and evidence as detailed in the statute(s). To illustrate, a discussion 
will be had on witness proofing and testimonial evidence given in court, which are central 
debates within the transitional justice scholarship on legal processes of witnessing 
(Combs 2010; Jordash 2010). Furthermore, a recurrent human rights framing of witnesses 
in international tribunals and courts will also be highlighted. To be sure, the purpose of 
summarising these debates on witnessing is not as a means to provide an alternative 
offering for judicial reform. Rather, highlighting these debates is used here specifically 
to show that dominant discussions within the scholarship on witnessing are saturated 
within the efficiency of legal procedures. Crucially, in doing so foregrounds a lack of 
understanding of how discursive conditions are central to understanding what witnesses 
are and can do, which is the aim of Chapters 4-7. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that 
the ICTR statute does not provide any legal definition of ‘witness(es)’. The section will 
go on to propose a need to depart from an instrumental understanding of witnessing: the 
witness conceived as a pre-existing self-evident subject, through which previously 
 
29 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are the largest rebel group in the country. 
30 Legal approaches to the scholarship positioning legal processes as unequivocal is mirrored by the 
United Nations:  
 [t]here is a need to ensure that reconciliation is not the ideological mantel of injustice, the 
cement used to cover the cracks that have developed within society. Considering that the law, 
rights and justice are closely connected, reconciliation cannot be achieved by deliberately 




‘hidden’ or ‘suppressed’ memories can to a greater or lesser extent be recovered. 
Accordingly, arguing for the need to understand witnessing as non-instrumental: a 
contingent and multi-layered discursive process.  
 One frequent debate on witnessing within the legal scholarship on transitional 
justice is commonly framed within discussion on the legitimacy of judicial procedures, 
centring around the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). More specifically, the RPE 
provide legal counsel and judge’s chambers with regulations on the use of witness 
evidence in the lead up to (pre-trial), during trials, and the appeal process at international 
criminal tribunals/courts. The origins of RPE in contemporary tribunals and courts – 
ICTR, ICTY, ECCC, ICC,31 can be traced back to the Nuremberg Tribunal, albeit at 
Nuremberg there was not an official RPE.32 As May and Wierda note, the ICTR adopted 
a broadly similar approach to procedure and evidence to Nuremberg, though the RPE at 
the ICTR was legislated within the statute (May and Wierda 1999). That being the 
Nuremberg statute stated that the court is not bound ‘by technical rules of evidence. It 
shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical 
procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value’ 
(Nuremberg statute in Cassese 2013, 380). According to Cassese it was the Nuremberg 
statute’s advocacy for not being insurmountably bound by ‘technical rules’ which, in part, 
informed the drafting of the ICTR RPE,33 which was adopted somewhat uncritically 
(Cassese 2013). In other words, unlike Nuremberg, the RPE for witnesses in 
contemporary tribunals are legally legislated within the statute(s). 
 Statutes and RPE provide the context for much of the legal scholarship debates on 
witnessing at international tribunals, with sustained discussions particularly on witness 
proofing.34 This is relevant to understanding the transitional justice scholarship on 
 
31 For discussion on the use of civil and common law in international tribunals and courts see Carter and 
Pocar 2013, Doria, Gasser, Cherif 2009. Also see: Langbein 2012. 
32 Cassese points to a number of contributing factors to why the Nuremberg Tribunal did not implement 
RPE as part of its statute. These included the void of international human rights norms protecting the right 
to cross-examination, a mandate of the Nuremberg statute stating the need for expeditious proceedings, 
and the adoption of ‘civil law’ use of judges instead of a jury, meaning there was not a need to shield a 
jury from irrelevant/unreliable evidence (Cassese 2009, 314). The favouring of judges (‘civil law’) over a 
sitting jury, as noted by May and Wierda had a positive impact for the Nuremberg tribunal, whereby 
discarding the concern of protecting a jury from hearing prejudicial evidence ‘presented a liberal 
approach akin to that of the civil law systems. The result was an expeditious trial of the accused – 
required by the Charter – which was completed in ten months and in which issues such as the 
admissibility of evidence did not take up much time’ (May and Wierda 1999, 729-730). 
33 See May and Wielda (1999) for discussion on Law of Evidence at international tribunals and courts. 
34 For a general discussion on the influence of national legal systems – common and civil – on witness 
proofing/familiarisation see: Hannah Garry (2013, 66-99) in Carter and Pocar (2013). 
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witnessing particularly as it relates to notions of truth seeking and legitimacy. According 
to Garry, in a general sense witness proofing or familiarisation (also known as witness 
preparation) is the preparation by parties to a case to prepare witnesses for giving 
testimony during a trial (Garry in Carter and Pocar 2013, 66-67). Though, Garry is keen 
to note that witness proofing has been one of the ‘more polarising procedural issues 
litigated before international criminal tribunals’ (Garry in Carter and Pocar 2013, 66). 
The contention that witness proofing has been polarising is partly explained by the fact 
none of the ad hoc tribunals nor the permanent International Criminal Court clearly define 
the term witness proofing or familiarisation. As Jordash argues, neither the statutes nor 
rules of procedure and evidence of these tribunals and courts define the term.35 At the 
ICTR, the definition of the term is usually determined on a case by case basis (Jordash 
2009). Here a noteworthy point: during the first decade of the ad hoc tribunals witness 
proofing was not perceived as a major issue of contention. It was specifically during the 
Fatmir Limaj36 case (IT-03-66) at the ICTY (2004) that the defence counsel raised issue 
with the use of witness proofing in relation to breaches of fair trial rights (Garry in Carter 
and Pocar 2013, 67). It is with this backdrop that transitional justice scholarship debates 
on the role and legitimacy of witnessing are commonly positioned. 
 For example, Jordash, who understands international tribunals as having an 
important role in contributing to ‘truth- telling’, raises specific concern with the re-
articulation of witness statements by legal counsels during witness proofing, which ‘at 
the ad hoc tribunal has for too long been allowed to undermine the truth-finding process’ 
(Jordash 2009, 503). For Jordash there is a clear distinction between providing witnesses 
with adequate information and misuse of proofing. The former allows for the witness to 
be informed of the process of giving evidence whereas the latter is when witnesses are 
informed of the exact question they will be asked and in what order (Jordash 2009). 
Jordash argues that through witness proofing legal practitioners are in a difficult position, 
trying to serve the interests of their client whilst maintaining a duty to ‘present only that 
which is believed to be the truth’ (Jordash 2009, 512). This leads Jordash to state that in-
spite of the ICTR stating they have prohibited, rehearsed or coached witness testimonies, 
they have in fact either sanctioned or ‘turned a blind eye to – activities which are 
 
35 While the ECCC can be encompassed within generalisation on ad hoc tribunals, the ECCC adopted 
national Cambodian law which does not provide provisions for witness proofing. 
36 Lamja was judged by the trial chamber in November 2005 to be Not Guilty. The case went to appeal, in 
September 2007 the appeals chamber found him Not Guilty. 
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indistinguishable in practice’ (Jordash 2009, 513). Thus, Jordash’s argument points 
towards the important role trials have in establishing the truth. The potential risk is not 
with the pre-trial interaction between witness and lawyers per se. Rather the issue is 
specifically with the judicial process of proofing lacking universal clarity by the ICTR 
and other ad hoc tribunals that gives rise to claims of manipulation of evidence and 
impedes the potential for uncovering the truth (Jordash 2009, 503-519).  
 Relating to Jordash’s concern of witness proofing and ‘truth recovery’, Shoen 
(2010), Karemaker (2008), and Sliedregt (2008) question the ICC’s use of witness 
familiarisation. Interestingly not defined in the Rome Statute, witness familiarisation was 
introduced as a legitimate procedural practice in the first case at the ICC (Thomas 
Lumbuga), whilst the trial chamber rejected the use of ‘witness proofing’ (Shoen 2010).37 
For Karemaker, the procedural measures for witness proofing employed and developed 
by the ad hoc tribunals have overall had a positive impact. International Criminal law’s 
contribution to ‘truth recovery’ at the ICC is more likely to be enhanced by the 
continuation of witness proofing rather than by a wholesale rejection of it (Karemaker 
2008, 695-697). Contradicting Karemaker, Ambos argues that the continuations of the 
provision for witness proofing at the ICC is incompatible with the legal procedures of the 
court. Ambos positions his argument specifically within the ICC’s adoption of mixed 
adversarial-inquisitorial procedures,38 which is converse to the ad hoc tribunals which 
primarily employed adversarial procedures (Ambos 2008, 915-916). Thus for Ambos, the 
procedural model of the ICC is incompatible with the ad hoc tribunals’ witness proofing 
adversarial orientation. Consequently Ambos argues, that at the ICC proofing is ‘neither 
legally admissible nor a necessary and useful practice’ (Ambos 2008, 916).39 Here, 
importantly, these debates on the legitimacy of witness evidence and its contribution to 
the ‘truth recovery’ process encapsulate a recurring dialogue in the transitional justice 
scholarship on witnessing. Whereby, what it is witnesses are is self-evident and a 
fundamental feature of international tribunals and courts’ contribution to the ‘truth 
finding’ process: the catharsis of witnesses giving testimony of a violent past. As such, 
framed in the context of procedural legitimacy and legal systems, these dialogues focus 
 
37 See pre-trial chamber hearing for the Lumbuga case (ICC-01/04-01/06-679) (ICC 2006). 
38 For discussion on adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems in international tribunals and courts see: 
Amobs 2003. 
39 Ambos (2008) and Jordash (2009) state that the ICC’s use of ‘witness familiarisation’, administered by 
the court’s Victim and Witness Protection Unit (VWU), provides witnesses with appropriate means of 
preparation for giving testimonial evidence. 
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on the way witnessing should function in international tribunals and courts. It is the 
scholarship’s concentration within normative debates on what the ‘correct’ way 
witnessing should be that has contributed to the transitional justice legal scholarship 
neglecting to question the normalisation of witnessing.  
 Following a similar normative approach to witnessing, Combs questions the 
extent to which testimonial evidence of witnesses can contribute towards reliable 
judgments at international tribunals (Combs 2010, 2015). According to Combs, despite 
ad hoc tribunals’ common perception that testimonial evidence given in trials will 
contribute to fact-finding and informed judgments, witness testimonial evidence is often 
confusing, contradictory, or unreliable and thus ill-equipped to provide information which 
judges can understand and critically evaluate (Combs 2015, 21). As Combs argues:   
 
International criminal trials employ Western-style criminal procedures that 
presuppose a smooth flow of questions and answers between counsel and 
witnesses… International witnesses frequently are unable or unwilling to relate 
whole categories of information that are crucial to accurate fact-finding (Combs 
2010, 22).40 
 
While Combs does acknowledge that other procedures and functioning’s of ad hoc 
tribunals does impact on judgments, however a considerable part of Combs’s argument 
focuses specifically on witness reliability. Combs attributes substantive weight to the 
failings of witnesses whom ‘claim not to understand counsel’s questions’, in addition 
some ‘respond evasively or otherwise unresponsively’ (Combs 2015, 22). In the context 
of the ICTR, Combs purports that witnesses were often inconsistent with their stories or 
at times deliberately testified to information which was untrue (Combs 2010). The 
reliability of witnesses is something international and domestic courts are aware of and 
need to manage. Yet, Combs’s framing of witnessing, including the ICTR, can be 
 
40 Within the witness box, techniques deployed by legal counsels during ‘witnesses examination are 
divorced from discourse in ordinary life which revolves around “turn-taking”’ (Uglow 1997, 325). The 
term turn-taking refers to the order and a sequence of questions and answers during witnesses’ testimony. 
The way an individual would testify in a social context is very different from the way testimony is 
delivered in court (Uglow 1997, 327). In a social context giving an account of something for example, ‘to 
a doctor the individual has the opportunity to tell their story in full’ (Uglow 1997, 327) in their own time 
and without interruption. Usually it is legal counsels who prepare questions in advance that are put to the 
witness. Accordingly, witnesses produce accounts that are in the ‘sequential position of post-question, 
and should therefore be answers; this means that persons who are being examined may not exercise the 
option of selecting by, for instance, themselves asking the other party (i.e the examiner) a question’ 
(Atkinson 325-326). The rigid sequences of turn-taking for some witnesses can come as a surprise as they 
assumed being called to give evidence would be their opportunity to tell in full what they have 
experienced (Schabas 2006).  
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understood as diagnosing witnesses themselves as a key symptom of the weakness of 
judgments at ad hoc tribunals. Importantly, Combs’s claims that the unreliability and 
dishonesty of witnesses was a core issue at the ICTR and other tribunals appears largely 
unsubstantiated. Combs focuses exclusively on ‘culture’, how Rwandan culture shapes 
how witnesses engage with the ICTR. Combs fails to acknowledge the important role the 
legal culture and practices of the ICTR had in shaping what the testimonies of witnesses 
(Eltringham 2019, 137).41  The limitation of witnesses’ ability to contribute to the truth 
recovery process stated by Combs lacks consideration of how the discursive conditions 
within a discourse of witnessing produce the subject of ‘witness(es)’ and produce 
‘legitimate’ knowledge about the past.  
 A recurrent understanding of witnessing at international tribunals and courts is 
provided from a human rights perspective. Sikkink (2011), Groome (2011), and Klinkner 
and Smith (2015) frame witnessing within a wider human rights project. Central to this 
perspective is an assumed normative process of advocacy for universal human rights 
within international criminal trials (Dixon and Tenove 2013, 3-4; Klinkner and Smith 
2015). This places a strong emphasis on human rights violations not being forgotten but 
remembered, and victims having the ‘right to [tell] the truth’ of their experience (Klinkner 
and Smith 2015, 11-12). With its objectives informed by ‘human rights discourse’, this 
perspective perceives victims being given a voice to remember the violations they 
suffered as a human right in itself (Klinkner 2015, 11). As Klinkner and Smith (2015) 
argues, the ‘right to truth’ is becoming a prominent and important component of legal 
approaches to transitional justice. Proponents of the right to truth, such as Klinkner, 
advocate the institutionalisation of this right ‘as a legal obligation, which in turn is 
enforceable through the procedures of appropriate courts’ (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 4). 
The right to truth entails the right to seek and obtain information ‘relating to the reasons 
and causes which lead to the victimisation of the individual(s) concerned, together with 
 
41 The evidence provided through witness testimonials is weighed by trial judges in determining what the 
truth is (Jones 2009). The judgments made at international criminal tribunals including the ICTR differ 
from many municipal courts (Combs 2012). Judgments made in municipal courts are usually made by a 
panel of jurors whereas in tribunals a panel of judges are tasked with determining ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ what the truth is (Schabas 2006). According to the ICTR statute rule 87 on deliberation ‘A finding 
of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved 
beyond reasonable doubt’ (ICTR 1995, 36). In his assessment of ICTR judicial processes Schabas states 
the legal mechanism of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ means: 
a doubt that is founded in reason. It does not mean “any doubt”, “beyond a shadow of a doubt”, 
“absolute certainty” or “moral certainty”. Nor, at the other end of the scale, does it imply “an 




the prevailing conditions, circumstances and reasons which led to or otherwise facilitated 
the gross violation of human rights more generally’ (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 4). 
Important to note here, the right to truth encompasses individual as well as collective 
components.42 In principle, the ‘right to truth’ allows individuals to know why and how 
they or their loved ones were abused, whilst on a collective level, through testimonial 
evidence of victims, communities can understand the political and social conditions 
which led to the violations occurring. Individual and collective components of the right 
to truth are increasingly being advocated by human rights scholars as an important 
contributor to ‘truth-telling’ (Groome 2011; Klinkner and Smith 2015). In particular, the 
right to truth does not only include the right to hear the truth but also the right to impart 
the truth, which is often framed by advocates of the right within the judicial process of 
witness testimony (Klinkner and Smith 2015). The purported capacity of the ‘right to 
truth’ to contribute to the ‘truth telling’ is reflected in Klinkner stating: 
 
the inclusion of truth-telling within the ambit of the right would not only place 
survivors in a more proactive role in the achievement of a broad, societal truth, 
but would also provide society, which may have diminished trust in the ability of 
the State to provide accurate and reliable information about human rights abuses, 
with an alternative source of information. (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 11-12) 
 
For proponents of the right to truth such as Klinkner and Smith the ICC offers the 
potential to further establish the right as a key judicial response to mass violations. In 
particular, it is the ICC’s victim centric approach which for advocates (Groome 2011, 
Klinkner and Smith 2015) of the right represents an important function for promoting 
‘truth telling’ in legal proceedings (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 12). In other words, those 
who purport the beneficial relation of legal approaches to ‘truth telling’ and the right to 
truth argue it aids individuals and ‘satisfies society’s interest in the truth about gross 
violations of human rights’ (Groome 2011, 198). 
 However, this human rights discourse on witness memories fails to comprehend 
the discursive and contingent nature of memory. This is because there exists a 
fundamental principle within normative human rights discourse (Clark 2012) that 
 
42 UN resolution 9/11 ‘right to the truth’ states the need through judicial trials for the ‘right of the victims 
of gross violations of human rights and the right of their relatives to the truth about the events that have 
taken place, including the identification of the perpetrators of the facts that gave rise to such violations’ 
(UN Resolution 2012). 
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individual victims of rights abuses have a universal right to agency in legal proceedings 
(Klinkner and Smith 2015, 11-12). 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Defining Legal Witnesses 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created (UN Resolution 
955) following the request led by the Rwandan government (Rwandan Patriotic Front) 
and a United Nations investigation that concluded the violence in Rwanda between April 
and July 1994 was genocide. The preamble in the ICTR statute states the establishment 
of the tribunal will bring a new era to international criminal justice and individual 
accountability for violations of international law including genocide (ICTR Statute 2007). 
The United Nations Resolution (955) states the court is established to try perpetrators of 
crimes of genocide and human rights violations that occurred between 1 January 1994 
and December 31, 1994 (ICTR Statute 2007, Article 1). The statute also states that the 
tribunal will contribute to reconciliation and peace in Rwanda: 
 
[c]onvinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would 
enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace. 
(ICTR Statute 2010, 2) 
 
At the ICTR’s core are investigations carried out by prosecution and defence counsels 
where tens of thousands of witness statements from individuals who had survived the 
violence were gathered (ICTR 2014). The tribunal comprises three organs: the chambers, 
the prosecutor and the registry.43 The ICTR RPE are an established set of processes that 
define the conditions for the use of testimonial evidence, enforced by the ICTR Statute. 
The Statute’s authority is enshrined by constitutional agreement amongst United Nations 
member states on international law (Statute of International Law Commission Article 1 
 
43 Trial judges that preside over Chambers are elected by a nomination process (ICTR 2007). Judges serve 
out a period of four years at which point they can be nominated to serve a second term (Schabas 2006). 
For a discussion of a need for changes in the process of judge selection at the International Criminal 
Court see Al- Khudayri and De Vos (2019) - https://www.justiceinitiative.org/voices/excellence-not-
politics-should-choose-the-judges-at-the-icc. The registry organ is responsible for administration and 
servicing of the ICTR (Article 16 2010). This includes managing the tribunals’ finances, managing 
external communications and managing victims and witnesses (Jones 2009, 116). The registry is also 
responsible for engaging the workings of the tribunal with Rwandan society. Such activities included the 
setting up of an information centre in the Rwandan capital Kigali to inform citizens of the activities of the 
ICTR (Jones 2009, 117). 
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2005, 2), and political authenticity by the State of Rwanda requesting the creation of an 
international criminal tribunal (Resolution 955). 
 However, despite the central importance of witnesses to the tribunal the ICTR 
statute does not define the term witness. The statute and RPE do outline the technical 
process for witnesses in the pre-trial stage and in court. Schabas points out that in practice 
at international tribunals and courts individuals who provide witness testimony are 
usually categorised as ‘ordinary witness’ and ‘expert witness’ (Schabas 2006). Though, 
the ICTR statute and rules of evidence do not define the term witness. Generally, an expert 
witness is someone who is perceived to have specific knowledge and expertise that can 
contribute to trial proceedings. Whereas, an ‘ordinary witness’ is somebody who gives a 
‘factual account’ of events based upon ‘personal knowledge’ (Rule 90 2007). In principle, 
the giving of testimony at the ICTR is structured first by a witness taking an oath declaring 
the account they will give is the whole truth. This is followed by the witness testifying 
during evidence-in-chief led by the prosecution counsel then the defence counsel are 
allowed to ask questions during the cross examination of the witness (Rule 90 2007). In 
International Criminal Tribunals a distinction is made between testimonial evidence and 
hearsay evidence. Testimonial evidence is based upon a ‘true’ account of what someone 
saw whereas hearsay evidence is what they have been told happened by somebody else. 
However, Schabas points out that at the ICTR during evidence-in-chief witnesses are 
afforded an element of admissible hearsay evidence as a way of ‘narrating background 
information for the court’ (Schabas 2006, 473). 
Regulation 79 of the Regulations of the Registry makes it clear that preparation 
of witnesses for the experience of testifying is an important consideration:  
 
Pursuant to article 43, paragraph 6, and rules 16, 17 and 18, the Registrar shall 
develop and, to the extent possible, implement policies and procedures to enable 
witnesses to testify in safety, so that the experience of testifying does not result in 
further harm, suffering or trauma for the witnesses. (ICTR Statute 2010) 
 
In relation to the registrar’s regulations for witnesses, the Victim and Witness Support 
Unit (VWSU) is responsible for both victims/witnesses and perpetrators (RPE 69 2007).44 
 
44 In assessing functions of the VWSU Clark and Palmer state that the unit had a narrow focus that 
emphasises giving practical assistance to victims and witnesses. Rather than also considering how the 
Rwandan government through the VWSU could develop a set of laws protecting the future rights of 
witnesses. This would appear to be significant in considering that a number of ICTR and all remaining 
Gacaca cases have been transferred to the Rwandan judicial system (Ministry of Justice 2013). 
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They provide guidance regarding trial proceedings to prepare witnesses for the giving of 
testimonial evidence (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 21). Witnesses who give testimonial 
evidence at tribunals and courts may be concerned that by giving accounts of acts of 
violence they may be accused of participating in the criminal act they are giving testimony 
about. In such cases testimony can be used as a bargaining chip allowing lower-level 
participants in the genocide to testify and in return are given amnesty against prosecution. 
This concern is detailed in the United Nations rules of evidence for genocide judicial 
proceedings that witnesses are encouraged to testify without the concern of the possibility 
of future indictments against them: ‘A witness may object to making any statement which 
might tend to incriminate him. The Chamber may, however, compel the witness to answer 
the question. Testimony compelled in this way shall not be used as evidence in a 
subsequent prosecution against the witness for any offence other than perjury’ (Rule 90 
1995). Many of the prosecution witnesses who were incarcerated were lower level 
suspects and were not on trial at the ICTR but were being held often without charge until 
the national judicial system or gacaca courts could process them (Jones 2009).45 However, 
what it is witnesses are, the discursive conditions which constitute the subject-position of 
the witness, are largely absent from the legal scholarship. Furthermore the ICTR rules of 
evidence and procedure do not define the term witness. Within the Statute and Rules of 
Evidence the term witness is positioned in a very technical legal sense. These technical 
descriptions of witnessing in the literature and in the ICTR documents leads to a void in 
understanding of how the discursive conditions constitute the subject position of the 
witness.  
 
Conclusion - International legal institutions: spaces of memory construction  
Despite the parallel emergence of transitional justice and memory work after the Second 
World War, within the transitional justice legal scholarship there has been surprisingly 
little direct critical engagement with memory. The limited work that has been done on 
memory within transitional justice research has primarily been on the use of remembrance 
and commemoration as a modality for state building by new governments during 
transitional periods: an official narrative of a nation’s history. Moreover, there has been 
 
45 Palmer highlights that for many Rwandans they gave testimonial evidence in at least two, if not all 
three of the legal processes established in response to the genocide against the Tutsi: ICTR, National 
Rwandan Courts, and the Gacaca community courts. Palmer coins the term ‘concurrent justice’ for 
multiple legal institutions responding to the same mass atrocity. See Palmer (2015). 
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sparse analyse of memory production at international legal institutions. What research 
there has been comes from a liberal institutional epistemology. For example, Osiel (2000) 
points to a far-reaching paradigm for witness memories, stating that witness testimonies 
can and should construct a coherent collective memory of atrocities, providing victims 
and societies affected with a collective narrative of past events. Yet Osiel’s advocacy for 
a collective legal explanation of the past, this thesis argues, negates the discursive 
contingency of collective memory. Understanding memory as pluralistic, multi-layered 
and transient, as this thesis does, necessitates the need to ‘explore [the] various non-
territorial spaces of memory’ (Resende and Budryte 2013, 10). These spaces are 
constructed by various forces including international norms (Human Rights, Rule of 
Law). Accordingly, analysing the intersection between memory and political change 
should take international actors and organisations into account, highlighting the 
international dimension of memory and the wide variety of actors involved (Resende and 
Budryte 2013). 
 From the origins of the practice of transitional justice (Zunino 2018), memory and 
the exceptional use of international law have been a central response by the international 
community to mass atrocities. It was at the Nuremberg Tribunal that international law, 
and advocacy for remembering the human rights atrocities committed, were evident. 
Indeed, it was a criticism of Nuremberg not putting front and centre the memories of 
victims which directly contributed to witness testimony having a pivotal role at the 
Eichmann trial (Felman 2002). 
 The emergence of a discourse transitional justice scholarship in the late 1980s 
continued to frame international law and remembering past rights violations as central to 
this embryonic field of study (Teitel 2003). The perceived capacity for law to uncover the 
truth of past rights violations was, and is, perceived as a mandatory prerequisite for 
societies to successfully transition to a peaceful democratic future. As Teitel reminds us, 
‘transitional law is both backward- and forward-looking, as it disclaims past illiberal 
values and reclaims liberal norms’ (Teitel 2014, 96).46  
Yet, the transitional justice legal scholarship has neglected to address the way that 
international legal institutions and international actors can play a fundamental role in the 
 
46 For a discussion on the role of memory in nation building projects see De Brito (2001), Lessa (2013). 
For example, De Brito has investigated the way national level justice and reconciliation initiatives in the 
Southern Cone – Argentina and Uruguay – have been used to construct particular narratives of the 
nations’ pasts, which supported the new regime’s own political agendas and highlights the importance for 
state constructed narratives of past atrocities to be subject to critical scrutiny (De Brito 2001). 
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construction of the past in the present. The limited research on memory work in post-
conflict international legal institutions that has been conducted is framed within a liberal 
epistemology. For Osiel (2000, 2009), the criminal law correctly encapsulates 
assumptions about ‘human nature and society that are primarily liberal’ (Osiel 2000, 9). 
In the aftermath of mass atrocities, criminal trials can provide a productive response to 
the affected societies’ need for a collective understanding of the causes that led to the 
violations occurring (Osiel 2000, 2). According to Osiel, atrocity trials are processes that 
can and should construct a collective memory for societies affected by mass violations, 
and, ‘such trials should be unabashedly designed as monumental spectacles’ (Osiel 2000, 
5-6). However, as argued in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the conceptual liberal 
assumptions that allow Osiel to argue that international legal institutions can have an 
important role in constructing a collective societal understanding of atrocities ultimately 
unconvincing. The framework proposed in Chapter Two of the thesis suggests a post-
structuralist epistemology provides a useful alternative, and more nuanced, understanding 
of the discursive construction of memory in international tribunals and courts. 
 This thesis therefore critically engages with the ICTR as a space of legal memory 
construction, specifically analysing the universal application of human rights and rule of 
law norms to produce a singular ‘narrative’ of history.47 International tribunals and courts 
are a crucial, albeit neglected, part of any given post-conflict memory-scape. These 
international institutions and the international actors – judges, legal counsel, registrar, 
investigators – who inhabit these spaces of memory production, shape in important ways 
the discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing, in which legitimate meaning and 
knowledge of past violations are constituted. The construction of memory is understood 
here as something that is plural, multidimensional and transient. As Rothberg points out, 
collective memory is best understood as multidirectional. This concept: 
 
draws attention to the dynamic transfers that take place between diverse places 
and times during the act of remembrance. Thinking in terms of multidirectional 
memory helps explain the spiralling interactions that characterize the politics of 
memory (Rothberg 2008, 29). 
 
Collective memory is not able to exist autonomously from other spaces of memory 
construction and production. Collective remembering is fluid and pliable, which means it 
 
47 For critical discussion on witness testimonies at international criminal tribunals and courts see 
Dembour and Haslam (2004); Viebach (2017); Wilson (2011). 
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can be shaped and reshaped across and between spaces of memory (Rothberg 2008, 5). 
Notwithstanding the plurality and fragility of memory, in the context of transitional 
justice, truth recovery in legal trials can become a dominant discursive practice. The 
perceived authority of the legal judgments, substantiated by the universal nature of human 
rights and rule of law norms, acts to legitimise knowledge produced in trials as an 
authoritative true account of the past (Blants 2013). Thus a legal collective memory 
produced from the discursive legitimacy of law, whilst not static, can become a dominant 
objective account of a violent past. Any challenges to legal collective memory resulting 
from the nature of the universal principles of international law, which legal collective 
memory is founded upon, are accused of bringing into question the principles of law itself. 
Therefore, it is the way in which the universality of human rights and rule of law norms 
as an unequivocal response for making sense of mass human rights violation can become 
a dominant discursive practice. The discursive conditions of the language of law and 
human rights act to stabilise the collective memory produced within a discourse of 
witnessing. It is therefore the purpose of the chapters which follow to present Foucauldian 
discourse analysis as a suitable method for analysing archived ICTR legal documents and 
positioning the original conceptual framework. This framework combines the concept of 
‘witnessing’ (Giorgio Agamben) and ‘memory’ (Paul Ricoeur) as an informative mode 
of enquiry. This enables Chapters 4-7 to argue that the public construction of individual 
internal memories into an authoritative legal collective memory should have limited 





Chapter 2 - Conceptualising the way Legal Witnesses Remember Mass Human 
Rights Violations 
 
This chapter constructs a theoretical framework using the concepts of ‘memory’ (see 
Ricoeur 2004) and ‘witness’ (see Agamben 1997). Agamben’s concept of ‘witness’ 
contributes to the philosophical foundation of the thesis’s framework. Agamben argues 
that witnessing is a non-instrumental, contingent and multi-layered practice (Agamben 
1997). Unpacking the nexus of the concept foregrounds Agamben’s central contention, 
that being the paradox between what he defines as the ‘true complete witness’, the victim 
who experienced the full horror of trauma and did not survive, and the survivor who is 
bestowed with the ethical obligation of bearing witness, speaking in proxy for the ‘true 
witness’ (Agamben 1997, 25-37). However, Agamben’s concept of the ‘witness’ does not 
provide a full philosophical theory of memory. Therefore, the remainder of the chapter 
discusses the thesis’s engagement with Paul Ricoeur’s concept of ‘memory’ and his 
understanding of this concept (Ricoeur 2004). The chapter then discusses how the thesis 
uses Ricoeur’s and Agamben’s concepts as a theoretical lens through which to analyse 
the role of witnesses and memory construction in courts. 
Ricoeur perceives remembering to be comprised of two parts: embodied and 
external. Embodied or ‘inwardness’ refers to individual memories, what individuals have 
encountered and done (Ricoeur 2004, 40-45). Remembering is also external, entailing 
‘community’, in that communal memories are what derives a sense of ‘we’ – plural – that 
offers a sense of shared experience. It is through remembering in and with ‘community’ 
that individuals gain a sense of a shared experience, which forms a ‘life in common with-
others’ (Ricoeur 2004, 132). 
The chapter concludes by proposing that the philosophical insights offered by 
Agamben and Ricoeur account for the manner in which legal witnessing would be 
constitutive of the discursive conditions of the subjects (witnesses) engaged in collective 
remembering which entails plural, shared experiences. This explanation is necessary if 
the thesis’s contention that legal memory in courts is a tightly controlled discursive 
process is to be given substance. The insights offered by Agamben and Ricoeur provide 
a philosophical framework for this thesis’s investigation, attempting to better understand 
the extent to which memory constructed through legal witnessing at the ICTR is able to 




Law and the ‘grey zone’ of witnessing 
According to Agamben, the survivor who bears witness to the horrors of Auschwitz is not 
the true witness, rather the survivor is the witness of the ‘witness’ (Agamben 1999, 34). 
For Agamben, those at Auschwitz who reached the bottom, saw the ‘gorgon’ (gas 
chamber),48 but did not return to bear witness to the full horrors of Auschwitz are the 
complete witness (Agamben 1999, 16). Thus the burden to bear witness is bestowed upon 
those who did not experience the full trauma of what happened. Rather the survivor is 
burdened to speak of what they have not fully experienced (Agamben 1999, 19). 
Agamben’s engagement with the concentration camps at Auschwitz in his book Remnants 
of Auschwitz (RA), where he constructs his concept of witnessing, is employed as a mode 
to advance his philosophical thinking on ethics (Durantaye 2009, 252). In RA Agamben’s 
central question is on testimony, specifically the theory and practice of testimony 
(Agamben 1999, 13; Durantaye 2009). In relation to the thesis’s theoretical framework, 
as a lens through which to explore legal witnessing at the ICTR Agamben’s philosophical 
thinking on ethics offers a conceptual way to cast the phenomenon of legal witnessing in 
a new light. Specifically, what the thesis draws out of Agamben’s philosophical work on 
ethics is subjectivity and the separation of law from ethical categories. To be clear, the 
oeuvre of Agamben’s work covers vast ontological ground, and it is not the stated purpose 
of this thesis to provide full coverage of Agamben’s philosophical arguments.49 Instead, 
it is the purpose of this chapter to engage and draw out specifics from Agamben’s 
conceptual insight on witnessing, which along with Ricoeur’s concept of ‘memory’ 
discussed in the latter part of this chapter, provides the thesis with the conceptual tools in 
which to offer an alternative understanding of the way in which witnesses remember 
during political transition.  
 
48 Also, Agamben engages with the use of the term ‘gorgon’ from ancient Greece (that which must not be 
looked at). 
49 Agamben’s philosophical thought stretches across disciplines and often individual pieces of work can 
be interpreted by some, and on occasions stated by Agamben himself, as being a singular philosophical 
offering and unconnected to other works. Moreover, Agamben’s work can be perceived as being in two 
distinct categories, his early writings on language, and his later political writings. However, both the 
perceptions, that individual works are singular and can be separated to two distinct categories, is to not 
fully appreciate the continuity of thematic interest that run across Agamben’s body of work, namely, the 
relationship between literature, ontology and politics (Durantaye 2009, 11; Murray 2010; Frost 2015). 
While it is the case that ‘Homo Sacer is indeed more directly concerned with political questions, than any 
of Agamben’s earlier books … this is a change that is all too easy to overestimate’ (Durantaye 2009, 11). 
For discussions on Agamben’s philosophical arguments, see: Frost 2011, 2014, 2015; Zartaloudis 2010, 
2018; Durantaye 2009; Mills 2008; Murray 2010; Clemens, Heron, and Murray 2012. 
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This section begins by acknowledging that Agamben’s work on ethics in RA 
forms part of his Homo Sacer project.50 This acknowledgement is necessary given that 
RA has received sustained criticism. In particular, critics have challenged the lack of 
historical coverage of Auschwitz by Agamben in his philosophical discussion on ethics 
(Bernstein 2004; Marion 2006; Norris 2005). A summary of these criticisms will be given 
and, importantly, how some of these criticisms have missed the essence of what Agamben 
is attempting in RA – not a historical account of Auschwitz, rather ‘a kind of perpetual 
commentary on testimony’ (Agamben 1999, 13). This summary is needed as it allows the 
section to justify and locate the use of Agamben’s concept of ‘witness’ as part of the 
thesis’s theoretical framework. The chapter then goes on to unpack and outline the 
concept of ‘witness’. Agamben, throughout his conceptualisation of the ‘witness’ draws 
directly upon The Drowned and the Saved, an account of life in Auschwitz and the 
responsibility to bear witness to it written by camp survivor Primo Levi (Levi 1988). As 
such, a brief summary of Levi’s account of Auschwitz, and a discussion on Agamben’s 
philosophical use of it will be put forward. In particular, this is relevant to the thesis 
suggesting that the witness testifying in trials is positioned in a ‘grey zone’. The latter 
part of the section discusses Agamben’s theoretical insights on what he sees as the 
conflation of judicial categories with ethical categories, such as responsibility and justice, 
which Agamben argues places upon law categories that are only judicial, not ethical 
(Agamben 1999, 20-21). The thesis’s framework interprets this in order to advance the 
conceptual claim that the legal testimony of witnesses can be understood as a purely 
judicial category which is absent of ethical categories.  
RA forms the third instalment of Agamben’s Homo Sacer project, though it is this 
third instalment in particular that received heavy criticism for its apparent deemphases of 
historical singularity (Marion 2006). Although, as will be foregrounded below, such 
criticism overlooks the nuances of the philosophical method Agamben employs. This 
criticism stemmed from Agamben’s use of Auschwitz and figures and events from the 
camp as much as it did for the content and insights it offers (Durantaye 2009, 248-249). 
For example, Marion argues that the method deployed by Agamben in RA creates a 
‘lacuna of the horror of Auschwitz’ and dehumanises the Holocaust (Marion 2006, 1018-
1023). Following a similar trajectory to that of Marion, Bernstein has stated that RA is an 
extreme aestheticization of figures in the camp, particularly that of the Muselmann 
 
50 See, The Omnibus: Homo Sacer (Agamben 2017). 
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(Bernstein 2004). Muselmann was the term camp detainees used referring to an individual 
that had reached a state of psychological despair. Someone who was not dead though was 
not fully alive either (Levi 1988, 63). Agamben also employs the term Muselmann in 
explaining his philosophical framing of testimony (Agamben 1999, 41-86).  Moreover, 
criticism aimed more generally at Agamben’s work on Homo Sacer, similarly to the 
historical issues raised against RA, has focused on Agamben’s use of examples. This 
criticism can be seen in Laclau stating: 
  
by unifying the whole process of modern political construction around the 
extreme and absurd paradigms of the concentration camp, Agamben does more 
than present a distorted history: it blocks any possible exploration of the 
emancipatory possibilities opened by a modern heritage (Laclau 2007, 22). 
 
For Laclau and others,51 Agamben’s use of the concentration camp at Auschwitz as an 
‘example’ to frame what he sees as shortfalls in contemporary politics all too easily jumps 
from establishing the historical specificities of Auschwitz to the relevance and workings 
in a contemporary context (Laclau 2007, 22). What critics including Laclau, Marion and 
Bernstein appear to be challenging most of all, albeit Marion and Bernstein from a slightly 
different position to Laclau, is the paradigmatic method Agamben uses to make his 
philosophical offerings. That being, Agamben approaches his argument on ethics 
specifically, and the Homo Sacer generally, with a distinct understanding of ‘paradigm’. 
Agamben, explaining ‘paradigm’ states: 
 
The figures of the ‘homo sacer’ and the camp serve as examples inasmuch as they 
are concrete historical phenomena. I do not reduce or cancel this historical aspect 
– on the contrary, I try first to contextualize them. And only then do I try to see 
them as a paradigm through which to understand our present situation. This is 
simply another way of working historically, another methodological approach 
(Agamben in Durantaye 2009, 223). 
 
Thus, the above framing of ‘paradigm’ by Agamben highlights that common criticism of 
its use, such as that made by Laclau, seems to miss or avoid taking seriously the 
paradigmatic methodology Agamben uses to advance his philosophical argumentation 
(Agamben 2002, 4).52 In other words, the ‘paradigm’ as understood by Agamben is 
 
51 See: Norris 2005. 
52 Agamben’s understanding and use of ‘paradigm’ is closely connected to Foucault's understanding, so 
much so, Agamben in his early work did not feel the need to explain his use of ‘paradigm’ as he thought 
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dualistic. Whereby it provides exemplarity in contemporary context and singularity of 
historical context. However, importantly, exemplarity and singularity are never fully 
separated. Thus, the ‘paradigm’ functions more than just a lens through which to show 
what is already there. The ‘paradigm’ not only ‘renders intelligible a series of phenomena’ 
that may have ‘escape[d] the historians’ gaze’ but is constitutive of a given phenomenon 
(Agamben 2002, 4-5, Durantaye 2009, 223-224).53 As Durantaye points out the ‘idea of 
the paradigm as that which casts light through which things first come to be known, but 
that does not, for as much, diminish the integrity of that source of light’ (Durantaye 2009, 
226). In short, the ‘paradigm’ engages with historical materials and methods (importantly, 
structures as well as events), not in order to understand the past; rather, as an attempt at 
understanding present situations.54   
The above discussion on criticism of Agamben’s use of Auschwitz to advance his 
philosophical insights has been a necessary prelude to unpacking his concept of ‘witness’ 
and beginning to construct the theoretical framework of the thesis. In summary, 
explaining Agamben’s engagement with Auschwitz and his philosophical frame 
legitimates this chapter to propose a conceptual framework of witnessing at the ICTR. In 
order to construct this framework, the discussion which follows will unpack and outline 
Agamben’s understanding of the ‘witness’ including a discussion of Agamben’s 
engagement with the concentration camp at Auschwitz. 
 
Bearing Witness 
According to Agamben, there are two types of witnesses at Auschwitz. The witness who 
was killed at Auschwitz and the witness who survived and left to tell the story of 
Auschwitz to others (Agamben 1999, 16). For Agamben, these two types of witnesses are 
an instructive ‘paradigm’ for thinking through, ontologically, how experience 
(knowledge) is understood (Agamben 1999). That being, interrogating the lacuna in 
which ‘survivors bore witness to something it is impossible to bear witness to’ (Agamben 
1999, 13). This is why Agamben insists RA’s central concern is testimony (Agamben 
 
it was obvious (see: Durantaye 2009, 214-217). For an example of Foucault’s use of ‘paradigm’, see: 
Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). 
53 As Agamben himself points out his understanding of ‘paradigm’ is similar to that of Foucault. 
Although, it is important to note that Agamben’s philosophical oeuvre should not be mistaken as 
explicitly following Foucauldian coordinates: not as a successor to Foucault philosophically, as Frost 
argues, ‘it would be more accurate to view Agamben as complementing his wider philosophical project 
with a re-imagination of Foucault’s ideas’ (Frost 2011, 58; also see: Frost 2017). 
54 See: Agamben 2002. 
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1999, 13). According to Agamben this lacuna of the impossibility for the survivor to bear 
witness is clearly evident in Primo Levi’s account of his own experience of surviving 
Auschwitz (Agamben 1999, 16-17). Specifically, Agamben uses Levi’s account in The 
Drowned and the Saved as the ontological foundation for thinking through how the 
experience, and more specifically knowledge, of Auschwitz can be known if it is 
impossible for the survivor to bear witness to it (Agamben 1999). Therefore it is necessary 
for the discussion that follows to briefly summarise Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved 
then to go on to unpack how Agamben uses it to develop his philosophical understanding 
of witnessing and how the thesis will use it. 
A central theme of Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved is the survivors’ 
responsibility to speak, ensuring the atrocities of Auschwitz were not forgotten, and 
simultaneously coping with the guilt of having survived the camps when so many did not. 
Levi’s account of life in the camp depicts the relentless violence and suffering of the 
camp’s inhabitants (Levi 1988). The everyday routine-ness of the brutality of the beatings 
and deprivation imposed upon prisoners was experienced first-hand by Levi.55 For Levi, 
those who lived through and survived the camps bestowed upon themselves the moral 
obligation to bear witness to Auschwitz. To speak for those who did not return from the 
camps and to make sure the memory of the Nazis’ plan to exterminate the Jews was not 
forgotten. On bearing witness to the memory of Auschwitz and a moral obligation to do 
so, Levi is clear on one thing: as a survivor of the camps Levi accepts the moral obligation 
to testify to what he witnessed.56 However, Levi is unequivocal that the true witness to 
the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps were those killed in the gas chambers (Levi 
1988). Here it is worth stating at length Levi’s conviction on his understanding of the true 
witnesses: 
 
I must repeat – we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is an unfortunate 
notion, of which I have become conscious little by little, reading the memories of 
 
55 Levi himself acknowledges that having been a chemist prior to arriving at the camps had afforded him 
certain ‘privileges’ which the vast majority prisoners were not afforded (Levi 1988). However Levi insists 
that life in the camp, for those with ‘privileges’ or not, was extremely tough. In addition to having the 
‘luck’ of having a profession prior to Auschwitz, which afforded him moments of respite from the 
continuous beatings (Levi 1988), Levi also regards his survival as down to another element of ‘luck’, that 
being the decision by the Nazis shortly before he was moved to Auschwitz to extend the life expectancy 
of camp inhabitants (Levi 1991, 4). 
56 Levi is ‘stereotypical’ of those who have witnessed atrocities. Upon returning home from Auschwitz 
Levi continuously recounts his experience, which included writing down what took place in the camps 
(Agamben 1999, 16). Although, as Levi himself states, responding to the question of whether he sees 
himself as a writer or a chemist: ‘A chemist, of course, let there be no mistake’ (Levi 1988, 102). For 
Levi, writing afforded him the opportunity to bear witness. 
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others and reading mine at the distance of years. We survivors are not only an 
exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by the prevarications 
or abilities or good luck did not touch the bottom. Those who did so, those who 
saw the gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they 
are ‘Muslims’, the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose the 
position would have a general significance. They are the rule, we are the exception 
… we who were favoured by fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to account not 
only our fate, but also that of the others, the submerged; but this was discourse on 
‘behalf of third parties’, the story of things seen from close by, not experienced 
personally (Levi 1988, 63-64).  
 
It is this ‘speaking in proxy’ Levi foregrounds that Agamben interprets in advancing his 
philosophical explanation of testimony. In that for Agamben, Levi’s claim that the 
survivor speaks in proxy for those who cannot is analogous to how experience is 
understood (Agamben 1999). In other words, Agamben, conceptualising his 
understanding of witnessing takes as its starting point Levi’s account of the ‘true 
witnesses’ of Auschwitz. In the context of the thesis developing a theoretical framework 
it is in particular Agamben’s engagement with Levi’s discussion on the ‘grey zone’ of the 
camps and the Muselmann that is relevant (Agamben 1999, 41-86). As such, the following 
discussion will detail Agamben’s concept of ‘witness’.  
Agamben uses the term subjectivity, in part, as the potential for an individual to 
‘become’ something. This thesis acknowledges that both ‘becoming’ and ‘to have 
language’ are important parts of Agamben’s ontological oeuvre and political thought.57 
However, for the purpose of constructing a conceptual framework of legal witnessing at 
the ICTR it is particularly the potential to ‘become’ something that is of primary interest 
here. 
Subjectivity, similar to much of Agamben’s philosophical thought, is framed 
within his understanding of potentiality.58 For Abamben, potentiality is the ontological 
 
57 Language, or the philosophy of language, is a central concern throughout Agamben’s philosophical 
oeuvre. For Agamben language is where the human is defined and redefined through the human’s ‘faculty 
for language’ (Agamben 1999b). Humans having language is fundamental to understanding who we are 
(Murray 2010, 5). According to Agamben language directly relates the philosophical concern about how 
the essence of language constitutes our ‘being in this world’. Agamben’s enquiry on the 
interconnectedness of language and existence (being) is directly influenced by the thought of Martin 
Heidegger [see ‘Being and Time’ (Heidegger 1962)]. Thus for Agamben, literature, ontology and politics 
and their relationship between each other are central themes of enquiry. For Agamben this philosophical 
frame allows him to examine ‘how government and the law use and manipulate language to create and 
reinforce their power, but also how representations and the use of language can be the means of 
challenging that power’ (Murray 2010, 5), See Homo Sacer (Agamben 1995); State of Exception 
(Agamben 1999); The Coming Community (Agamben 2007). 




principle of the possibility that there is always the potential to do something, although 
whether an individual does that thing or not is never predetermined (Agamben 1995, 39-
49). Potentiality is not the potential of something waiting to be actualised, rather 
potentiality, or ‘impotentiality’, is the opposite to understanding events as totalising. It is 
the potential for an individual to ‘become’, but also not to become something, the 
eschewing of single unity of subjects. Following Agamben, an individual subject’s 
relation to the totality of a group, such as witnesses, is the potential to only be part of that 
totality, which is referred to by Agamben as a ‘remnant’ (Agamben 1999, 87-135). 
Importantly, ‘remnant’ is the subjectivity of the subject not becoming encapsulated within 
the singular identity of a collective (Agamben 2005, 54). A subject understood as a 
‘remnant’, which is the interpretation taken by the thesis, is a conceptual tool to see ‘how 
a totality conceives of itself and of its component parts’ (Durantaye 2009, 299). In short, 
the subject, the individual who saw the horrors of rights violations, is a kind of ‘remnant’. 
The subject as a ‘remnant’ is ‘neither the all, nor a part of the all, but the impossibility for 
the part and the all to coincide with themselves or with each other’ (Agamben 2005, 55).59 
In other words, the subject framed as a ‘remnant’ challenges the notion that a community 
completely encapsulates the singularity of its members (Durantaye 2009, 300). From the 
thesis’s perspective, it is instead the discursive conditions and thus discursive practices 
that constitute who can speak as the subject witness and what they can speak about.  
 
The Grey Zone: Law, Ethics and Legal Witnesses 
The ‘grey zone’, a term Agamben takes from Levi, is where the intersection, or more 
specifically the conflation, of law and ethical categories exist (Agamben 1999, 22). 
According to Agamben, philosophical understandings of ethics encompass categories 
such as guilt, responsibility, and judgment as judicial as well as ethical categories. 
 
I think that the concept of potentiality has never ceased to function in the life and history of 
humanity, most notably in that part of humanity that has grown and developed its potency 
[Potenza] to the point of imposing its power over the whole planet … I could state the subject of 
my work as an attempt to understand the meaning of the verb “can” [potere]. What do I mean 
when I say: “I can, I cannot”? (Agamben 1999, 177).  
See: Potentialities: Collected essays in philosophy (Agamben 1999). The centrality of potentiality to 
Agamben’s philosophical oeuvre is evident in his work on ‘Homo Sacer’. Potentiality ‘enters Homo Sacer 
through an analysis of the relation between the constituting power “that founds a sovereign state” and the 
“constituted power” that maintains it once it has been established’ (Durantaye 2009,230). See Homer 
Sacer (Agamben 1995). 
59 Agamben engages with St Paul’s text and Jewish Messianism in his discussion on ‘remnants’. See: The 




Agamben’s main contention is that what he sees as legal categories are being misused as 
if they are ethical categories. In other words, according to Agamben, law and ethics are 
separate areas, and ethics should not borrow concepts from law, but instead develop its 
own categories (Agamben 1999, 22).60 Agamben appears to suggest that there is 
something problematic about weakly developed ethical categories, rather than something 
fundamentally dangerous about law (Durantaye 2009, 254). Agamben locates this 
problematic borrowing by ethics of legal concepts in the ‘grey zone’ (Agamben 1999, 21-
22). Here, it is worth summarising what it is Agamben takes from Levi’s concept of the 
‘grey zone’. This is important as the thesis framework uses an interpretation of 
Agamben’s understanding when suggesting that witnesses at the ICTR are located in a 
‘grey zone’.  
Levi’s term, the ‘grey zone’, relates to camp detainees and the blurring of 
distinctions between prisoner and ‘executioner’ at Auschwitz; some detainees 
‘volunteered’ for ‘work’ roles within the camp. One such collaborative role was the 
Sonderkommando (Special Squad) who were ‘entrusted with running the crematoria’: 
disposing of the bodies from the gas chambers (Levi 1989, 32). Levi discusses an unusual 
event, a soccer match, that took place at Auschwitz between the ‘Special Squad’ and SS 
camp guards. It is Levi’s depiction of the soccer match, which Agamben uses as an 
example of the ‘grey zone’ in framing his philosophical argument on law and ethics.61 
Levi notes how surreal the event of the soccer match was: 
 
Men of the SS and the rest of the squad are present at the game; they take sides, 
bet, applaud, urge the players on as if, rather than at the gates of hell, the game 
were taking place on the village green (Levi 1989, 38). 62 
 
For Agamben, the soccer match at Auschwitz may be incorrectly understood by some as 
an example of a ‘brief pause of humanity’ in the despairs of the horrors and atrocities 
taking place at Auschwitz (Agamben 1999, 26). However, Agamben argues that this 
‘game’ is not a sign of hope. It is for Agamben the normalcy of the soccer match, which 
 
60 For a discussion on Agamben’s thought on ethics and his engagement with Levinas see: Frost 2015. 
61 Levi’s discussion on the soccer match is based upon the account of Miklos Nyszli, one of the very few 
individuals who survived the last ‘special squads’ at Auschwitz (Levi 1988, 63-68). 
62 According to Levi, it was the specific nature of the ‘work’ carried out by the ‘special squad’, and no 
other category of prisoners that made it possible for the SS to take part in the match: 
we have embraced you, corrupted you, drag you to the bottom with us. You are like us, you 
proud people, dirtied with your own blood, as we are. You too, like us and like Cain, have killed 
the brother. Come we can play together (Levi 1989, 38). 
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is the true horror of the Nazis’ concentration camps. As Agamben states, ‘that match is 
never over; it continues as if uninterrupted. It is the perfect and eternal cipher of the “grey 
zone” which knows no time and is in every place’ (Agamben 1999, 26). What Agamben 
appears to be pointing towards here in explaining his philosophical framing of the ‘grey 
zone’ is that what can appear as a break in the cycle of repression or violence is not in 
fact a rupture that signals change. Instead it is the illusion of change. Agamben’s 
philosophical framing of the ‘grey zone’ encapsulates the fallacy of security and distance 
from repression and/or violence. This fallacy is but a ‘brief respite, and at any moment 
the suffering and cruelty can come screaming back’ (Durantaye 2009, 257). In other 
words, for Agamben the ‘grey zone’ is, ontologically, a dangerous projection of hope and 
progression towards change. The ‘grey zone’s’ projection of hope and progression 
towards a better horizon is a sinister fable marking the closure of an unpleasant past and 
the beginning of a ‘better’ future (Agamben 1999, 26). Agamben argues it is the ‘grey 
zone’s’ fallacy of a rupture to the status quo that needs to be shattered. Like the soccer 
match at Auschwitz, it is essential the ‘grey zone’s’ illusion of actual positive change be 
exposed: ‘if we do not succeed in understanding that match, stopping it, there will never 
be hope’ (Agamben 1999, 26).63 In short, the ‘grey zone’ projects an interruption to 
unpleasant and repressive action. This interruption to the status quo has the false 
appearance of bringing back normalcy as the foundations for progressive change. 
However, the apparent appearance of normalcy is no guarantee of breaking the status quo. 
Agamben’s ‘grey zone’ is interpreted by the thesis as a conceptual tool, which 
will be used to shed light on how legal witnessing has the illusion of movement from a 
violent past to a more peaceful future. More specifically, the thesis’s framework 
interpreting Agamben’s ‘grey zone’ suggests that dominant perspectives in the legal 
transitional justice scholarship purporting that transformative benefits of legal witnessing 
facilitated by law and human rights norms, is a ‘grey zone’. That being, these dominant 
perspectives perceive that law facilitated through international tribunals acts as the 
distinct marker between a violent past and a more peaceful future (Klinkner and Smith 
2015; Sikkink 2011). In other words, from such perspectives international law and its 
 
63 Agamben’s engagement with literature is a central mode he uses to make his philosophical offerings. 
Agamben engages with a range of literary characters and figures, these include creatures that transcend 
particular divisions: man/animal; human/divine, that Agamben employs as ‘thresholds’ that are key to his 
philosophical argumentation. One source of literary work Agamben engages with on multiple occasions is 
that of Franz Kafka. The figures (characters) from Kafka, as with figures from other literary works, are 
for Agamben illustrative of ‘desubjectivised’ entities, ‘an image of the undoing of our structured and 
imposed forms of 
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universality steps in where law has previously failed resulting in the violations occurring 
(Turner 2016). It is the perceived primacy of international trials and the testimonial 
evidence of witnesses they facilitate, that acts as linear progression. That being, law 
affords the violations of a violent past to be known, which facilitates a collective 
understanding and provides individual catharsis of past trauma (Keydar 2019; Osiel 
2000). It is the externalising and understanding of the past, made possible by the 
purported universality of law that makes transition to a peaceful and democratic future 
most likely to succeed. In other words, from such perspectives, in order for society to 
transition to a positive future there first needs to be understanding and acceptance of past 
violations. It is the perceived universality and ‘neutrality’ of law and human rights norms 
which makes comprehensible knowledge of a violent past, and through the historical 
record trials produce, contributes to transition to a progressive future. The thesis pushes 
back against witness testimony being the bridge between the past and movement forward. 
The framework of the thesis looking at witness testimony at the ICTR through the lens of 
the ‘grey zone’ will foreground that legal testimony is not the completion of 
understanding a traumatic past, it is not the bridge between the past and present. 
 
The ‘Muselmann’: the lacuna of law and justice or legal witnessing as ‘Judgment’  
The Muselmann, alongside the ‘grey zone’, is for Agamben an ontological concept that 
he uses to argue that law and ethics are separate categories (Agamben 1999). By 
decoupling law from justice Agamben states that, ontologically, law is solely about 
‘judgment’ absent of justice and truth. For the purpose of the thesis’s conceptual 
framework, it is Agamben’s insights on the need for distance to be drawn  in  law-justice 
understood as one as the same thing.64 To be clear, the thesis is specifically interested in 
Agamben’s insights on the relationship, or lacuna, between law and justice, rather than 
directly engaging with his thinking on law.65 Here it is also worth acknowledging that the 
thesis interprets this insight of Agamben. Specifically, the thesis does not follow 
Agamben all the way in seeking the deactivation, or removal of law, in order for justice 
 
64 In the context of philosophy’s engagement with questions of ethics Agamben’s approach needs to be 
understood as somewhat unconventional. That being, ‘there is no essence, no historical or spiritual 
vocation … that humans must enact or realise’ (Agamben 2007, 43). ‘Since there is no telos, origin or 
vocation, there is only the intrinsic potentiality of the human being, and uncovering that potential is the 
primary ethical task’ (Murray 2010, 117). This is why Agamben insists that ethics is a question of history 
and language, and thus ethics is not in the realm of law, but elsewhere, in language’ (Murray 2010, 120). 




to be reached (Agamben 1999). Although, the thesis does agree with Agamben that law 
and justice are distinct. In short, using Agamben’s insights on the lacuna of law and justice 
is not to argue that transitional justice should seek the removal of law for justice to be 
possible for transitioning societies. Rather, his insights are interpreted as a conceptual 
tool to argue (Chapters 5, 6) the need to unshackle the fallacy of a transcendent synthesis 
at international tribunals (ICTR). This fallacy is the conflation of legal determination and 
the capacity of law to contribute to making sense of the past in deeply divided societies: 
the law’s (in)ability to facilitate social change.  
 Agamben’s ontological writing on law-justice is very complex and dense, and 
therefore for the purpose of accessibility and clarity the following discussion will primary 
engage with Zartaloudis’s (2010) work that discusses Agamben’s insights on law and 
justice. The following discussion will briefly summarise Agamben’s understanding of the 
Muselmann, and then outline his ontological argument that law and justice are separate 
and then go on to explain how the thesis will use this. 
For Agamben, the Muselmann66 is the ‘true witness’ and it is in the Muselmann’s 
name the survivors of Auschwitz speak in proxy for.67 Agamben, developing his 
philosophical understanding of the Muselmann, continues to engage with Levi’s account 
of Auschwitz (Agamben 1999, 15-39). Levi explains that there were individuals in the 
camp that were like ‘Mummies’. These corpse-like figures were referred to by the rest of 
the camp detainees as Muselmann.68  Agamben, like Levi, does not understand the 
Muselmann as no longer human, rather than the zone of indistinction between human and 
inhuman (Agamben 1999). That being, the Muselmann is no longer able to communicate 
or respond to abuse and is unrecognisable as human. However, the Muselmann has not 
yet ceased living, the death that awaited all the Muselmann had not yet occurred, and 
therefore has not passed across to being inhuman (Agamben 1999, 61). In other words, 
for Agamben the ‘Muselmann is not so much the limit of life and death; rather he marks 
the threshold between the human and the inhuman’ (Agamben 1999, 55). For Agamben, 
‘threshold’, or lacuna, is a key conceptual device that he uses throughout his ontological 
 
66 The origins of the term Muselmann is contested, though Agamben suggests the likely origin of the term 
can ‘be found in the literal meaning of the Arabic word Muslim: the one who submits unconditionally to 
the will of God’ (Agamben 1999, 45). 
67 Agamben also uses the Muselmann in discussing his understanding of biopolitics. See: Agamben 1995, 
1999. 
68 Prisoners did not attempt to help the Muselmann or offer them sympathy as this would be a futile 
exercise because the Muselmann would not acknowledge their existence. Though, there was another 
reason why prisoners avoided the Muselmann. By looking at them, acknowledge their existence was an 
all too painful reminder that the Muselmann was the fate that awaited all prisoners (Levi 1988).  
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oeuvre, including the separation of law-justice, to foreground ‘the undoing of our 
structured and imposed forms of subjectivity’ (Murray 2010, 100). It is this threshold 
between the human and inhuman that Agamben suggests foregrounds the problem of 
weakly developed ethical categories.69 Crucial to Agamben’s ontological understanding 
of the lacuna is the relationship between law and justice, or more directly put, the need to 
draw distance within the notion that law and justice are one and the same thing. Law is 
only about ‘Judgment’ (Agamben 1999). To explain why Agamben understands law as 
only about Judgment, and the relevance of this understanding to the thesis, there first 
needs to be a discussion on the conceptual relation of law and justice. For Agamben, law-
justice as inseparable is a fallacy that entrenches the idea that through the applications of 
law, justice is unequivocally attainable. To be clear, Agamben’s conceptual framing of 
justice and law is not a dismissal or challenge to the work of legal theorists, such as 
Dworkin or Raz, rather Agamben approaches the question from a slightly different 
position and offers different insights.70 In short, Agamben’s critical approach to law is 
less concerned with developing judicial instruments such as human rights or answering 
common legal scholarly questions around resistances to politico-legal power (Parsley 
2010, 121-122). Instead, his focus is on understanding the ‘limits’ of law. 
According to Agamben, there is no origin or foundation of law that it is possible 
to return to, that would allow for the fulfilment of justice (Agamben 1995). Law in the 
Western tradition has from the outset always been conceived as law and justice 
(Zartaloudis 2010, 279). As Zartaloudis argues, ‘Justice is neither the justice that gives a 
reward to those that may will it or deserve it, nor a perpetual punishment to what is (and 
could not be otherwise), but is instead a turn to potentiality, to pure existence’ 
(Zartaloudis 2010, 285). Justice understood as ‘potentiality’ (Agamben 1995, 39-49) is a 
conceptual understanding where justice is not a right or a ‘predicate of human beings that 
can be demanded or possessed, but their condition of being without essential predicates, 
their whatever being’ (Zartaloudis 2010, 285). Following Agamben, Frost has highlighted 
that justice understood as ‘potentiality’ requires the ‘messianic’ deactivation of the law 
(Frost 2015). To deactivate the law is not the destruction of law or to move beyond the 
law. Rather to ‘deactivate’ the law, or the messianic deactivation of the law, is the ‘gate’ 
 
69 Frost (2015) argues that Levinas’s ethics is more closely related to Agamben’s conceptual thought, 
more so than Agamben himself recognises. 
70 For key work of Dworkin’s see, Law Empire (Dworkin 1998). For a discussion on Dworkin’s influence 
in the Philosophy of Law see, (Hershovitz 2006; Ripstein 2007) For Raz see, The Authority of Law (Raz 
2009); Practical Reasons and Norms (Raz 1999). 
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that can lead to justice (Frost 2015, 219; Agamben 1995). The ‘messianic’, a key concept 
for Agamben, above all signifies a crisis and radical transformation of the entire order of 
the law (Frost 2015). The messianic deactivation does not mark the completion of law 
where justice is achieved. Rather law is what must be ‘“fulfilled” in the passage to justice’ 
(Whyte 2010, 111). As Agamben argues, ‘law is not directed toward the establishment of 
justice. Nor is it directed toward the verification of truth. Law is solely directed toward 
judgement, independent of truth and justice’ (Agamben 1999, 18). In short, the thesis 
interprets Agamben’s understanding of the ‘witness’, discussed above, and the distancing 
of law-justice discussed here, in order to argue that legal witnessing at the ICTR should 
be understood as located in a lacuna between legal determination and justice-truth, 
‘judgement’.  
This challenges the common perception within the legal transitional justice 
scholarship of a transcendent synthesis of legal determination and the capacity of law to 
make sense of a violent past. For example, according to Sikkink (2011), human rights 
trials necessarily address mass rights violations through judicial accountability. 
Simultaneously the judicial accountability through the application of international human 
rights law allow for those violations to be understood (Sikkink 2011). In other words, for 
scholars such as Sikkink (2011) a tribunal reaching a legal determination of guilt or 
innocence and related judgment is inherently tied with being able to make sense of past 
violations. Legal determination and law’s ability to make sense of past horrors are one 
and the same thing. For the thesis, understanding law-justice as independent from each 
other is an important conceptual tool to argue that the ontological distancing of law-justice 
produces a lacuna in which the myth that legal and human rights norms facilitates a 
transcendent synthesis from legal determination to understanding a traumatic past can be 
exposed. 
 In further explaining the thesis’s understanding of the lacuna between legal 
determination and justice-truth, it is helpful to engage with Agamben’s understanding of 
‘superstes’ and ‘testis’. In framing his philosophical understanding of ‘witness’ Agamben 
engages with Roman Law and the Latin words for witness, those being ‘superstes’ and 
‘testis’. The word ‘testis’ refers to a person in a trial between two parties and who speaks 
as a third party.71 ‘Superstes’ relates to the specific events experienced personally, 
something an individual has lived through, and thus has intimate details of the event and 
 
71 Testis is the origins of the word testimony (Agamben 1999, 17). 
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can bear witness to it (Agamben 1999, 17). Empirically, it seems improbable to be able 
distinguish between these forms of witness, for example witnesses at the ICTR were 
commonly both a ‘third party’ and had personally ‘experienced’ violations. However, the 
point to be made is not an empirical one. It is rather a conceptual one. Attempting to avoid 
a conflation of ‘superstes’ and ‘testis’ is an endeavour to navigate the nexus of the 
transitional justice project, law-truth and justice-peace. For Agamben it is important that 
‘superstes’ and ‘testis’ are not blurred and remain separate. In short, it is law’s need for 
closure, and to bear witness to human action that is beyond the capability of law 
(Agamben 1999, 18). It is in this lacuna of law’s need for closure and the perpetual need 
to bear witness to the past being beyond the reach of law, which is the nexus of law and 
justice-truth.72 It is law’s need for closure which leads to law’s inability to facilitate what 
is so important to survivors; trials do not connote that a troubled past has been overcome. 
‘Judgement’ aims to ‘neither establish justice nor to prove the truth. Judgement is in itself 
the end’ (Agamben 1999, 19). 
In short, it is the law‘s messianic fulfilment that leads to justice (Agamben 2017). 
This fulfilment is located in the lacuna of ‘Judgement’. This Lacuna is where the 
messianic fulfilment of the law occurs. It is the ‘deactivation’ of the law that allows the 
‘fulfilment’ of the law. When law is ‘fulfilled’ it is returned to ‘pure potentiality’. 
Crucially in being returned to potentiality law is understood in terms of what it ‘can be’ 
rather than what ‘it is’ (Agamben 1995, 39-49). Importantly for the thesis, it is the 
‘potentiality’ of the lacuna between law and justice where legal witnessing needs to be 
located.  
 
Theoretical lens: conceptualising legal witnessing  
This section has discussed specific components of Agamben’s concept of the ‘witness’ 
through engaging with his ontological understanding of subjectivity (witness), the ‘grey 
zone’, and legal and ethical categories (Muselmann). Specifically, the above discussion 
has outlined the three conceptual components from Agamben’s philosophical thought on 
 
72 Agamben, framing his understanding of Law as separate from truth and justice (ethical categories) 
engages with Franz Kafka’s story The Trial. Reading Kafka’s The Trial Agamben suggests: 
law appear[ing] solely in the form of the trial, contains a profound insights into the nature of law, 
which, contrary to common belief is not so much rule as it is judgement and therefore, trial. But 
if the essence of the law – of every law – is the trial, if all right (and morality that is 
contaminated by it) is only a tribunal right, then execution and transgression, innocence and 
guilt, obedience and disobedience all become indistinct and lose their importance. ‘The court 
wants nothing from you. It welcomes you when you come; it releases you when you go’ 
(Agamben 1999, 18-19). 
77 
 
witnessing, which forms part of the theoretical lens of the thesis. These conceptual 
components will support the thesis’s contention that there is a need to depart from an 
instrumental understanding of witnessing: the witness conceived as a pre-existing self-
evident subject, through which previously ‘hidden’ or ‘suppressed’ memories can to a 
greater or lesser extent be recovered (Combs 2010; Sikkink 2011). It is through the 
conceptual offerings of subjectivity, the ‘grey zone’ and the lacuna of law and justice, 
that will enable the thesis to better understand what witnesses are and can do in 
international criminal tribunals. 
In summary, the thesis’s conceptualisation of legal witnessing at the ICTR is 
formed around three philosophical insights. Firstly, the way in which the past is 
understood is always partial and told by individuals who did not experience the full 
trauma of the atrocities (Agamben 1999). Moreover, the way in which individuals become 
subjects always entails the potential not to become a given subject. That is, the identity 
of an individual is never predetermined, and the identity of a group, such as witnesses, is 
not singular and therefore never self-evident. This relates to the thesis suggesting that 
legal witnesses are constituted by the discursive conditions and practices of the ICTR. 
This highlights what it is witnesses are, and can do, is formed within a tightly controlled 
discursive field. Secondly, the thesis pushes up against the dominant perception in the 
legal scholarship, of a linear flow from past, present, and future, facilitated by and through 
legal and human rights norms. In short, legal witnessing facilitated through and by law 
and human rights norms should not be understood as contributing to a linear progression 
from a violent past to a more peaceful future. It argues instead for the need to understand 
the limitations of a singular legal narrative, constructed through the testimony of 
witnesses, and asks whether this narrative is able to aid understandings of the multi-
layered social-political conditions that led to the violations occurring. Thirdly, the thesis 
makes an important distinction between the ICTR reaching a legal determination which 
contributes to bringing those responsible for atrocities to account, and, constructions of 
the truth relating to the reasons and causes that facilitated the atrocities. 
The three philosophical insights taken from Agamben’s ontological thought, will 
contribute to the thesis investigation aiming to better understand the ways in which legal 
witnesses remember. However, the philosophical insights of Agamben do not allow the 
thesis to fully address the research question: ‘How do legal witnesses of human rights 
violations contribute to memory in transitional post-conflict societies?’ The thesis 
understands memory as something which is multidirectional and transient. This entails an 
78 
 
exploration of the central questions on the legal construction of memory: who remembers 
when, why and how? Therefore, the following discussion will engage with Paul Ricoeur’s 
(2004) concept of ‘memory’ and will then explain how the thesis interprets his concept. 
 
Memory 
This section begins by discussing how Ricoeur’s philosophical understanding of memory 
consists of both internal and external memory. Specifically, Ricoeur eschews 
philosophical understandings of memory being reduced to a binary of individual 
(internal) or collective (external). From these polemical perspectives, memory is 
understood as either belonging to an individual (Augustine 2009, Locke 1996, Husserl 
2006) or as collective and attributed only to ‘groups’ or ‘society’ (Ricoeur 2004; 
Halbswach 1950). Ricoeur frames his concept of ‘memory’ as entailing both individual 
and collective components, which is the understanding of memory used by this thesis. 
This is the framework used to understand memory construction at the ICTR. Specifically, 
understanding memory as being comprised of individual and collective components 
contributes to the thesis which argues, in Chapters 4-5, that the tightly controlled legal 
discursive conditions are absent of plural understandings of a violent past. Ricoeur’s 
concept of memory forms part of his phenomenological oeuvre, but it is not the stated 
purpose of this framework to directly engage with the wide body of his philosophical 
thought. Rather, the purpose of this section is to unpack and outline Ricoeur’s 
understanding of memory, and how this understanding contributes to the thesis’s 
theoretical lens that analyses the way in which legal witnesses remember. In particular, 
what the thesis draws upon from Ricoeur’s concept of memory is the individual-collective 
nexus, plurality, and manipulated memory (Ricoeur 2004). The section then goes on to 
discuss how Riceour’s conceptual understanding of memory entails shared experiences 
and ‘being with others’ (Ricoeur 2004, 132). This relates to the thesis’s conceptual claim 
that the legal construction of memory lacks plural shared experiences. The final part of 
this section concludes the chapter by drawing together the thesis’s understanding of 
‘witness’ and ‘memory’.  
 
Memory: Individual and Collective Components 
Ricoeur understands memory to be both individual and collective, rejecting the polemical 
positing that memory is either individual or collective. Underwriting Ricoeur’s rejection 
of a binary understanding of memory is the idea that if memory belongs purely to the 
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individual it does not seem possible to have a genuine sense of communal memory. 
Conversely if memory is only collective, our understanding of memory is separated from 
the memories of individual subjects (Ricoeur 2004, 45-50).73 According to Ricoeur, 
individual memory or ‘inwardness’, is phenomenologically what an individual has 
remembered. Ricoeur, directly engaging with Augustine’s thought on ‘inwardness’, notes 
that memory from an Augustinian position is private.74 Memories are singular. The 
memories of an individual are theirs and not someone else’s (Ricoeur 2004, 96). It is the 
internal existence of memory, belonging to the individual, that phenomenology ties 
‘inwardness’ to memory, where the origins of ‘consciousness to the past resides’ (Ricoeur 
2004, 96). Following Ricoeur, the foundations of memory, ‘inwardness’, are 
insurmountably of the past which belongs to the individual. Memory located purely in the 
past is the perpetual temporality of the individual and is a linear movement from the 
present to the past and back again without being fragmented. For example, this temporal 
continuity facilitates the individual to remember far off events from their childhood 
without interruption (Ricoeur 2004, 97). As noted by Ricoeur, memory as belonging to 
the individual is the capacity ‘to move back through time, without anything, in principle, 
preventing the pursuit of this movement, without any end to its continuity’ (Ricoeur 2004, 
97). In short, memory understood as ‘inwardness’ perceives the individual as the origin 
of memory, and it is memory that allows individuals to traverse from the present to the 
past.75  
In summary, memory understood as being individual draws directly upon 
phenomenological thought on ‘inwardness’ (Augustine; Husserl) which understands 
memory as interconnected, and inseparable from interiority and time: ‘consciousness and 
memory are one and the same thing’ (Ricoeur 2004, 105). The interiority of memory is 
directly related to temporal orientation in two connected ways. The passage of time from 
the past to the future following linear progression, and the inverse from the future to the 
past (Ricoeur 2004, 105). It is the temporal movement of the individual between past-
present-future that the origins of ‘inwardness’ was founded upon. Ricoeur, in outlining 
 
73 Jeffery Olick takes a similar position that ‘[t]here is no individual memory without social experience, 
nor is there any collective memory without individuals participating in communal life’ (Olick 2007, 34).  
74 ‘Augustine is at once the expression of this tradition and its initiator. He can be said to have invented 
inwardness against the background of the Christian experience of conversion’ (Ricoeur 2004, 97). 
75 Ricoeur’s exploration of the ‘inwardness’ (individual memory) side of the binary understandings of 
memory also engages with Husserl’s thought on ‘inwardness’: that memory as understood as belonging to 




his understanding of memory, also engages with the sociological understanding of 
memory as collective (external).  
Ricoeur’s understanding of the collective component of memory directly engages 
with Maurice Halbwachs’s sociological framing of memory as communal: memory 
requires ‘others’ (Ricoeur 2004, 121). According to Ricoeur, memory understood as 
collective perceives that the origins of memory are not capable of starting with interiority 
and then filtering down to ‘others’. Rather, memories derive from individuals 
externalising experiences which then form individual understandings of past events. For 
example, testimony about the past given by an individual is conceived here in a specific 
way. Events are not understood by the utterance of testimony coming from an individual. 
Instead, testimony is something received by an individual ‘from someone else as 
information about the past’ (Ricoeur 2004, 121). In short, testimony is something external 
to the individual. Testimony positioned as something received rather than uttered is the 
derivation of memory, which is shared or communal (Ricoeur 2004, 121). In other words, 
the origins of memory understood as communal begins with other people’s testimonies 
about the past, and then working through memories that ‘we have as members of the 
group’ (Ricoeur 2004, 121). Therefore, access to information about the past is assembled 
for us by the memories of ‘others’. The essence of the argument claiming memory is 
collective can be summarised thusly. When an individual is no longer part of the group 
in which a given event from the past is preserved the individual’s internal memory 
becomes fragile because of the lack of external support. ‘[O]ne does not remember alone’, 
rather individuals remember by putting themselves in the vantage point of a group or 
often multiple groups (Ricoeur 2004, 121). Here, importantly, Ricoeur rejects the 
polemical terrain upon which phenomenological and sociological understandings of 
memory exist. For Ricoeur, it is necessary to denounce the ‘inwardness’ position that the 
origins of memory can only reside within the individual. However, he also challenges the 
claim that memory is unequivocally ‘communal’. Specifically: 
 
[d]oes not the very act of ’placing oneself’ in a group and of ‘displacing’ oneself 
or shifting from group to group presuppose a spontaneity capable of establishing 
a continuation with itself? If not, society would be without any social actors. 
(Ricoeur 2004, 122) 
 
For Ricoeur, conceptualising ‘memory’ requires a middle ground, ‘between the self and 
they’ (Ricoeur 2004, 132); a framing of memory that is inclusive of the ‘inwardness’ 
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perspective of agency whilst also allowing for the ‘collective’ sharing of memories with 
‘others’. This middle ground proposed by Ricoeur entails being in close proximity with 
‘others’. That is, being close with ‘others’ (groups) whilst at the same time maintaining a 
relation to the self; between the private solitary individual and public communal life 
(Ricoeur 2004, 132). ‘[C]lose relations’ are individuals who ‘approve of my existence 
and whose existence I approve of in the reciprocity and equality of esteem’ (Ricoeur 2004, 
132). It is with ‘close relations’ that an individual can speak and remember, and 
importantly, includes those who may not approve of an individual’s actions though do 
not dismiss the individual’s experience.76 In other words, being close with ‘others’ is the 
capacity to share stories of the past with ‘others’ and have a collective understanding of 
events without individuals being reduced to the collective identity of a group. Sharing 
stories ‘with others’, Ricoeur suggests, is what forms a ‘life in common’ (Ricoeur 2004, 
131-132). Specifically, a shared understanding of a traumatic past is not located in what 
a given community (group) remembers about itself. Rather it is the stories of individuals 
which they tell each other about the origins of their shared experience of past events 
(Leichter 2012). It is the plural stories of individuals and heterogeneous experiences 
communally shared that forms a ‘life in common’ with ‘others’ (Ricoeur 2004, 131-132). 
Whilst the sharing of heterogeneous memories of the past with groups is for Ricoeur an 
important component of ‘memory’, Ricoeur does acknowledge that collective 
understanding of the past produced through individual experiences can potentially be 
problematic, particularly the institutional production of memory.  
 
Manipulated Memory 
Ricoeur users the term ‘manipulated memory’ in relation to institutionalised production 
of memory (Ricoeur 2004, 80). Specifically, the institutionalised production of memory 
entails strategies including the intentional omission of certain facts and the promotion of 
others, and a contextual narrative emphasising a casual relationship between events. For 
Ricoeur it is within ‘manipulated memory’ that ideology functions, justifying power ‘that 
the resources of manipulation provided by narrative are mobilised’ (Ricoeur 2004, 85). 
Here, an important point of note in framing the thesis’s conceptual understanding of 
 
76 Ricoeur’s understanding of ‘close relations’ engages with Augustine’s thought: ‘my true brothers are 
those who rejoice for me in their hearts when they find good in me [qui cum approbat me], and grieve for 
me when they find sin. They are my true brothers, because whether they see good in me or evil, they love 
me still. To such as these, I shall reveal myself [indicabo me]’ (Confessions, 10.4, 209). 
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memory. The framework takes an interpretation of Ricoeur’s thought on ‘manipulated 
memory’, not using the idea of ideology but, rather, discursive conditions. Discursivity is 
understood here to mean the way in which language constitutes meaning and knowledge 
that then becomes accepted social practices, on which serious claims to truth and falsity 
are made (Foucault 1991). Whilst the framework acknowledges there are conceptual 
contours in reading ‘manipulated memory’ through the discursive lens (Foucault 1972), 
that said, there are key overlaps between discursive conditions and ideology in 
understanding ‘manipulated memory’.77 In particular, they are both conceptual tools 
concerned with showing how institutional structures and forms of power construct 
identity and knowledge about the past.  
 According to Ricoeur, the institutional construction of the past, manipulated 
memory, centres around the legal demand for the public expression of memory (Ricoeur 
2004, 220). For the thesis, it is the institutional actors and discursive practices of 
institutions, such as the ICTR, which mould and structure the ‘manipulation’ of memory. 
Institutional discursive conditions and practices act to legitimate certain constructions of 
knowledge of past events. Crucially, manipulated memory in international institutions is 
centred around hierarchal systems of power and order that legitimise certain courses of 
action (Ricoeur 2004, 83). For Ricoeur, the production of institutional knowledge of past 
events is legitimised through a hierarchal relation between the agency of certain actors 
being enacted over actors with less or no agency (Ricoeur 2004, 83). In the context of this 
thesis the ICTR is understood as an institution that entails discursive conditions and 
practices, which are systems of power that structure and legitimatise certain knowledge 
whilst simultaneously constraining other forms of knowledge (see Chapter 3 for 
discussion on discursivity). Importantly, understanding the ICTR as a site of ‘manipulated 
memory’ will contribute to the thesis arguing that the discursive conditions at the ICTR 
construct a narrow, rigid and fixed memory of the mass human rights violations in 
Rwanda.  
 Directly related to Ricoeur’s understanding of institutional production of 
knowledge of past events (‘manipulated memory’) is the problem of dominant ‘norms’. 
More specifically, in the context of knowledge construction dominant ‘norms’ and 
institutions should be considered jointly (Ricoeur 2004, 220). Ricoeur argues that 
 
77 Using discursive conditions rather than ideology is also intended as acknowledgement to Foucault’s 
dislike of the term ideology, which Foucault argued would result in understanding reality as a singular 
and which he refuted (Foucault 1979). 
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institutions tie together models of social relations and behaviors including dominant 
‘norms’, which leads to the notion of regularity (Ricoeur 2004, 220). In the context of the 
thesis we can think of legal and human rights norms at the ICTR as a dominant ‘norm’. 
Specifically legal and human rights norms form a paradigm of how legal witnessing 
‘should be’ (see Chapter 1). It is in this regularity of institutions and the role of ‘norms’ 
in the representation of past phenomena that they produce collective knowledge, and 
constraints to the way that knowledge is constructed and framed. Ricoeur argues that a 
dominant ‘norm’ is one of the key components for the construction of knowledge of past 
events (Ricoeur 2004). This epistemological frame acts as a powerful representation that 
classifies and constrains.  
 
From Agamben and Ricoeur to an original conceptual framework: analysing the 
way legal witnesses remember at the ICTR 
The discussion so far has explained the conceptual ideas, ‘tool kit’, the thesis takes from 
the philosophical thought of Giorgio Agamben and Paul Ricoeur. It is now necessary to 
draw together these conceptual insights into an original conceptual framework for 
understanding legal witnessing at the ICTR. It is this conceptual framework that the thesis 
proposes will expand existing transitional justice legal scholarship’s understanding of 
what it is witnesses are, and the way in which witnesses remember in international 
criminal tribunals and courts. It is suggested here that using these concepts and drawing 
them together provides a framework to question the labels and assumptions in the existing 
legal transitional justice scholarship on legal witnessing, and, offers a novel insight which 
moves beyond the current saturated debates within traditional legal frameworks for 
understanding legal witnesses (Combs 2010). Specifically, the thesis’s conceptual 
framework is directed at challenging and offering an alternative to the narrow procedure 
lens of traditional legal frameworks, human rights norms as a framework for legal 
witnessing, and the need to understand legal memory construction as process.  
Traditional legal frameworks often focus on whether the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence relating to witness testimony have been adhered to. For example, as argued in 
Chapter 1 legal analysis of witnessing at international tribunals and courts often centres 
around debates of procedural legitimacy, for example, the process of ‘witness proofing’ 
(Ambos 2008; Jordash 2009; Karemaker 2008; Shoen 2010).78 Framed in the context of 
 
78 Also see Chapter 1 for a critique of Combs’s approach to legal witnesses. 
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procedural legitimacy and legal systems these debates focus on the ‘correct’ functioning 
of witnessing in international tribunals and courts. Whilst discussions of procedural rigour 
are necessary, what these approaches miss, or are conceptually unable to comprehend, is 
the question of ‘how’ legal witnessing is.79 This has led to the transitional justice legal 
scholarship neglecting to question the normalisation of witnessing. In other words, 
traditional legal frameworks as a lens to analyse legal witnessing begins with the 
assumption that what it is witnesses are is self-evident. What is missed by this legal 
analysis is understanding witnessing as non-instrumental, a contingent and multi-layered 
discursive process. This is where the framework’s conceptual component, subjectivity 
(witness), will be used to show the way in which individuals become subjects always 
entails the potential not to become a given subject. That is, the identity of an individual 
is never predetermined, and the identity of a group, such as witnesses, is not singular and 
therefore never self-evident. 
The thesis’s conceptual framework also pushes up against the recurrent 
understanding of legal witnessing in the scholarship, which is framed within the human 
rights project. In particular, right to truth and the perceived crucial role it has in 
international tribunals and courts to aid victims to come to terms with the past (see 
Chapter 1). However, this human rights discourse on witness memories fails to 
comprehend the discursive and contingent nature of memory. This is because there exists 
a fundamental principle within normative human rights discourse that individual victims 
of rights abuses have a universal right to agency in legal proceedings (Klinkner and Smith 
2015, 11-12). It is the conceptual components of the ‘grey zone’ and ‘Muselmann’ (lacuna 
of law-justice) that the thesis uses to suggest the legal witnessing at the ICTR is located 
in a ‘grey zone’, which challenges the notion that legal and human rights norms are the 
‘bridge’ to move from a violent past to a more peaceful future. It is this normative human 
rights discourse that often leads to ‘faith-based’ rather than ‘fact-based’ prescriptions 
(Clark 2012, 12). This exemplifies the need for the transitional justice legal scholarship 
to examine the discursive conditions of legal witnessing in which the subject of ‘witness’ 
is constituted and the manner in which memory becomes fixed and rigid. 
 Within the limited work that has been done on the legal production of memory, 
Mark Osiel’s conceptual insights directly engage with questions on the legal construction 
 
79 For discussion critiquing witness testimonies and their contribution to historical ‘truth’ in international 
criminal trials, see Wilson 2011; Gaynor 2012; Viebach 2017; Dembour and Hasham 2004.  
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of memory after mass atrocities (see Chapter 6).80 Crucially, however, the thesis positions 
itself against Osiel’s conceptual offering that proposes the legal construction of memory 
can, and should, construct a collective societal understanding of past atrocities. For Osiel, 
trials established in response to mass atrocities successfully ‘stimulate reflection [and] 
such proceedings indelibly influence collective memory of the events they judge’ (Osiel 
2000, 2). Osiel argues that, seen through a lens of liberal legalism, collective memory 
constructed at trials and established in response to administrative massacres can provide 
individuals affected by mass violence with a shared understanding of the reason that led 
to the atrocities occurring. Osiel notes, ‘liberal show trials are ones that are self-
consciously designed to show the merits of liberal morality and to do so in ways consistent 
with its very requirements’ (Osiel 2000, 65). In short, memories belonging to individuals 
can be ‘recovered’ through trials. Here, individuals are perceived as self-evident beings 
capable of thought autonomously to the material world. However, the thesis argues that, 
seen through the framework’s theoretical lens, what it is witnesses are, and the way in 
which they remember, are formed within a tightly controlled discursive field.  
To recap, memory is understood by this thesis as something that is plural, multi-
directional and pliable (Rothberg 2008, 5), which means it can be shaped and reshaped 
across and between spaces of memory (see Chapter 1, Section 5). Notwithstanding the 
plurality and fragility of memory, in the context of transitional justice, truth recovery in 
legal trials at the ICTR can become a dominant discursive practice (see Chapters 3-4). 
International legal institutions, such as the ICTR, and the international actors – judges, 
legal counsel, registrars, investigators – who inhabit these spaces of memory production, 
shape in important ways the discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing, in which 
legitimate meaning and knowledge of past violations are constituted (Ricoeur 2004, 80). 
Crucially, the thesis’s conceptual framework will contribute to the discussion on the role 
of witnesses and how the past is remembered during political transition, by highlighting 
the need for the study and practice of transitional justice to fully understand how 
theoretical insights can make visible the complexities and contours of the legal 









This chapter has discussed and outlined the conceptual insights from Agamben 
(‘witness’) and Ricoeur (‘memory’), which have been drawn together to construct the 
original conceptual framework for the thesis. It is these conceptual insights which the 
chapter has argued will provide the conceptual framework for this thesis’s investigation 
attempting to better understand the extent to which memory constructed through legal 
witnessing is able to contribute to the wide-reaching aspirations of transitional justice. 
The transitional justice legal scholarship has largely neglected to analyse the way in which 
international legal institutions are important sites of legal memory construction and 
production, which is where the thesis’s conceptual framework will contribute. The 
theoretical framework of the thesis, discussed above, understands the legal production of 
memory as constructed within a field of tightly controlled discursive conditions (see 
discussion on Foucault and discursivity: Chapter 3). The discursivity of legal memory 
construction will be argued by the thesis (Chapters 4-6) that the ICTR produces a narrow, 
singular and rigid memory of past human rights violations. It is a singular authoritative 
legal narrative of a violent past that directs the thesis to argue that the public construction 
of individual internal memories into an authoritative legal collective story should have 
limited application in how transitional justice discourses shape the future of transitioning 
communities. Therefore, it is through the conceptual lens of the thesis, that it will be 
shown what is at stake during legal witnessing and the manner in which collective 
remembering is constructed. Therefore the conceptual offering of the thesis provides a 
lens through which we are able to gain a better understanding of the scope, and 
limitations, in which historical accounts of the past, produced through legal 
determinations of ‘the truth’, can make a contribution to the wider transitional justice 






Chapter 3 - Discourse and Legal Archives 
 
Introduction 
In order for the thesis to be able to show how the original conceptual framework can be 
applied to the empirical context of legal witnessing at the ICTR, it is the purpose of this 
chapter to present a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis as a suitable method 
for analysing archived ICTR legal documents and UoW interview transcripts. Therefore, 
Chapter 3 aims to outline the ICTR and UoW archives as the data to be analysed and 
explain poststructuralism as the methodological approach of the research. The thesis 
engages with the original conceptual framework and the date from a Foucauldian 
poststructuralist position. The latter part of the chapter draws upon Michel Foucault’s 
thought on discourse theory which the chapter uses to construct an analytical framework 
that will be employed to conduct a close discursive reading of ICTR archived legal 
documents and interview transcripts (Chapters 4-7).  
The chapter begins by outlining as the data to be analysed the ICTR archives and 
interview transcripts of ICTR personnel from an online archive created by the UoW. The 
material analysed from the ICTR archive includes written and transcribed 
communications between legal counsels and judges, witness statements, statutes and rules 
of procedure and evidence, motion and motion decisions, indictments, and pre-trial briefs. 
Importantly for the research, analysing ICTR court documents and interview transcripts 
is discursivity. Discursivity is understood here to mean the way in which language 
constitutes meaning and knowledge that then become accepted social practice, on which 
serious claims to truth and falsity are made (Foucault 1991). More specifically, it is the 
discursive conditions constituting particular political subjects and objects of knowledge 
that entail processes of inclusion/exclusion that are of interest (Foucault 1972). Thus, this 
research understands discursive conditions to involve a set of rules or ‘discursive 
formations’ that are ‘specific to a particular time, space and cultural setting’, determining 
under what conditions meaning emerges within discourse. In other words, it is not a case 
of ‘external determinations being imposed on people’s thought’, instead it is a case of 
rules allowing certain statements – language – to be made (O’Farrell 2005, 79). 
 The chapter then goes on to discuss a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and 
the epistemological implications for this research of taking this methodological position. 
This includes outlining how Foucault’s understanding of discourse is distinct from 
linguistic understandings of discourse such as those conceived by Saussure, Levi-Strauss, 
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Benveniste and others, and why a Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis is a 
suitable mode for analysing the discursive conditions of witnessing within the archived 
ICTR court documents and interview transcripts. In short, it is understanding discourse 
not as a ‘language system’ in which utterances and statements relate to syntactically well-
formed grammatical sentences. Rather, this research understands discourse to entail a set 
of contingent rules in which the objects and subjects who describe them are constituted 
(Foucault 1972).  
 
The Data 
The transcripts of communications between legal counsels from which the data 
were collected and analysed included prosecution indictments, detailing the witnesses to 
be called during trials and summaries of what will be included in their testimonies. It also 
includes legal counsels’ motions and motion decisions documents relating to the 
admissibility of witnesses, commonly including a detailed exposition of the authentic or 
inauthentic knowledge correlating to rights violations. Transcripts of pre-trial briefs were 
also analysed.  
The material from the ICTR online archives formed the majority of data that was 
analysed. However the ICTR archive, like all archives, are partial and thus contain gaps 
(Keetlaar 2012). In order to address some of these gaps, archived transcripts of interviews 
with ICTR staff were also analysed. These interviews were conducted by the UoW 
Faculty of Law (2008-2009) for their project ‘Voices from the Rwanda Tribunal’, and 
include the full transcripts, audio and video recordings of the interviews along with all of 
the questions the interviewees were asked. The online archive contains 49 interviews with 
ICTR personnel including Judges, Acting Chief of Investigations, Legal Officers, 
Prosecution and Defence Counsel, Investigators, and the Chief of Information. The 
University of Washington’s project was created for the purpose of establishing an online 
archive of information with the intention that it be reused and repurposed by others 
including Rwandans, researchers, artists and educators (Nathan 2011, 593). The interview 
transcripts provide very useful information about first hand experiences of the functioning 
of the tribunal relating to witnesses and therefore offers the thesis an additional 
complement of data in analysing the discursive conditions of witnessing at the ICTR. The 
data quoted in Chapters 4-7 is drawn from a larger quantity of analysed data. The data 
analysed included 512 documents across the two primary ICTR case studies. The data 
analysed also included 43 archived ICTR documents from other ICTR cases. 
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Furthermore, 23 interview transcripts of ICTR personnel taken from the UoW online 
archive were also analysed. 
Identifying the discursive conditions within the court documents and interview 
transcripts entails the analysis identifying the repeatability of statements. In a Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse, statements are ‘series of signs’ (Foucault 1972), in which, 
certain subjects and objects are constituted whilst other ‘just as feasible’ subjects and 
objects are not (Foucault 1972). For example, the way in which legal counsels and judges 
deploy certain statements, i.e. in the ‘interest of justice’, instead of other ‘feasible’ 
statements. Importantly, it is also the discursive conditions within relational groups of 
statements that constitute the subject of witness that the analysis will attempt to 
understand. Following the idea that the identity of witness is not a pre-existing thing, 
identity is not a pre-determined condition which defines human beings (Foucault 1972). 
It is the aim of the analysis to identify the discursive conditions that constitute the subject 
of witness, what it is witnesses are and can do; the way relations of statements produce 
witness subjects, and the authority by which the language of witnesses produces 
legitimate knowledge about the past. As such, the analysis focuses on the discursive 
conditions that determine who is rendered with the right to speak, subject of witness, and 
how language constitutes meaning which defines the conditions in which individual 
memories of the past can be externalised.  
 The archives of international tribunals and courts, specifically the ICTR, are 
commonly perceived by these institutions and the legal scholarship on transitional justice 
as providing a historical legal record of the facts of mass human rights violations (Adami 
and Hunt 2005; Adami 2007). However, whilst the legal scholarship commonly advocates 
the importance of legal archives during transitional periods, there has been minimal direct 
engagement with legal archives by the transitional justice scholarship.81 This thesis 
provides a conceptual enquiry into witnessing and legal memory and thus challenges the 
perception of transitional justice archives as passive repositories of history (Adami and 
Hunt 2005). Importantly this research understands legal archives as a site where the 
discursive formation and conditions that constitute a discourse of witnessing can be 
explored. In considering the research’s epistemological position, whereby the meaning 
and knowledge of past violations is part of a contingent discursive construction, the ICTR 
archive material is an important, and underexplored, discursive space. This research 
 
81 For existing discussions on transitional justice archives, which predominantly exists within the field of Archival Studies see: 
Adami and Hunt 2005; Campbell 2013; Ketlaar 2012; Peterson 2008; Redwood 2017; Syrri 2008; Sachs 2006. 
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suggests the archive documents at the ICTR need to be understood as entailing the 
discursive conditions upon which law produces an authoritative singular account of a 
violent past. The ICTR archives are not analysed here in order to determine whether the 
legal process has allowed witnesses to remember. Rather, understanding the restricted 
space of the discursive field and the set of conditions that forms it, allows both memory 
and witness subject(s) to be understood as being discursively constituted. By applying a 
Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis, the discursive conditions that constitute 
the witness and the meaning of the past, this thesis argues that the ICTR archives are a 
crucial site which can offer an alternative understanding on the scope, and limitations, 
through which international tribunals and courts can contribute to historical truth telling 
during transition.  
The ICTR archives provide a suitable data-set for analysing a discourse of 
witnessing in the context of transitional justice and legal tribunals’ contribution to 
understanding the traumatic past. Furthermore, the ICTR and ICTY as ad-hoc tribunals 
were pre-cursors to the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) 
established in 2002. 82  In particular, the ICC’s legal rules (Rome Statute) governing the 
use of witnesses and testimonial evidence given in court has a direct correlation to the 
ICTR’s ‘rules of procedure and evidence’. As such, the discursive conditions of 
witnessing identified at the ICTR, using a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis 
could be applied in future research to archived documents at the ICC to see if a similar 
set of discursive conditions are evident. However, it is important to note here, that in 
suggesting a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis could be applied to other 
international tribunals and courts; the epistemological limits of a poststructuralist 
methodology means it is not the intention of this analysis to provide a template of 
witnessing which can be applied unconditionally to any given phenomena. However, 
what is offered is one alternative conceptual understanding of the legal discursive 
conditions of witnessing. 
The choice of archival data, instead of other sources of data collection such as 
fieldwork, analysed using Foucauldian discourse analysis is suitable for this thesis’s 
critique of international criminal institutions, using the context of the ICTR. The analysis 
of archival data using textual analysis is a well-established and productive method within 
numerous disciplines for investigating processes of knowledge production (Ahl 2007, 
 
82 For a discussion on the ad-hoc tribunals in relation to the creation of the ICC. See: Schabas 2014. 
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247). This well-established use of archival data and textual analysis supports this thesis’ 
decision to engage with archival sources from the ICTR and UoW. Moreover, a fieldtrip 
to the ICTR archival facility in Arusha was planned, however this had to be cancelled due 
to practical ICTR issues relating to accessibility of the physical archive (see Chapter 7). 
Related, applying a Foucauldian discourse analysis to the archival data allowed the thesis 
to investigate how institutional process, and its actors, construct knowledge about the 
past. Furthermore, the central focus of the thesis is the ICTR rather than explicitly 
Rwanda. Understanding post-genocide Rwanda and memory construction in the country 
is an important site of research and has indeed been a site of investigation by numerous 
scholars (Viebach 2019; Longman 2017; Burnet 2012; Cieplak 2017). However, memory 
construction in Rwanda is not the stated central focus of this thesis, rather the thesis’ 
choice of the case study of the ICTR, and archival data, fits the main thrust of the thesis 
which is a critique of liberal international law as a response to mass atrocities. 
Notwithstanding this, the context of the thesis’s investigation has relation to Rwanda, 
which is a theme taken up in Chapter 7’s discussion on the potential role ICTR archival 
material could have in aiding the post genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. In short, the 
choice of the thesis to engage with archival data and to use a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, is suitable methodologic approach for this thesis’ focus on how the ICTR as a 
legal institution constructs witness memories.  
As this thesis is using Foucault’s insights on discourse, it is worth briefly 
summarising the similarities between Foucault and Agamben, particularly in how they 
understand the philosophy of language and methodology (Snoek 2010, 48-56). 
Agamben himself has acknowledged the influence of Foucault on his own philosophical 
writings (Agamben 2008). Agamben was criticised for not fully explaining his 
paradigm concept. He stated that he did not feel an explanation was necessary as this 
concept was so closely related to Foucault’s historical methodology, he thought it was 
obvious (Agamben 2002, 2-3). Moreover Agamben and Foucault share a similar 
understanding of subjectivity and knowledge (Frost 2017). Agamben and Foucault 
agree that identity and knowledge are constituted within language, and both theorists 
refute the notion of the existence of origins or foundations (Snoek 2010, 56).  These 
conceptual similarities between Foucault and Agamben support the decision to apply a 






The ICTR archives: selecting the ‘corpus’ for a Foucauldian discourse analysis 
Conducting a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis of ICTR archived 
documents and interview transcripts requires what Foucault referred to as identifying the 
‘archive’ (Foucault 1972, 146). Foucault understood the ‘archive’ not as a mass of records 
documenting social practices, although the ‘archive’ for this thesis happens to be taken 
from an archive in this sense. Rather, an ‘archive’ is ‘the general system of the formation 
and transformation of statements’ (Foucault 1972, 146), which for the thesis is the relation 
of statements within the ICTR documents that constitutes the witness subject. Identifying 
an ‘archive’ requires acknowledging that Foucault’s thought on discursivity did not 
provide a complete method for conducting discourse analysis. As Kendall and Wickham 
state, ‘they do not add up to a coherent statement of his methodology and they hardly 
constitute a user-friendly “how to” guide to Foucauldian scholarship’ (Kendall and 
Wickham 2011, 2). This lack of a coherent method within Foucault’s work on discourse 
points towards that there is not one singular mode of Foucauldian discourse analysis. As 
Diaz-Bone (2007) notes, Foucauldian concepts of discourse analysis have developed into 
numerous national and international domains. As such, the term Foucauldian discourse 
analysis does not define a singular field of study. 83 Rather: 
 
one can speak of a fragmented international field containing national ‘subfields’, 
which are more or less self-oriented. Some of these have a rich tradition of their 
own and focus mainly on this tradition (as, for example, does French discourse 
research); some are more internationally oriented (Diaz-Bone 2007, 7). 
 
Whilst there are numerous national subfields and internationally orientated perspectives 
on Foucauldian discourse analysis, this thesis takes a poststructuralist methodology and 
draws directly upon Foucault’s thinking on ‘discursive formations’ understood as being 
 
83 Diaz-Bones identifies Foucauldian discourse analysis developing in national subfields including: 
French – Annales School (Pecheux 1975; Althusser 1970; Bachelard 2016), German (Zimmerman 2007), 
Great Britain (Fairclough 2010), and the Netherlands (Wodak 1995). For a summary discussion on 
national subfields of Foucauldian discourse analysis see Diaz-Bones (2007). Foucauldian understanding 
of discourse in the Great British field led to a strand of discourse analysis being developed: Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA methodology, whose development was highly influenced by the work 
of Ruth Wodak, combines Foucault’s thinking with linguistics and sociolinguistics. In particular, 
Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis was influential in Norman Fairclough’s thinking, 
specifically his ‘Three Dimensional Approach’ to CDA. See Fairclough (2010). Also see; Muleffu 2019; 
Wodak 2009; Dijk 2006; Richardson 2007; Kelsey 2015. 
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related to French Discourse Analysis (FDA).84 That being, it is specifically the influence 
of French structuralist Ferdinand de Saussure on Foucault’s thinking of statements and 
discursive rules of formation and FDA’s primary concern with poststructuralist 
methodology (Diaz-Bone 2007, 8-9; Williams 1999). 85  
 The thesis conducting a Foucauldian discourse analysis informed by the FDA 
‘field’ means the selection of the ‘text’ (‘corpus’) to be analysed is explicitly related to 
identifying the research problem. As Williams points out: 
 
[o]nce the definition of the problem has been achieved, the problem of collecting 
a large corpus of text for the objective in hand can be confronted. That is, the 
problem must be defined before the nature of the corpus unit (Williams 1999, 258-
259). 
 
In other words, identifying the ‘problem at hand’ then allows the researcher to select the 
‘corpus’, which will facilitate an investigation into the chosen research problem.86 The 
problem this thesis has identified is remembering the past and the discursive creation of 
the witness.  
Therefore this requires a ‘corpus’ (ICTR documents and interview transcripts) in 
which the legal discursive conditions which constitute memory and the witness subject 
can be analysed, which is selected by the researcher. The researcher identifying suitable 
‘corpus’ for a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis can be seen in Helen Ahl’s 
research on representations of women in academic papers. Ahl used a Foucauldian 
framework to conduct a discourse analysis of academic research papers on women’s 
entrepreneurship, in order to understand how the female entrepreneur was discursively 
constructed.87 Ahl selected 81 research articles on woman’s entrepreneurship published 
 
84 Undoubtedly Foucault as a French Philosopher, Historian, and Epistemologist was highly influential in 
the thinking of FDA, though it was also the case that ‘the groups in the Parisian region which promoted a 
Foucauldian form of discourse analysis as an empirical method were interdisciplinary from the beginning’ 
(Diaz-Bone 2007, 9). Similarly, Williams notes that French discourse analysts were ‘embedded in the 
wider context of post-structuralism and therefore not narrowly oriented only to the works of one author’ 
(Williams 1999, 251). See ‘French Discourse Analysis: The Method of Post-Structuralism’ (Williams 
1999). 
85 Whilst Foucault was influenced by structuralist thought he never perceived himself as a ‘structuralist’ 
(Foucault 1983). For discussions on structuralism’s impact on Foucault’s thought: See Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982, 16-43. Also see Glyn Williams 1999, 33-62. For discussion on Louis Althusser’s 
influence on poststructuralism in FDA see Williams 1999, 67-76. 
86 For a discussion on poststructuralist methodologies in legal research see Sohki-Bulley 2013, 2019. 
87 A further example of research using Foucauldian discourse analysis is Bonnafous’s (1991) research on 
racism in the French press (Bonnafous 1991). It was the press, that Bonnafous argued, stood between 
‘oral discourse which was’ not meant to be preserved and the ‘reflection that exists in the discourse of 
politicians’. Bonnafous selected 10 newspapers which represented the spectrum of French political 
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between 1982-2000. In justifying her ‘text’ selection Ahl argued ‘[t]he discourse in 
research texts are particularly important study objects since researchers enjoy an expert 
status in society. They are seen as those who are supposed to know and are often asked 
for opinions by the popular media’ (Ahl 2007, 219). The above definition of ‘corpus’ 
selecting is interpreted by this thesis for the identified problem as archived ICTR 
documents. Investigating the discursive conditions of legal witnessing during periods of 
transition (ICTR) requires investigating the manner in which written and transcribed 
communications between legal counsels and judges; the tribunals Statutes and Rules of 
Procedure; witnesses and the recalling of violations (witness statements, indictments, 
witness lists) are edited, changed, discarded, and transformed by the discursive conditions 
at the ICTR. The documents from which a close discursive reading was conducted have 
been taken from two ICTR cases, Ildephonse Nizeyimana and Emmanuel Rukundo and 
(see Appendix 1 for case details). These two cases were selected primarily because of the 
location in Rwandan where their crimes occurred and the length of the cases. The 
Nizeyimana case relates to the Butare area in Rwanda which was where some of the most 
extensive and prolonged violence occurred, and the total length of the two cases, 
particularly Nizeyimana, accounts for a significant time period of the ICTR’s lifespan and 
has resulted in an extensive collection of legal documents. The large collection of legal 
documents for these two cases offers the thesis a useful data across a range of legal 
processes before witnesses testified in court. There is also the practical implication of 
working with the ICTR online archival material that has influenced the thesis’s choice of 
case studies. Specifically, some of the ICTR ‘landmark’ cases that would have been 
relevant and suitable case studies currently have limited publicly available documents 
from the archive. This is partly because the digitisation process is still ongoing and many 
documents relating to these ‘landmark’ cases, such as Akayesu, are currently going 
through the process of legal review. This is particularly prevalent for early ICTR cases 
such as Akayesu and Kambanda (former head of state) (see Chapter 7).88   
To be sure, the thesis does not analyse the discursive conditions of witnessing of 
the selected ‘corpus’ in order to uncover previously hidden truths of past rights violations 
or to offer a conceptual template of testimony in which the witness is able to become an 
 
opinion published between 1974-1984 (Bonnafous 1991 in Williams 1999, 231). Also See; ‘A 
Foucauldian framework for discourse analysis’ (Ahl 2007, 216-250). 
88 The ICTR have indicted 93 individuals in which 62 have received sentences. A further 14 have been 
acquitted, 10 cases referred to national judication for trial, three indicted individuals are currently still at 
large, two were deceased before judgment, and two cases were dropped before trial (ICTR 2015).  
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emancipated subject. As such, the selected research ‘corpus’ from a poststructuralist 
position is not an unproblematic collection of ‘texts’, which can provide objective 
reflection of an existing reality. Rather, ‘texts’ are ‘part of the reality producing process’ 
(Ahl 2007, 219). However, it is the aim of the research to offer an understanding of the 
data (‘corpus’) that will recast the phenomenon of witnessing, offering an alternative 
understanding of the role of memory during legal redress of violations of human rights. 
Importantly, understanding discourse as a series of representations involves 
understanding the conclusion the research reaches as one interpretation of the data. Thus, 
this research does not claim to offer a more truthful understanding of witness memories 
at the ICTR, but rather an alternative understanding of how law constructs meaning and 
knowledge during periods of transition. Claims this research makes should always be 
subject to the same tenet of investigation that gave rise to it. In short, the intention of 
selecting the documents detailed above housed in the ICTR archives and the archived 
interview transcripts is an attempt to show that discursively we can take this data as a 
wider discursive creation of the condition and possibility of the witness, what is it 
witnesses are and the way in which witnesses remember. 
 
Framing the data and methodology 
A general orientation of research focusing on periods of political transition, particularly 
within transitional justice, is an investigation of empirical evidence (Gahima 2013; Jones 
2009; Schabas 2006; Waldorf 2009). These investigations (Combs 2010; Gahima 2013; 
Klinkner and Smith 2015) typically attempt to work with data to find new evidence that 
can uncover previously unknown facts. Scholars such as Sharp (2019) and K. Clark 2011 
have noted that empirical research into mass violations of human rights can have a 
tendency to privilege new facts over theoretical constellations (Sharp 2019, 13). 
Accordingly, this privileging perceives working with empirical data will lead to 
undocumented evidence, which can unveil new facts about an existing reality (K.Clarke 
2011). However, Sharp suggests that an emphasis on empirical evidence can leave 
theoretically focused engagements with data open to criticism regarding their contribution 
to research (Sharp 2019, 5). Sharp’s note relates to Mamdani who has emphasised the 
importance of methodological rigor: ‘facts need to be put in context and interpreted, 
neither of which is possible without theoretical illumination’ (Mandani 2002, xiii). Both 
Mamdani’s and Sharp’s points are insightful, inasmuch as to distinguish between 
empirical facts and theoretical engagements in such a way suggests subverting the 
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importance of theory when working with empirical evidence (Coward 2009, xii). The 
reason for highlighting this point is to position the thesis’s engagement with the data. To 
understand the non-instrumental role of the witness requires not just empirical evidence 
but a new interpretation of existing evidence through a conceptual re-working of the 
evidence (Coward 2009, xii).89  
The empirical evidence this thesis analyses and interprets is neither new nor are 
the facts the data pertains to undocumented. It is not the purpose of this research to analyse 
a discourse on witnessing in order to uncover previously undiscovered facts attaining to 
the indictments and successful prosecution of perpetrators. Indeed, from the thesis’s 
perspective it is likely that the facts discussed are relatively well known and are publicly 
available. However, what is being argued here is that by problematising memory and 
witnessing, an attempt can be made to reinterpret existing facts and to better understand 
the manner in which truth-claims emerge, which occurs in discourse (Coward 2009, xii).  
It is within discourse that identity is constituted; that is to say, the identity of 
human beings is not a pre-existing thing that has remained the unchanged condition of 
the human subject throughout history (Foucault 1982, 331). From this, the thesis does not 
take the human subject to be an individual self-evident being, as human rights advocates 
and liberal perspectives within the transitional justice literature and practice often 
understand it to be, either explicitly or implicitly (Combs 2010; Klinkner and Smith 2015; 
Osiel 2000). Here we can see the similarities between Foucault and Agamben’s 
understanding of identity, Agamben, like Foucault, rejects the notion that identity is self-
evident. From the perspectives such as Combs 2010; Klinkner and Smith 2015, 
individuals are perceived as existentially pre-existing other ‘subjects’ and ‘things’, in that, 
individuals are interiority beings capable of thought autonomously to the material world 
and society (Foucault 1977). However, this research understands the subject as 
‘continuously dissolved and recreated in different configurations, along with other forms 
of knowledge and social practices’ (Foucault 1977, 118). Thus, the empirical data this 
research analyses is constitutive of a discursive formation of a discourse of witnessing, in 
which it is the discursive conditions that constitute the subject position of witness. 
 
 
89 This is an approach used by Martin Coward, arguing the anthropocentric understanding of political 
violence evident in the literature failed to understand urbicide – the destruction of the built environment – 
as a form of political violence. Accordingly, Coward was able to show, developing a conceptual 
framework, the role urbicide has in ‘negating plural communities and constituting homogenous, 
exclusionary political programs’ (Coward 2009, xiii).   
97 
 
Methodology and Research design  
To be able to understand the thesis’s use of ‘rule of formation’ as the analytical tool for 
analysing the ICTR archived documents there firstly needs to be a discussion of what 
discourse is. As Howarth indicates, the multi-disciplinary use of discourse has created 
widening interpretations and understandings of the term discourse (Howarth 2000, 1). 
Within the social sciences ‘discourse is often perceived as tantamount to the social 
system, within which, discourses literally constitute the social and political world’ 
(Howarth 2000, 2). One such approach to discourse, and which is the understanding of 
discourse taken by this research, is that of Michel Foucault.  
Foucault understood discourse to be ‘historically specific systems of meaning’ in 
which the identities of subjects and objects are formed (Foucault 1972, 49). Moreover, 
for Foucault it is through specific historical rules that consideration can be given to the 
manner in which discourses are both shaped by social practices and how they shape 
‘social relationships and institutions’ (Foucault 1972, 55). Importantly, the historical 
tracing of discourse is not centred on binary practices of foregrounding a falsehood or 
uncovering a hidden truth per se, but rather focuses on identifying the historical effects 
of truth within discourse (Foucault 1972, 50). The historical effects of truth, constituted 
within discourse, involve the discursive formations and representation of knowledge. 
Here, the production of knowledge is part of a contingent system of discursive formations, 
a representation allowing for the making of truth and false claims that become over time 
normalised accepted social practices (Foucault 1972, 98-101). All social practices have 
meaning and it is those meanings that construct and influence our actions, so all social 
practices have discursive elements. It is discourse that forms topics, and Foucault points 
out that our knowledge is not only defined by it but also produced by it (Foucault 1972, 
50-68). 
Foucault’s understanding of discourse carries with it distinct epistemological 
assumptions about the social and political world. Firstly, Foucault’s positioning of 
discourse as the constitutive ‘conditions for [objects’] historical appearance’, dispenses 
with the objectivist accounts that reduce discourse to a ‘pre-existing reality’ (Foucault 
1972, 48; Howarth 2000, 52-53). Accordingly, objects are created within discourse and 
made possible by discursive rules of formation, which relate objects ‘to the body of rules 
that enable them to form as objects’, constituting the conditions of their historical 
appearance (Howarth 2000, 50). So, from a Foucauldian perspective, discourse is not a 
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linguistic mechanism that describes objects. Rather discourse is what constitutes both 
objects and subjects.  
To understand discourse being the constitutive foundation of objects as well as 
subjects is an understanding of the human being not as a universal person that has 
remained the unchanged basis of the human subject ‘for all of history’ (Foucault 1972). 
Instead, it is the historical modes in which it has become possible for human beings to be 
made particular subjects (Foucault 1982, 207-208). As Foucault states, ‘[n]othing in man 
– not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for 
understanding other men’ (Foucault 1987, 87-88). Thus, the important point Foucault 
foregrounds is to understand the human subject not to be a pre-existing thing. Rather it 
requires investigations into the manner in which the identity of subjects are rendered 
possible (Foucault 1987, 88). For example, to understand how identity, woman/man, 
mad/sane or victim/survivor,  have been constituted over ‘time and in different places’ 
requires a binary association of inclusion/exclusion. From this perspective, it is not 
possible for identity, individual or collective, to be taken as natural or unproblematic.  
To comprehend the way in which certain subjects are bestowed the right to speak 
involves consideration of subjects that are not rendered with the right to speak. A subject 
is afforded the right to speak by the manner in which they and the objects they described 
are deemed to be on one side of a dualistic structure. This structure centres on the idea of 
‘the limit attitude’, the limits or boundaries that give meaning to thought and practice 
(Foucault 1979, 198). Of concern here, is the inside/outside binary association. For 
example, in Discipline and Punish (1979) Foucault, using the example of a prison, 
demonstrates what the prison confines of is as much about the identity of society outside 
the prison walls as it is about the prisoners on the inside (Foucault 1979, 205). Outside 
the prison walls the good, civilized society is constituted by the bad, uncivilized, violent 
prisoners contained inside. The pathological effect of criminalising prostitution or drug 
taking is to ‘normalise the moral order’ in which particular behaviours are excluded 
(Foucault 1979, 205-208). As such, the inclusion/exclusion binary of identity involves 
power, although, power in a Foucauldian context needs to be understood as productive 
and not repressive. Here, power is productive in that, it does not contain the possibility of 
limits or constraints. Rather, relations of power establish the limitations of inside in 
relation to outside. Without the limitations of the notion of inside, the outside would not 
exist; ‘we know what this thing is by knowing what it is not’ (Campbell 2014, 232-236). 
Therefore, limitations are productive, a productive form of power – ‘disciplinary power’ 
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– that ‘disciplines’ to be able to produce a particular political subject. As such, the 
particular phenomena that are recognized in history are therefore to be ‘understood as 
constituted by an order always dependent upon the marginalization and exclusion of other 
identities and histories’ (Campbell 2014, 234; Foucault 1979). 
Therefore, this research understands discourse as a series of representations and 
practices. This involves ‘a multiplicity of discursive elements which come into play in 
various strategies’ in which meanings are produced, identities constituted and political 
outcomes made more or less possible (Foucault 1979, 101). Understanding discourse 
from this perspective means the analysis of the data is not intended to show a discourse 
of witnessing is an ‘accepted discourse’ whilst simultaneously excluding other discourses 
(Foucault 1979, 101). Rather, it is the non-uniform and unstable discursive formations 
within the data that are the focus of the analysis.  
 
Statements 
In clarifying the modes of the ‘statement’, as understood by Foucault, and its centrality 
to the thesis’s analysis, it is useful to restate here the distinctive functioning of the 
statement in a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis. As Foucault 
acknowledged, it is difficult to define the statement easily as it covers a lot of ground 
within the formation of discourse (Foucault 1972, 110-116). However, a statement as 
defined within Foucault’s conception of discourse is not language in the sense that would 
centre on proposition and unified meaning. The statement has no inherent correlation with 
the propositional content of spoken words or written sentences. Nor is the statement 
concerned with the human subject as cogitative creator of statements (Foucault 1972, 55-
56; Foucault 1972, 57-67). Rather, the speaking or writing subject is replaced by the 
authorial function, which indicates from where and what authority statements arrive but 
does not deduce anything about the human author of the statement.  
Statements are made possible by their relation with other groups of statements, in 
which language is constituted. Again, language here is not understood as linguistic units, 
but rather as relations of statements which involve an analysis of signs, which are not 
reduced to linguistic units, referred to by Foucault as the ‘enunciating function’ (Foucault 
1972, 99). In relation to the research analysing court documents, the enunciating function 
is analysing language – statements – to foreground the discursive conditions under which 
something about the past could be said. Thus, the enunciating function is a way of 
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understanding where in the data meaning is constituted, which is always within related 
groups of statements. 
Understanding statements and related groups of statements as where meaning is 
constituted, requires the thesis to analysis series of signs, specifically the concept of ‘sign’ 
as understood by sociolinguist Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure 1972). 90 It is therefore 
necessary for the discussion which follows to briefly summarise Saussure’s 
understanding of ‘Sign’, which was fundamental to Foucault’s thinking on statements.91 
Though Foucault’s understanding of ‘langue’ is distinct from that of Saussure’s whose 
semiology focused on a science of signs within society (Saussure 1972). From this the 
discussion will point out it is a Foucauldian poststructuralist understanding of ‘Signs’, 
which this thesis employs in analysing statements within the selected ‘corpus’ of ICTR 
archived documents. 
Saussure’s thinking on ‘Signs’ entailed understanding the fundamental relation 
between the signifier and signified.92 Signifier is the ‘sound image’, not explicitly an 
actual sound, rather something material: i.e. visual, touch, taste etc.… Signified is the 
concept in the mind, not of an actual thing but a notion of a thing (Saussure 1972). In a 
Saussurian context Sign(s) can be anything and are all around us, that is to say a sign can 
be anything that interprets meaning, which always must have a ‘sound image’ and 
‘concepts’ (signifier and signified). Saussure’s understanding of ‘sign’ therefore 
positioned the signifier and signified as distinct yet unequivocally connected; it is not 
possible to have one without the other for there to be meaning. Saussure used the analogy 
of a piece of paper to explain his understanding of language and the inseparability of 
signifier and signified.93 Language consists of signs, each sign consists of two 
interconnected parts – signifier and signified – a piece of paper, like a sign, has two sides. 
In this analogy signified is the front of the piece of paper and signifier is the back: ‘one 
cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; likewise in language, one 
can neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound’ (Saussure 1972, 65). 
Saussure’s thought on signs was a radical departure from the existing philosophy of 
 
90 There are numerous strands of linguistics and the use of signs. See; Pierce 1989; Levi-Strauss, Searl 
1979; Halliday 1978; Pecheux 1975; Benveniste 1971. 
91 For discussion of Saussure’s work on ‘Signs’, see ‘Course in General Linguistics’ (Saussure 1972). For 
general discussions on language and signs, see; Levi-Strauss. For a reworking of Saussurian 
understanding of signs see Benveniste 1971. Also see ‘Mythologies’ (Barthes 1970). 
92 For discussion on Cartesian linguistics see Chomsky (2009). Also see Gadet (1987). 
93 For a discussion on Emile Benveniste’s reconfiguration of Saussure’s concept of ‘Signs’ and it 
influence in the field of Structuralism see ‘Problems with General Linguistics’ (Benveniste 1971). Also 
see; (Attridge 2004, 58-84). 
101 
 
language. A Cartesian philosophy of language, converse to Saussure’s, argued that 
meaning of the world is outside of language, that the mind mediates between the world 
external to language and spoken words. Signs which conceive language entails their 
relation to ‘things’ external to language. Accordingly, from a Cartesian position, the 
human subject is a rational sovereign being who assigns meaning to words. Thus ‘the 
subject is allocated primacy in that orders of thought and of the world are constructed by 
the subject’ (Williams 1999, 35). What this meant was language as described by Saussure 
rejected the Cartesian philosophy of language, and foregrounded that it is not possible for 
things and ideas to exist prior to language. Saussure rejected the idea of a real world being 
out-there which could be defined and fixed by language. This can be seen in Williams 
stating that from Saussurian position ‘[l]anguage was no longer a stock of things waiting 
for stock of labels to give them their designation’ (Williams 1999, 36). Thus as Saussure 
reminds us if there is not language (langue) ‘thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There 
are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language 
(langue)’ (Saussure 1972, 111).  
Saussure’s thought on ‘langue’, converse to Foucault, understood series of signs 
as encapsulating a universal language for society. Saussure thus conceived ‘langue’ and 
‘parole’ as being more than language and speech. For Saussure, ‘langue’ is an entire 
semiological system which makes language possible, whose base unit is the ‘sign’. 
‘Parole’ is the actual use of the system such as an utterance, though it is not the system 
(Saussure 1972). Accordingly for Saussure, ‘langue’ consisting of series of signs acted 
as a collective or universal system of language, it (‘langue’) ‘is treated as a social fact in 
being the faculty of language that is peculiar to humans’ (Williams 1999, 41). Importantly 
here for the thesis using Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis is Foucault’s 
departure from a Saussurian understanding of ‘langue’ as a universal system.94 
Specifically, Foucault (1972) challenged the idea of social knowledge having a 
commonality that sought to explain human actions in terms of universally applicable 
conditions.   
 
94 Foucault’s understanding of language being where human subjects are constituted was influenced by 
Emile Beveniste. It was in particular the similarity of Foucault’s and Benveniste’s thought on subjectivity 
as being premised within language. Although, Benveniste confines the constitution of the subject to 
grammatical structures, which he understands as being distinct from discourse (Williams 1999). For a 
discussion on Benveniste’s work on subjectivity see ‘Problems with General Linguistics’ (Benveniste 




Whilst Foucault did follow Saussure in understanding that meaning entailed series 
of signs, Foucault rejected the notion of the existence of a universal system of meaning. 
Crucially, Foucault focused on series of signs, not as part of a universal system of 
knowledge, instead the manner in which signs and the statements they comprised 
emerged, that being, the rules which allow certain statements to exist (Foucault 1972, 
121; Williams 1999, 76). As Foucault states, analysing the discursive rules of statements 
is: 
 
not to show that the mechanisms or processes of the language (langue) were 
entirely preserved in it; but rather to reveal, in the density of verbal performances, 
the diversity of the possible levels of analysis; to show that in addition to methods 
of linguistic structuration (or interpretation), one could draw upon a specific 
description of statements, of their regularities proper to discourse (Foucault 1972, 
220). 
 
In summary, for Foucault ‘langue’ defines the conditions that give function to ‘series of 
signs’ to exist and enables the existence of ‘series of signs’ to operate, although ‘series of 
signs’ are not ‘grammatically’ or ‘logically’ structured (Foucault 1972, 122). Instead, the 
structure of ‘series of signs’ operate as a set of possible discursive positions. These 
positions being of the subject, not as being ‘capable of forming meaning of its own 
accord’, rather an element in the ‘field of coexistence’ within a discursive formation. 
Therefore, the thesis analysis describing statements is concerned with the ‘conditions of 
existence of different groups of signifiers’ (Foucault 1972, 122). 
Identifying statements, as has been described, entails departing from 
understanding language as a pre-existing proposition of meaning or as something that 
comes from the psychology of a speaking individual. In this sense, identifying statements 
is not focused on the individual content of a statement. It is not interested in uncovering 
hidden meanings of words, or the encrypted objectives of the author (Foucault 1996, 57-
67). It is instead identifying the discursive rules that govern the relation of statements, 
therein describing the discursive field that connects the statements. 
Statements as relational groups, is important as it refers to the contingent nature 
of the constituting of meaning and language, which entails related dispersed groups of 
statements. These groups are concurrently related to the material world but are not fixed 
to it. Statements made about subjects and objects cannot be repeatedly made producing 
the same meaning every time (Foucault 1972, 230). Significantly, this understanding of 
statements does not assume the inherent repeatability of meaning. Indeed, positioning the 
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analysis within discourse where meaning and language is not tied down insurmountably 
by the material world. Accordingly, understanding statements as relational groups of 
contingent meaning, allows the data to be read as a discursive field where groups of 
statements indicate discursive formations (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 59). As such, this 
affords an analysis into the language that describes the past not as correlation to a pre-
existing linguistic unit or a physical material object. Rather, understanding the basic 
elements of accounts remembering the past, are statements. As such, the statement: 
 
Circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, 
serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and 
becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Foucault 1972, 126) 
 
Thus, the manner in which remembering the past and the temporal accounts of rights 
violations are made in international tribunals, can through analysing the data offer a 
comprehensive understanding of the way in which the subject positions of the witness 
and the objects they describe become meaningful authoritative accounts of the past.95 
 
Method 
Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis: the analytical tools for analysing the 
data 
In order for the thesis to use Foucault’s theoretical insights on discourse as a 
practical method for conducting discourse analysis of ICTR archived documents, the 
discussion which follows outlines three steps the thesis uses to develop a Foucauldian 
framework in order to undertake a discourse analysis (Ahl 2007, 216-251). Step one is 
‘reading Foucault’, step two is translating Foucault into an analytical framework, and step 
three is the analysis (Ahl 216-220). To be sure, developing a Foucauldian framework and 
the three steps involved is specific to the research problem and research questions this 
thesis will address. While it is the case that the three steps are specific to this thesis, and 
as such would not necessarily be appropriate to duplicate and apply to other research 
projects, using a three-step process and engaging with the particularities of Foucault that 
are relevant to a given project, can be applied to other research ‘text’ in conducting a 
discourse analysis (Ahl 2007). The discussion which follows begins by summarising the 
 
95 For discussions on legal language systems in the context of debates on Universal Jurisdiction see, (O’ 
Sullivan 2017). Furthermore, Muleefu (2019) used critical discourse analysis to investigate different 
narratives that criticise and defend the functioning of the ICC, particularly its work in Africa. 
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selection of ‘text’ (coding) for this analysis. Then the chapter will describe a three-step 
process to construct a Foucauldian framework for analysis of ICTR archived documents 
relating to the selection of witnesses. Outlining the first step includes identifying 
components of Foucault’s thought on discourse and relevance to the thesis analysis. 
Describing step two, building on from identifying components in step one, will detail the 
analytical framework to be used for the analysis.  
Part 1 (coding) 
 
The two ICTR cases are used as case studies, discussed above and detailed in Appendix 
1, frame the trajectory of documents to be collected and analysed. For each of the two 
cases documents will be taken from: 
• Indictments, including samples and/or summaries of witness statements  
• Pre-trial briefs 
• Motions and motion decisions (before and during trials) 
• Statute 
• Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
• Judgments 
• Interview transcripts 
 
The above documents were collected from the UoW and ICTR online archives. 
Documents gathered from the ICTR online archive and the UoW archive, searching the 
sections, stated above, working on one case at a time. For example: starting with the 
Nizeyimana case, searching the sections relating to this case, then searches in sections 
relating to the next case, and so on and so forth.  
 In order to be able to work with the vast amount of documents relating to the two 
case studies, it is necessary for the analysis to narrow down the documents to be worked 
with through doing a keyword search. The keywords selected by the researcher, which 
relate to the research questions and the thesis argument, include:  
• witnesses 
• witness statements 
• testimonial evidence 






The keyword search takes place during the process of gathering the documents; for 
example, a section (plenary meeting transcripts) is searched on the online archives; once 
retrieved these documents will be listed above. The documents that are retrieved from 




The discussion which follows outlines the theoretical insights from Foucault which 
will be developed into an analytical framework (step two). The discussion here will 
include a summary of the theoretical insights from Foucault the thesis has chosen. 
The speaking subject, out of the totality of speaking individuals who are the 
individuals which are constituted to speak as a given subject. There are specific 
conditions, such as faith, law, tradition, of the individuals, and those individuals alone, 
who have the status to speak. Discourse does not permit anyone to occupy ‘a specific 
subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions’ (Foucault 1972). For example, the status 
of doctor entails some criteria of knowledge, legal conditions, competence, institutions 
(Foucault 1972, 55-56). ‘Statements’ on medicine cannot come from anywhere, it is the 
doctor as speaking subject whereby the medical statements gains its value and efficiency 
and exist as medical ‘statements’. The doctor as speaking subject has the right to make 
‘statements’ ‘and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death’ (Foucault 
1972, 56). The thesis translates this to mean the discursive conditions of a discourse of 
witnessing, which constitutes the speaking ‘witness’. That being, out of all the individuals 
who experienced the horrors of the Rwandan genocide, identifying the discursive 
processes at the ICTR that constitute some individuals, as opposed to other individuals, 
as the legal ‘witness’.  
 
Institutional Sites are the places from which subjects speak, where discourse ‘derives 
its legitimate source’ and ‘its specific objects’ (Foucault 1972, 56). In keeping with the 
medical example used above, the institutional sites from which the doctor makes their 
discourse can include: the hospital – a site of ‘systematic observation, run by hierarchized 
medical staff’; and the laboratory – distinct from the hospital where certain truths 
concerning the human body, life, diseases, which provide certain criteria for diagnosis, 
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cure etc (Foucault 1972, 56-57). This analysis takes Institutional Sites to mean the places 
from which the ‘witness’ can speak about past violations. Specifically, these legislated 
sites where the ‘witness’ subject can speak from form part of the discursive conditions 
and practices in which the discursive field controls the places from which the witness 
subject can speak of objects of knowledge of past rights violations.  
 
The positions of the subject: From which legitimate and authorised statements can be 
made. Certain ‘statements’ can only be made from certain positions that a given subject 
occupies. For example, the positions from which the subject of doctor can make legitimate 
and authorised statements can include: the listening subject and the questioning subject. 
These positions enable the subject of doctor to be ‘emitter and receiver of observations, 
case histories, statistical data, general theoretical propositions projects and decisions’ 
(Foucault 1972, 58). This thesis takes this to mean the position from which the witness 
can speak about the past at the ICTRs entails conditions which ‘limit’ what the ‘witness’ 
can do and talk about. 
 
Surface of emergence is the field in which objects first arise, allowing discourse to 
define what it is talking about. The continuities and discontinuities that define the 
‘limitations’ in which objects become normative functions for understanding social 
practices. In a given discourse, such as psychiatric discourse (Foucault 1968), discourse 
‘finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, given it the status 
of an object – and therefore making it manifest, nameable, and describable’ (Foucault 
1972, 46). Therefore this research needs to pay attention to the emergence of objects 
within a discourse of witnessing and how these objects restrict and ‘limit’ the discursive 
space, producing normative practices. For example, in the context of ICTR documents 
the term in the ‘interest of justice’ emerges in multiple fields including: the trial, 
investigations, formal correspondence, and meetings between legal counsels. It is within 
these fields in part because they are a normative function of legal tribunals that would 
determine the paradigms that make admissible or inadmissible witness subjects: a given 
witness is admissible instead of three other witnesses because it is in the ‘interest of 
justice’.96 Worth noting here, the term ‘interest of justice’ at the ICTR is not defined in 
the statute or RPEs. 
 
96 In the case Michel Bagaragar (ICTR-2005-86-T) the judge motioned to remove six witnesses from the trial being replaced by one 




Authorities of delimitation are the authorities empowered to determine which objects 
belong to which discursive formation. The authority of delimitation could be: judge’s 
chambers, witness protection unit, and the office of the registrar that all have the judicial 
authority in relation to the witness subject to ‘delimit, designate, name, and define’ 
(Foucault 1972) a given object, such as in the ‘interest of justice’. 
 
Grids of specification are the systems according to which different understandings of 
an object are ‘divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one 
another’ (Foucault 1972, 47). The medical profession would define different kinds of 
madness, in which objects will be constituted and derived from one another in psychiatric 
discourse (Foucault 1972, 46). The analysis translates this to mean the way in which a 
given object, for example in the ‘interest of justice’, is understood, reshaped, categorised.  
Importantly, it would be the three planes – emergence, authority and specification – 
triangulating the term in the ‘interest of justice‘, which could only form as an object in 
the discursive relation of the three planes. Here, it is worth pointing out, the research is 
aiming to identify the three planes and would analyse statements, and relations between 
groups of statements. For example, a statement containing the term in the ‘interests of 
justice’ would not only need to identify the three triangulating planes, but also the relation 
of this statement to other groups of statement would need to be shown. Accordingly, in 
the ‘interests of justice’ as an object of knowledge could only form within the discursive 
formation by the analysis indicating the ordering of statements. The ordering of 
statements could be for example: information from the president(s) of the tribunal to 
senior judges and communications from senior judges to the judges’ chambers and legal 
counsels, which provide a framework regarding protection of witnesses, investigation 
process, witness list, procedures for witnesses giving testimonial evidence, and so forth.    
 
Commentary forms part of the internal system of rules of discourse, which ‘regulates’ 
the discursive field. Each discourse has a set of foundational or primary ‘texts’ that are 
framed as highly important and are continuously commented upon (Foucault 1972). This 
‘commentary’ ranges from complementary appraisal of the ‘text’, attempts at explaining 
the ‘text’, or critical arguments challenging its content, though importantly, the 
continuous ‘commentary’ on the ‘text’ enables repeatability and exclusion (Foucault 
1969). The thesis translates this to mean that there are ICTR legislated documents, the 
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statute and RPEs, that are continuously referred to. Also important for the analysis are 
documents from other cases at the ICTR that become objects of exclusion: for example 
hearsay evidence explaining the background social conditions in Rwanda, might be 
excluded from one case, rationalised by a judge that the previous cases at the ICTR has 
extensively established these background social conditions. In short, it is the statute and 
RPEs, and transcripts from ICTR cases, which form part of discursive conditions which 
‘regulate’ which individuals can speak and which objects they can speak about. 
 
Statements (series of signs) are not linguistic units, that is, they are not the same as 
the sentence or utterance. The sentence and utterance comprises grammatical rules that 
are reducible to the ‘syntactical structures of grammatically well-formed sentences’ 
(Foucault 1972, 98). Rather, statements as understood by Foucault are relational entities 
that ‘must be related to a whole adjacent field’ of other statements (Foucault 1972, 98). 
In other words, the same statement can be uttered in different ways without being 
conflated to the ‘syntactical structures’ of sentences. Accordingly, statements are 
functions in which sentences and utterances are made. There can be statements without 
there being a sentence or utterance but not the converse (Howarth 2000, 55).  
Here, to point out the important relations between describing groups of statements – 
series of signs – and enunciation. Not all groups of statements or relations of statements 
are enunciated, only certain – constituted – statements. The analysis therefore aims to 
identify what the conditions are in which the ‘signifying groups that were enunciated can 
appear’ (Foucault 1972, 134). The discursive conditions that establish the signifying 
groups which are enunciated amongst other possible groups is referred to by Foucault as 
establishing a ‘law of rarity’ (Foucault 1972, 134). Importantly for the research, the 
analysis determining the ‘law of rarity’ of a discourse of witnessing is to identify the 
conditions that allowed only the enunciated groups of statements, in which, witness 
subjects and objects could emerge.  
 
Step Two: Analytical Framework  
 
The analytical framework takes Foucault’s theoretical insights, discussed above, and 
uses them as analytical tools to identify discursive conditions and practices. The 
analytical framework outlined below relates explicitly to answering the thesis research 
question and subsidiary questions. The framework comprises four tools, each of which 
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contribute to the research questions being explored and answered. For the purpose of 
clarity, the tools in the analytical framework have been ordered here in chronological 
order, though the order in which the tools are used in the actual analysis may vary: 
• Deconstructing the ICTR foundational texts  
• The individuals who get to speak about their experience of violations at the ICTR 
• The knowledge about past rights violations witnesses are allowed to speak about 
• The repeatability of certain ‘statements’  
 
The discussion which follows outlines each of the analytical tools and explains their 
relation to answering the research questions. To restate, the thesis research questions are: 
 
Primary research question 
How should witnesses of human rights violations contribute to memory production in 
transitional post-conflict societies? 
 
Subsidiary research questions  
(i) How is the subject position of ‘witness’ discursively created? (The way social 
power relations produce identities and specific historically located meaning)  
(ii) In cases of mass human rights violations, how does the construction of 
memory at the ICTR frame the manner in which violence is remembered?  
(iii) Does positioning memory within the discursive construction of witness mean 
memory becomes fixed and rigid? 
 
Deconstructing the foundational texts of the ICTR, as an international legal institution, 
operates under legislated rules and regulations, specifically, the statute and rules of 
procedure and evidence (RPE), which define the legal processes at the ICTR. In 
particular, for this research, the statute and RPE defined the paradigms in which witnesses 
engaged and participated in legal processes at the ICTR. The statute and RPE, during the 
tribunal’s existence, have gone through numerous processes of amendments. As such, the 
research will analyse the original and amended versions of the statutes and RPE. 
Deconstructing the ICTR statutes and RPE (foundational documents) will analyse these 
texts to identify the legislative processes by which ‘witnesses’ engage with trials and the 
authority from which such regulations are upheld and managed. In other words, to identify 
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the discursive practices in the ‘foundational texts’, which form part of the discursive 
regularities of a discourse of witnessing. To analyse the way in which dominant ‘texts’ at 
the ICTR form part of discursive conditions, the analysis will also need to explore 
‘foundational texts’, which are produced through the ICTR’s legal process. That being, 
outcomes from cases contribute to discursive regularity of other cases: information 
relating to the background social and political conditions in Rwanda gathered through 
hearsay evidence in the earlier cases at the ICTR results in the later cases not requiring 
substantial hearsay evidence. This is important as one of the claims of the ICTR’s output 
is that it will contribute to the truth in understanding the social and political reasons that 
led to the violations occurring (Byron 2008). 
 
The individuals who get to speak about their experience at the ICTR: To determine 
what conditions constitute the witness as speaking subject amongst the totality of 
‘speaking individuals’. These discursive conditions could be: the tribunal’s mandate 
stating specific crimes within the court’s jurisdiction, i.e. the main perpetrators of the 
genocide, indictments that state the specific violations purportedly committed by the 
accused, in which the testimony of witnesses will contribute to the legal determination of 
guilt, investigators determining which knowledge of individuals are most appropriate as 
evidence in relation to the specific crimes detailed in the indictment, investigators’ 
contextual knowledge, geographical location of potential witnesses. This relates to 
answering the thesis question in understanding the discursive conditions that constitute 
the ‘witness’ subject at the ICTR. In other words, this analytical tool helps to show how 
the identity of the legal witness is constructed.  
 
Conclusion 
The thesis, using a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis, will identify the 
discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing. The analysis does not intend to 
highlight a discursive field in which individual subjectivity has been supressed by a set 
of dominant discursive conditions, in which identifying sets of discursive conditions the 
sovereign subjectivity of the individual can be freed and can externalise their memories. 
Nor does the analysis understand identifying the formation of a discursive field to be able 
to offer a transcendent and uniform structure of discourse. However, in relation to the 
research questions and argument, what a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis 
does allow for is to understand what it is within the court documents that constituted 
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enunciations of objects to be made and the authority in which the witness subjects can 
speak. That being the constituted meaning of knowledge about the past emerges only 
from within the relation of statements which are enunciated. There are numerous 
alternative formations of dispersed groups of statements in which ‘things’ could have 
been given meaning and emerged as objects of knowledge but did not within the 
discursive field. Similarly, the way in which the witness subject is discursively constituted 
is dependent on a contingent set of statements that determine out of all the individuals 
who experienced the horrors of 1994 which ones can occupy subject position of the 
witness. Thus, the discursive field to be analysed is not intended to free objects of 
knowledge about the past and subjects of witness from the discursive conditions, in which 
they could (re)gain their autonomy. Rather, it is the discursive conditions, constituting 
the subjects of witnesses who are constituted to speak out of all the speaking individuals, 
the authority and places from which witness subject can speak, and the objects of 
knowledge about the past described by witness subjects through their perceived 
authoritative position. Thus, the analysis describing the formation of a discourse of 
witnessing is to identify the rules which constituted the existence of knowledge about the 
past and the subjects who describe it.  
 Therefore, the thesis through identifying the discursive conditions in which the 
enunciated subjects and objects emerged, it can be shown the manner in which the 
construction of legal memory at the ICTR operates and meaning about the past is 
produced. Thus applying a Foucauldian discourse analysis to ICTR archived documents, 
allows both memory and witness subject(s) to be understood as being discursively 
constituted. This thesis offers a perspective of legal memory not revealed through 




Chapter 4 - The Discursive Battleground of Legal Witnessing, Or, The Active 
Witness and Their ‘Right to Truth’ 
 
This chapter discusses the analysis including the ICTR rules of procedure and evidence – 
Rule 26, Rule 31, Rule 48, Rule 69, Rule 71-82, and Rule 106-111.97 Specifically, the 
chapter explores the discursive conditions that constitute the witness as the subject 
position of discourse. Particular consideration is given to the relation between the 
discursive construction of the ‘witness’ and the right to truth,98 which is legislated for in 
international human rights law and purported by advocates as being a key component 
during legal redress for mass atrocities (Groome 2011; Klinkner and Smith 2015). 
Beginning with discussing the legal rules of evidence surrounding the admissibility of 
witness evidence at the ICTR, the chapter lays out its main contention. That being, 
renderings of the witness as a catchall identity fail to comprehend the limits and 
restrictions of the discursive field. The assumed identity of the subject position of 
witnesses enables the conflation of the legal category of judgment with the ethical 
category of truth that discursively produces a language that constitutes witnesses as active 
participants in uncovering knowledge about the past. The second part of the chapter 
highlights a disjuncture between redress for victims-witnesses as sufferers of violations 
and witnesses as discursive objects of legal knowledge. Specifically, the common 
advocacy within the transitional justice legal scholarship (Klinkner and Smith 2015; 
Pindell 2002; Sikkink 2011) promotes victim-witnesses as active participants in legal 
redress, particularly in relation to the ‘right to truth’ as an emerging free-standing right 
(Klinkner 2015, 6), perceives the right to hear the truth, and importantly, to impart the 
truth, as a positive and inalienable process of legal redress during periods of political 
transition (Groome 2011). From such perspectives, the right to truth is a fundamental 
component for victim-witnesses’ redress, facilitating individual participation (agency) 
within the judicial process, and contributing to the construction of a wider societal truth 
of the atrocities (Klinkner 2015, 10-11; Osiel 2012). However, transitional justice is a 
project with aspirations of contributing to ‘democratisation’ and ‘peace’, a core part of 
 
97 Rule 26: Plenaries, Rule 31: Functions of the Registrar, Rule 48: Submission of Indictment by the 
Prosecutor, Rule 69: Status Conferences, Rule 71-82: (pre-Trial Proceedings), Rule 106-111: 
(Proceedings Before Trial Chambers). 
98 The ‘right to truth’ encompasses ‘the right to seek and obtain information’ relating to reasons and 
causes of individual victimisation, and ‘circumstances and reasons which led to or otherwise facilitated 




which is the uncovering of the past atrocities. In other words, for a society to be able to 
rebuild after mass violations there first needs to be a shared understanding of why and 
how the atrocities occurred, in which international tribunals are perceived to be a key 
modality (Klinkner and Smith 2015) (see Chapter 1). This advocacy for legal responses 
to understanding the past commonly emphasises the centrality of victim-witnesses during 
transition from ‘illiberal’ rule to liberal democracy (Teitel 2003): ‘victim-focused 
prosecution norms comport and provide more effective means of promoting respect for 
human rights… in democratic transition from mass atrocities’ (Pindell 2002, 1399). 
Challenging this claim, it will be suggested the transitional justice wide paradigm of 
victims-witnesses conflates individual victims with the legal subject position of 
witnesses, which are two different identities entailing nuanced distinctions.  
Witnesses at the ICTR, both directly and indirectly, interact with almost every 
facet of the tribunal. A very common association of witnessing at international criminal 
tribunals and courts is the testimonial evidence witnesses give in court. This important 
function was certainly a reality at the ICTR (Palmer 2015). However, this chapter 
suggests that witnesses’ engagement with the ICTR, and importantly the ICTR’s 
engagement with witnesses are part of the discursive construction of the witness subject. 
Specifically, from a discursive frame all the legal processes at the ICTR, including 
documents that created the tribunal, investigations and prosecutor’s investigation 
strategy, indictments, pre-trial briefs, witness lists, and motions, are all discursively 
important. Therefore, these processes need to be considered both individually and in their 
numerous interactions with each other. Thus witness testimony given in court is just one 
part, arguably a moderate part, of the discursive restrictions and conditions of legal 
witnessing at the ICTR. Put more crudely, the witnesses who get to testify in court at the 
ICTR are only the tip of a giant ‘discursive iceberg’. This discursive ‘giant’ needs to be 
analysed beyond what is initially ‘visible’ from the surface.  
 In relation to the thesis arguing that the subject position of the ‘witness’ is 
constituted within the tightly controlled discursive conditions of a discourse of 
witnessing, it is crucial for the analysis to focus on the diverse functions of witnessing at 
the ICTR (Foucault 1991). In short, this section argues that showing how the subject 
position of witness is discursively created supports the thesis’s contention that renderings 
of the witness as a catchall identity fails to comprehend the limits and restrictions of the 
discursive field (Foucault 1972, 52). This failing allows for the conflation of legal 
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determination and truth that discursively produces a language that constitutes legal 
witnesses as active participants in ‘uncovering’ the ‘truth’ about past atrocities.  
 
Nowhere and Everywhere: The Discursive Reach of the Witness at the ICTR  
Neither the ICTR statute nor the RPE define the term ‘witness’. This lack of definition is 
surprising given, as mentioned above, the extent to which witnesses reach into all legal 
and administrative functions of the ICTR. Within the discursive space of the ICTR the 
witness is everywhere, and simultaneously strikingly absent. In order for the chapter to 
argue that there is a need to radically rethink the common understanding in the legal 
scholarship of witnesses as self-evident, the following discussion will firstly focus on the 
‘foundational documents’ as part of the discursive conditions which ‘filter’ who can be a 
witness subject. Foucault refers to ‘foundational documents’ as texts which are crucial to 
the creation and functioning of institutional discursive practices (Foucault 1979). The 
discussion will then focus on investigations and indictments as another layer of 
discursivity.  
The ICTR consists of three organs, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), the 
Chambers and the Registry.99 The defence counsel at the ICTR are not included as an 
organ. Each of the organs consists of numerous sections/departments. The ICTR 
‘foundational documents’ include legislated rules and regulations under which the 
tribunal operates. Specifically, the statute and RPE which define the legal processes at 
the ICTR, contain discursive statements. In particular for this thesis, the statutes and RPE 
containing statements, are part of the discursive conditions that act to include/exclude 
which individuals can be the witness subject at the ICTR. For example, regulations 
 
99 The Registry is led by the Registrar and Deputy Registrar and is ‘responsible for the administration and 
servicing of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’ (ICTR Statute Article 16, 2010). The first Registrar Mr. 
Andronico O. Adede was appointed around 10 months after the adoption of UN Resolution 955 on the 8 th 
September 1995 (ICTR Annual Report 1995). For more detail on the role of the Registrar see Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence Rule 33, 1995. The ICTR, like all international criminal courts is ‘political’ (Clark 
2018; M. Clark 2009; Simpson 2007). For example, former Deputy Registrar Everard O’Donnell describes 
internal conflict between the President of the ICTR and the Registrar: 
[A]t that time, there was a considerable conflict between the President and the Registrar, the then 
Registrar, and there was a considerable lack of communication between the two poles of the 
tribunal… the judges in effect made it perfectly clear that as far as they were concerned, and no 
matter what the statute said, they were going to be exercising the governance of the tribunal. And 
it caused conflicts in the early days of the, certainly this tribunal. Because the Registrar felt that 
there were certain responsibilities that he had as the senior staff member responsible to the New 
York, to the General Assembly, to the Secretary General, that he could not just do whatever it was 
that the President wanted him to do. Whereas the President felt that she had a right to say, ‘I want 
this, I want, you know, this, and I want this person recruited,’ and so on. ‘And I want it done now.’ 




regarding investigations and interactions with witnesses are stated in the ICTR statute and 
RPE.  
The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of 
information obtained from any source, particularly from governments, United 
Nations intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor 
shall assess the information received or obtained and decide whether there is 
sufficient basis to proceed (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 17). 
 
While the statute states that it is the Prosecutor who decides to begin an investigation, 
from a discursive frame, however, the discursive conditions that shape the orientation of 
investigations, and by relation the selection of potential witnesses, begins with United 
Nations Resolution 955 defining what crimes are within the ICTR jurisdiction and that 
the Tribunal will prosecute those most responsible for the genocide. For example, two 
statements within the ICTR statute are, that the tribunal will prosecute those most 
responsible, and the specific crimes within the ICTR’s Jurisdiction (ICTR Statute 2010). 
The ICTR’s mandate stating it will prosecute the most responsible means, in practice, 
the evidence of witnesses required by prosecutors relates to the relatively small number 
of individual suspects. Individuals who experienced the horrors of 1994 but whose 
experiences were not perpetrated by those indicted by the ICTR are not relevant as 
evidence to prosecutors. As Foucault reminds, dominant statements, such as the 
suspects the ICTR has jurisdiction to prosecute, shape which individuals can and which 
individuals cannot, occupy a given subject position. As Foucault argues, the statement 
‘[c]irculates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or 
resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of 
appropriation or rivalry' (Foucault 1972, 126). What is being suggested here is that the 
statute contains discursive statements that from the creation of the ICTR has already 
begun the process of restricting which individuals can occupy the subject position of the 
witness. Understood as such, before the OTP begins an investigation, Resolution 955 
along with the Statute is part of the discursive restriction of who can be a witness 
subject. It is therefore important to understand these ‘foundational documents’ beyond 
legislation that brings international criminal institutions into being. They are part of the 
discursive conditions determining who can occupy the subject position of the ‘witness’. 
United Nations Resolution 955, which brought the ICTR into existence, explicitly 




Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would 
enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace. 
 
Whilst this statement on contributing to reconciliation and peace may have been 
intentionally abstract, in one sense it also served as rationale and motivation for those 
who understood the ICTR to have a dual role. This dual role entailed bringing judicial 
accountability, and understanding the historical truth of why and how the genocide 
occurred, through the testimonial evidence of witnesses. For example, former ICTR 
President and Judge Denis Byron was one advocate of this dual role of the tribunal. 
According to Byron, based on discussions he was involved in there was a general view at 
the ICTR that contributing to reconciliation, as stated in the mandate, required the tribunal 
to establish a factual historical record of what happened (Byron 2008). Byron states that 
the tribunal was conscious that having this dual role was costly in terms of the 
overrunning of the tribunal’s Mandate, however for Byron it was a cost worth paying. In 
interview with Utter, Byron points out: 
 
they addressed matters that were far wider and broader than were necessary to 
establish guilt or innocence in particular cases. They undertook the task of 
developing pretty comprehensive factual record of what transpired during that 
period [the genocide] and the period building up to it … we had adopted two roles 
– the role of fact finder and the role of historical chronicler (Utter 2008).  
 
According to Byron, it was because the ICTR went beyond its legislated mandate, the 
statute, that it is was able to produce a collective understanding of the reasons and causes 
that led to the genocide against the Tutsi occurring. However, what Byron’s position 
misses, and is argued throughout this thesis, is that the ICTR ‘foundational documents’, 
including the statute, are part of the discursive conditions that restrict what knowledge of 
past atrocities law is able to tell. Therefore, the common claim, such as Byron’s, that law 
can produce a comprehensive understanding of past atrocities needs to be deconstructed. 
This deconstructing foregrounds that the tribunal’s legal processes, including the 
‘foundational documents’, are a crucial component that produces a narrow singular legal 
story of past atrocities.  
 
The Discursivity of Investigations and Indictments 
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The OTP was comprised of the Prosecutor and ‘such other qualified staff as may be 
required’ who are recruited by the United Nations Secretary-General on the 
recommendation of the Prosecutor (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 15).100 The organ of the 
Prosecutor includes at its core the ‘Investigation Section’.101 The Investigation Section is 
structured into a number of divisions/subsections (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 17).102 The 
Investigation Section was also geographically split between the tribunal in Arusha and 
the investigation office in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. Although in practice, the 
allocation of staff to the sites varied across the lifespan of the ICTR, during the first few 
years of the tribunal (1994-1999/2000) most of the investigation personnel were based in 
Kigali (ICTR Expert Report 1999). As will be suggested in the discussion to follow, that 
the organ of the OTP is fundamentally reliant on witnesses and thus is an important site 
of discursivity in relation to the construction of the ‘witness’. The following discussion 
will highlight how the complexities of investigations, such as lack of professional 
investigators, finding witnesses with evidence relating to crimes within the ICTR 
jurisdiction, lack of local expertise and knowledge, do more than just mirror the 
difficulties of the tribunal’s operations, they are part of the discursive conditions that 
restrict who can be a witness subject. 
To give a taster here, according to the ICTR’s statute the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP), in addition to the Prosecutor, shall consist of ‘such other qualified staff’ including 
investigators (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 15). However, the investigation section, 
particularly in the early years of the tribunal, suffered from a lack of professional 
investigators.103 In an interview with Nathan, former Acting Chief of Investigations 
Alfred Kwende notes:   
 
100 ‘The Prosecutor shall serve for a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment. The terms and 
conditions of service of the Prosecutor shall be those of an Under-Secretary-General of the United 
Nations’ (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 15). Until 2003 the Prosecutor served both the ICTR and ICTY, 
from 2003 each of the tribunals had their own prosecutor. During the lifespan of the ICTR there has been 
four Chief prosecutors, Richard Goldstone (1994-1996), Louise Arbour (1996-1999), Carla del Ponte 
(1999-2003), Hassan B. Jallow (2003-2015). 
101 The Prosecutor was tasked with investigating and prosecuting individuals within the mandate of the 
ICTR (ICTR Statute 2010). The Prosecutor acts ‘independently as a separate organ of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any 
other source’ (ICTR Statute 2010, Article 15). 
102 According to the ICTR Anuual Report (1996) the Investigation Sections includes, ‘experienced senior 
and junior investigators, lawyers, intelligence analysts, advisers, a scientific director, experts in forensic 
medicine, statisticians, demographers, interpreters and translators, and support staff’ (ICTR Annual 
Report 1996). 
103 The Office of the Prosecutor in November 1995 consisted of 52 members of staff from 15 different 
countries. Half of which were on secondment. The majority of these the seconded staff were from the 




the tribunal didn’t start with professional investigators. It started with just picking 
anybody. They asked most countries to send staff, they sen[t] volunteers. Most of 
the volunteers were school‐leavers or people in fields which did not actually 
master the science of investigations […] in fact, within the first years a few 
professional investigators were picked up but the most of them were volunteers 
or secondees, secondees sent by states… In some case there were no follow ups 
[to investigations] because they had to go back to their countries, the secondees 
[were here] for three months, six months. They didn’t have a full‐time job so by 
the time they started recruiting people full‐time as investigators, this was in fact 
getting late into ’97, ’98 (Nathan 2008). 
 
This issue of lack of professional investigators and the somewhat chaotic approach to 
investigations in the first few years of the ICTR was also problematic for the defence. 
There were two instances where the defence counsel had employed investigators who, 
after a period working on investigations, turned out to be implicated in the genocide and 
were later prosecuted by the ICTR.104 One of these individuals, Joseph Nzabirinda, was 
only identified as being implicated in the genocide when a person testifying in court 
remarked that this man on the defence counsel was actually involved in the genocide 
(Nathan 2008). The ICTR RPE details a linear process for OTP investigations including 
the collecting of witness statements, which in principle regulates the manner in which 
legal counsel conduct their investigations. However, as will be highlighted in the coming 
paragraphs, investigations are not a linear process. Instead the complexities of 
investigations are an important component in understanding how the subject position of 
the witness is discursively constituted. Rule 39, Conduct of Investigations, states:  
 
[i]n the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may: (i) summon and question 
suspects, victims and witnesses and record their statements, collect evidence and 
conduct on-site investigations (Rules of Procedure and Evidence 1996, Rule 39). 
 
Prosecution counsels are also provided, in addition to RPE, with ‘Prosecution 
Regulations’. Regulation No. 2 (1999) states that during the process of investigations: 
 
 
104 Joseph Nzabirinda was indicted by the ICTR on charges including genocide and crimes against 
humanity (Rape). Initially pleading not guilty, Nzabirinda after reaching a plea agreement with the 
prosecution pleaded guilty on 14 December 2006 to the crime of aiding and abetting the perpetration of 
crimes of murder and was sentenced to seven years (Sentencing judgment 23rd February 2007). The other 
individual, Simeon Nchamihigo, was arrested by Tanzanian authorities in May 2001, charges included 
genocide and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to life imprisonment which later was reduced to 
40 years upon appeal (Appeal Judgment 18 March 2010). 
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Prosecution counsel will adopt the highest standards of professional conduct. The 
Prosecutor expects them to behave in a manner, consistent always with the letter 
and the spirit of the relevant Statute and Rules of Procedures and Evidence 
(Prosecutor Regulations 1999). 
 
However, in relation to investigations being part of the discursive condition of how the 
witness subject is constituted, it is argued here that the complexities of investigation, and 
prosecutors following a dominant narrative of the genocide, shaped in important ways 
who can be a witness and what they can speak about. Developing the discussion above 
on practical issues, such as lack of professional investigators, the following discussion 
will foreground that these practical challenges to investigations, along with internal power 
struggles within the prosecution,105 are part of the tightly controlled discursive field of a 
discourse of witnessing.    
During the ICTR reporting year of 1997-1998 a total 546 witness statements were 
gathered by prosecutor investigations, this was in addition to 1500 statements gathered 
before 1997-1998 (Annual Report 1998). In a characteristically optimistic tone, the ICTR 
1998 Annual Report uses these statistics to convey the positive accomplishments of the 
prosecution investigations, including the robustness of evidence gathering. As the report 
states:  
This numerical result of the investigations also attests to the quality of the 
information and evidence collected. Consolidation of the evidence has made it 
possible to formalize 12 indictments and take the initiative of consolidating 
certain procedures already pending before the Tribunal (ICTR Annual Report 
1998). 
 
Reading this text through a discursive lens, however, foregrounds important questions 
that need to be asked of this text beyond statistical values. Reading a text discursively 
entails consideration of what is absent as well as what is there (Foucault 1972). The 
subject position of the ‘witness’ is, like any subject position, restrictive. These restrictions 
need to be interrogated including understanding what knowledge of past rights violations 
the subject of ‘witness’ can talk about, and the places from which a ‘witness’ subject can 
speak (see Chapter 3). Therefore, this text needs to be interrogated and to be asked 
questions including, how were these witness statements gathered? Where were they 
gathered and by whom? Out of all the statements collected, how many were not submitted 
 
105 The Office’s organization chart for the 1997 budget period makes provision for 137 posts, whereas at 1 
May 1998 only 80 of the posts in question were filled and recruitment action was being taken in respect 
of 50 other posts (Annual Report 1998, 8). 
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as evidence, how many witnesses interviewed during investigations actually testified in 
court? In the following discussion, how witness statements were gathered, and how many 
witnesses actually testified will be explored further. Foucault reminds us that the 
discursive conditions of legal institutions include a range of processes and actors, and it 
is in the dispersed and often subtle interactions of these processes and actors that are a 
key component to understand how law produces knowledge and identity (Foucault 1991, 
11). In his writings on the discursive conditions of law and legal institutions, Foucault 
focused on the French civil law legal system. While the ICTR is primarily based on 
common law it does include aspects of civil law, which thus has relevance to this 
discussion.106  
An example of what is absent from the above annual report (text), and thus plays 
a role in the discursive construction of the ‘witness’, is the complexities of investigations: 
the lack of professional investigators and absence of local expertise. For example, the 
ICTR Expert Report (1998) states: 
 
Dislike and distrust of the Tribunal by many victims, potential witnesses and 
others involved in investigations often make it difficult to overcome obstruction 
or to obtain cooperation and needed information. (ICTR Expert Report 1998) 
 
Furthermore, as former ICTR investigator David Wagala explains, investigators were 
only interested in witnesses who could provide relevant evidence to support the 
Prosecutor’s case (Mckay and Friedman 2008). Finding the relevant witness evidence 
required a process of filtering out the ‘irrelevant’ witnesses. The filtering out of witnesses 
that did not have evidence relevant to ICTR investigations was a theme discussed in 
several of interview transcripts of ICTR investigators and prosecutors. For example, as 
Wagala explicitly states in interview with McKay and Friedman, 
 
so first we just ask [the person] general questions to ascertain that they have 
knowledge of what happened, because we want very good witnesses, not just 
people, fancy people coming here telling stories. So the first interview is meant to 
identify the good potential witnesses (McKay and Friedman 2008). 
 
Moreover, as former investigator Roger Pionana notes in an interview with McKay and 
Friedman: 
 




When we started investigating, talking about Butare – because I was assigned to 
work there – we started by interviewing many people at random, because we had 
to get information on what happened (McKay and Friedman 2008). 
 
The interviewing people at ‘random’ and identifying only the ‘very good witnesses’, 
suggests that some of the witness statements gathered were likely not used by the 
Prosecutor. The investigators’ process of selecting only the best witnesses discursively 
restricts certain witnesses from becoming a witness subject. Discourse does not permit 
anyone to occupy ‘a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions’ (Foucault 
1972). In the investigations mentioned by Pionana, the numerous witnesses approached 
were not selected because investigators knew they had relevant information relating to 
specific ICTR crimes. Rather they would speak to people and hope that some of what 
they were told had some relevance as potential evidence (McKay and Friedman 2008).  
Another part the discursive conditions of investigations is the Investigation 
Section lacked context specific knowledge and local expertise. The ICTR was reluctant, 
albeit implicitly, to allow Rwandans to be part of the OTP investigation teams, and allow 
judges and legal staff to visit Rwanda. The reluctance to use local expertise was based 
upon the concern that individuals sympathetic to the genocide as well as the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) could manipulate or destroy evidence (Nathan and Utter 2008).107 
Whilst it is understandable that the ICTR wanted to preserve the objectivity of 
investigations, the distancing of local expertise, particularly in the first decade of the 
tribunal, resulted in investigations being somewhat haphazard (P Nathan and R Utter 
2008). The lack of local expertise negatively impacting on investigations and the 
gathering of witness evidence was a common theme discussed within the archived 
interview transcripts. For example, in an interview with Nathan and Horowitz, former 
ICTR Legal Officer Suzanne Chenualt states that was a need for: 
greater knowledge of the anthropological dimensions of this community. And I 
think that we’ve gone in almost like bears in a china closet without understanding 
Rwanda extremely well [including the] ways of approaching those who have 
survived and those people who witness the events (Nathan and Horowitz 2008). 
 
 
107 Interview with ICTR Prosecutor Charles Adeogun-Phillips. Interviewed by Lisa. P. Nathan and Robert Utter for the University of 
Washington project ‘Voices from the Rwanda Tribunal’.  
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The impact of lack of local knowledge on investigations and gathering witness evidence 
is also highlighted my former ICTR prosecutor Charles Adeogun-Phillips. In interview 
with Nathan and Utter Adeogun-Phillips states, 
[We] lacked the involvement of national staff in the investigative process. We 
didn’t have any Rwandan help. What is the essential drawback of not having a 
Rwandan on your investigative team? Well, we’re foreigners We’re, we’re not 
native to the locality and there were so many diverse issues and intricacies about 
the whole genocide in itself that you, you are unable to understand or grasp at a 
very early stage if you don’t have that local context […] And you can imagine 
what the practical effect of that is, in the sense that we may have, based many of 
our trials on erroneous theories and  strategies, not out of negligence, but out of 
ignorance. (Nathan and Utter 2008) 
To identify what conditions constitute the witness as speaking subject amongst all the 
individuals who experienced the genocide against the Tutsi, is suggested here to include 
investigators’ contextual knowledge, and geographical location of potential witnesses. 
The resistance by the ICTR to engage with local knowledge and expertise, mentioned 
above, is a mentality engrained within international criminal justice, more generally 
(Horowitz and Nathan 2008). This mentality insists legal actors adjudicating these trials 
need to keep a distance from the society affected in case they become influenced by 
what they see and/or hear. However, particularly in relation to the investigation process, 
the sense of duty felt by legal actors to keep themselves ‘sterile’ from events had a 
detrimental impact on the Prosecutor’s ability to conduct robust investigations. As 
argued by Clark, international criminal institutions’ insistence on legal actors being 
distant from a given society underestimates how essential it is for judges and 
investigators to spend a sustained period in these locations to understand the context in 
which they will be passing judgment (Clark 2018, 43).108 The uncompromising  stance 
for legal actors to be distant from the society is evident in one senior ICTR judge’s 
response to Clark’s question, whether or not he had travelled to Rwanda? 
I have never been to Rwanda and I have no desire to visit. Going there and 
seeing the effect we are having would only make my work more difficult. How 
can I do my job – judging these cases fairly – with pictures in my mind of what 
 
108 Judge Eric Mose was a minority voice amongst ICTR judges advocating the usefulness of the trial 
chamber visiting the site where alleged crimes took place. Indeed, as one of the judges on the Ignace 
Bagilishema case Mose’s advocacy led to the entire chamber ‘judges, prosecutors, lawyers, clerks, 
registry staff, legal assistants’ going to Rwanda (Cruvellier 2010, 134). However, Mose’s advocacy for 
site visits was not something the tribunal embraced in the long term. See interview with Judge Mose 
(Voices from the Rwandan Tribunal 2008). 
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is happening over there? This task is already complicated enough (Clark 2018, 
43). 
It is crucial for courts to fully understand the historical and social complexities of the 
cases they are judging; however there is a continued failure by tribunals to properly 
engage with local knowledge. This failure has limited these courts’ ability to achieve 
successful prosecutions, and also has more generally negatively impacted on their 
credibility as international legal institutions (Clark 2018, 36-37, 315).109 Clark’s 
persuasive analysis that ICC investigations lack local knowledge stems from issues 
evident within its predecessor, the ICTR, as the current discussion highlights. It is also 
an indication of lessons not learnt by the ICC and thus reflects the relevance of this 
thesis’s argument to other international criminal institutions. In short, what is argued 
here as important discursive conditions to the construction of the witness at the ICTR is 
also relevant to the ICC.  
The highlighting here of the complexities and in some instances incompetence of 
investigations is not done in order to propose procedural reform. Rather, the focus here, 
from a discursive frame, is to argue that these procedural complexities and shortfalls in 
investigations are an important component in understanding the discursive conditions and 
restrictions of how the subject position of the witness is constituted. In other words, the 
ICTR legal procedures, including investigations, are part of the ‘filtering’ process of the 
construction of the ‘witness’. The way in which investigation teams gather evidence, 
respond to challenges/issues is more than just a reflection of procedural functioning of 
the ICTR; crucially, they are also part of the discursive process. 
 
Indictments 
The RPE states that following an investigation if there is substantial evidence an 
indictment can be submitted. As Rule 47 details: 
 
If in the course of an investigation the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is sufficient 
evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, he shall prepare and forward to the 
Registrar an indictment for confirmation by a Judge, together with supporting 
material. The indictment shall set forth the name and particulars of the suspect, 
and a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime with which the 
suspect is charged. (Rules of Procedure and Evidence 1996, Rule 47)  
 
 
109 Also see Gready (2005). 
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Rule 47 implies there is a linear flow of procedural process from conducting 
investigations to the submission of an indictment. However, as already discussed, the 
complexities of investigations are part of the discursive field. It is also the preparation of 
indictments as well as indictments themselves that are part of the discursive restriction of 
witnessing. In the following paragraphs it will be argued that in some instances 
prosecutors mobilised a common narrative that all those who held government positions 
during the genocide were guilty. The mobilisation of this narrative allowed for successful 
submissions of indictments without the OTP, at the time of indictments, producing 
substantial witness evidence. Again, to be clear, the point to be made here is not to identify 
possible violations of ICTR regulations, but more specifically these procedural 
irregularities are part of the discursive restrictions of whom can be a witness subject. In 
other words, individuals who could have potentially been witnesses but were not 
approached by investigators because they followed a dominant narrative is discursively 
important. In short what the discussion in the paragraphs below argues is procedural 
irregularities, such as the way OTP produced indictments, acts a part of the discursive 
conditions of who can be a witness subject.   
To provide an illustrated example, in the Nizeyimana (ICTR-00-55C) case a 
preliminary motion brought by the Defence stated: 
 
The Defence contends that the March Amended Indictment, contrary to leading 
case law, contains many allegations which are fundamentally incomplete while 
others are entirely missing. Most references to ‘orders’ fail to provide the 
minimum information required by Appeals Chamber jurisprudence concerning 
the particular acts or particular course of conduct of the Accused making it 
impossible for him to defend against these allegations … The Accused further 
notes that for many of the allegations included in the 1st March Amended 
Indictment, the Prosecutor seems to have no specific fact implicating the Accused. 
(Defence Preliminary motion on the defects in the indictment 2010, 6). 
 
This example, like many of the motions relating to indictments that the thesis analysed, 
expresses concern that the amended indictment lacks specific facts, evidence relating to 
the allegations. It is not uncommon for defence counsel to raise objections to indictments, 
indeed it is often part of the defence strategy (Rohan and Zyberi 2017). However, 
discursively it can be read as indicating that the Prosecutor not providing specific facts, 
including evidence, as regulated in the RPE, acts as a condition of which individuals can 
be included as witnesses in indictments. This discursive process is present again in the 




This Rule [rule 98] upholds paramount principles of criminal law: the 
presumption of innocence, and the corollary burden resting on the Prosecution to 
prove every element of the counts charged beyond a reasonable doubt. That 
burden is one of production of evidence before being one of persuasion … The 
Prosecution at that stage is only required ‘to establish a prima facie case against 
the Accused’. However, this standard ‘is not met by any evidence; there must be 
some evidence which could properly lead to a conviction’ and the ‘Trial Chamber 
must assess whether the Prosecution evidence is actually probative of the elements 
of crimes charged in the indictment’ (Defence Motion for Judgement of Acquittal 
Pursuant to Rule 98 Dis of the Rules 4 March 2011, 2-3). 
 
Prosecutors using a dominant narrative in order to navigate the complexities of gathering 
witness evidence for indictments is discursively relevant as it restricts who can potentially 
be a witness. Associate Legal Officer for the trial chamber I M-L Lambert acknowledges 
the difficulty of assessing witness evidence in relation to being influenced by external 
factors such as a dominant narrative of who was guilty. In interview with Horowitz and 
McKay, Lambert points out the challenge of:  
 
determining whether it is in true accordance with international legal principles, 
whether the accused, however famous or whichever position they may have held 
in Rwanda, can legally be held to account. And that’s the challenge. (Horowitz 
and McKay 2008) 
 
ICTR defence lawyer Phillippe Larochelle has argued that in practice ICTR prosecutors 
have followed a narrative of collective guilt in the manner in which they conducted their 
investigations.110 Larochelle locates this specifically within what he sees as failure of the 
prosecution to abide by the rules of procedure for investigations including the gathering 
of witness statements. Larochelle is in favour of prosecuting the main perpetrators of the 
genocide. Although, according to Larochelle, investigations should be a linear process, 
which gather and evaluate the evidence, then if there is substantial evidence produce an 
indictment that relates to that evidence (Larochelle 2008). In interview with McKay and 
Nathan, Larochelle states that prosecutors: 
 
are putting things in reverse order, they are saying there was a genocide, there was 
a government, the only possible rational conclusion is that all the government was 
responsible ... you are getting into the realms of holding people accountable by 
virtue of the fact they belonged to an organisation or collective or group which I 
 
110 See Mark Drumbl (2010) ‘Collective responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice’. 
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think is a mistake, and, it actually runs contrary to what the original resolution 
says which is if you want to find someone guilty, you have to demonstrate their 
own guilt, intent and guilty acts. You cannot hold someone guilty by the fact that 
they belong to a government, a political party or an organisation (McKay and 
Nathan 2008). 
 
In one sense, Larochelle suggests that contrary to the RPE for conducting investigations 
and producing indictments, witness statements were gathered that fitted a narrative that 
every member of the government during the genocide was guilty. It is the view of this 
thesis, having read indictments and motions across a range of ICTR cases, and engaging 
with interviews with legal counsels, investigators and registrars (Voices from the 
Rwandan Tribunal), that in some instances prosecution counsel, particularly in the first 
decade of the tribunal, did subscribe to this narrative. Again it is important to state that 
the procedural irregularities identified here are part of the discursive conditions that 
‘filter’ who can be a witness subject. Indictments being based upon a narrative of 
collective guilt and then prosecutors trying to find witnesses that fit that narrative was an 
issue argued by former ICTR defence counsel Avi Singh. In interview with Friedman and 
McKay, Singh states how the preparation of an indictment should work, however, Singh 
states that in many instances prosecutors were not doing any of this: 
 
So [an] ideal case, and let’s not even talk about whether the case is good or not, 
but ideal management of the case. It’s a well pleaded indictment, which actually 
tells you what evidence is going to be brought. Not one which is written before 
any of the witnesses are interviewed. There's timely disclosure of that evidence 
on which the indictment was based – this is stuff that’s basic right?  But none of 
this has happened. I mean this is stuff you would think is 101, none of this has 
happened. There would be timely disclosure of the witnesses on which the 
indictment was based. Those witnesses would then be brought. There would be, 
actually be a coherence to the prosecution case where you won’t have their own 
witnesses contradicting each other. So they would think about that before they 
wrote the indictment.  
 
What is particularly relevant in the above quote is indictments being written before any 
witnesses have been interviewed. In others, the charges against the accused are written 
without knowing if actual evidence, including witness evidence, exists to support the 
charges. This can be interpreted as suggesting that the prosecutors had written an 
indictment based upon the collective guilt narrative, discussed above by Larochelle, and 
then needed to try and find witnesses to support that narrative. Specifically, prosecutors 
only selecting witnesses that fitted this dominant narrative is part of the discursive 
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restrictions of who can occupy the witness subject position. Prosecutors using this 
narrative as a frame to inform which witnesses they will speak to and gather statements 
from means that from the beginning of investigations, possibly before, many individuals 
would not be relevant to the legal story prosecutors needed to tell. 
Here it is worth considering how many witnesses in the Nizeyimana case testified 
in court. In the Nizeyimana case the prosecutor called 38 witnesses to testify in court and 
the defence called 39 witnesses (Nizeyimana Judgment and Sentencing 2011, 450-451). 
Although, the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief stated the names, and summaries of what they 
would testify to in court, of 50 witnesses, twelve less than actually testified on the witness 
stand (Nizeyimana Pre-trial brief 2010). One month prior to the submission of the pre-
trial brief the Prosecute filed a memorandum title ‘Compliance with the scheduling order’ 
(2010). This document stated the names of 71 witnesses that the prosecution would call 
during the trial (Proscution Memoradium 2010, 1-9). In short, in the Nizeyimana case the 
number of witnesses which were to testify in court was reduced from 71 to 38, a reduction 
of 33 fewer witnesses. This does not include witness statements that may have been 
gathered by investigators but not included in the scheduling order or pre-trial brief. One 
example of the witness list being reduced before trial can be seen with witnesses BJW 
and BYE. Shortly before trial the prosecutor stated these ‘witnesses were removed 
because of difficulty securing their attendance’ (Prosecution Memoradum 2010, 3). 
Witness BYE’s statement given to investigators included information about them being 
victims of rape (Scheduling Order 2010). In short, the ICTR legal procedure, including 
investigations, are part of the ‘filtering’ process in the construction of the ‘witness’ 
subject.  
This section has outlined the important role the ICTR organs and foundational 
documents have within the discursive process in how the subject of the witness is 
discursively constituted. Furthermore, it has highlighted the central role legal actors, such 
as investigators and legal counsels, play in this discursive process. Building on this, the 
section argued that through a discursive lens the ‘foundational documents’, investigations 
and indictments are part of the discursive conditions that significantly restricted which 
individuals could be a witness. Having now made this argument, the following section, 
engaging with the above analysis, will use the illustrated example of the right to truth in 
challenging the claim that the ICTR facilitates witness agency and contributes to a 




Right to Truth  
This section explores the implication of the tightly controlled discursive conditions of the 
‘witness’, discussed above, in relation to the right to truth and its perceived important role 
in international tribunals and courts in aiding victims-witnesses to understand past 
atrocities (Klinkner and Smith 2015). Specifically, it is argued that advocacy for the right 
to truth at international criminal tribunals is a misguided concept because the witness 
subject is discursively constituted. The focus of the discussion to follow is specifically to 
critique and challenge the claim that the right to truth can facilitate victim-witness agency 
in trials and contribute to a collective understand of past atrocities. The common advocacy 
within the transitional justice legal scholarship for international tribunals to make an 
important contribution to historical truth conflates individual victims with the legal 
subject position of witnesses. These subject positions are two different identities entailing 
nuanced distinctions. To be clear, this section’s engagement with the right to truth should 
not be understood as making a broad claim within the oeuvre of the literature on human 
rights. Rather, this thesis challenges the claim in the legal transitional justice scholarship 
that international tribunals can produce a collective memory of atrocities (Osiel 2012). 
The right to truth is used to contextualise and illustrate this challenge.  
The section begins by briefly summarising the right to truth in the context of mass 
atrocities. The discussion will then outline the important distinction between the victim 
subject and witness subject in relation to claims that the right to truth facilitates agency. 
 
Mass Atrocities and the ‘Right to Truth’ 
The right to truth has gathered traction in recent years as an important part of the dialogue 
on how legal and human rights norms can aid societies’ recovery from mass atrocities.111 
The right to truth: 
 
encompasses the right to seek and obtain information relating to the reasons and 
causes which led to the victimisation of the individuals concerned, together with 
the prevailing conditions, circumstances and reasons which led to or otherwise 




111 International and national experiences have led to several diverse institutional and procedural 
mechanisms to implement the right to the truth. International criminal tribunals, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court constitute one way to establish the truth (United Nations Report 2006). 
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In the context of legal responses to mass atrocities Klinkner and Smith have argued that 
international criminal tribunals and courts are a suitable site to facilitate the individual 
and collective components of the right to truth, and the right ‘is playing an increasingly 
important role in judicial approaches to transitional justice’ (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 4) 
(see Chapter 1, Section 4). According to Groome, the right to truth in the context of the 
ICTY made important contributions including aiding victims and broader society’s 
interest in the truth about the conflict (Groome 2010, 187). Sweeney has suggested that 
the right to truth as a freestanding right is complex and more ambiguous than advocates 
such as Klinkner and Smith acknowledge:  
 
There is also a certain amount of legal elusiveness about the right to truth. The 
2006 UN Human Rights Commission ‘Study on the right to truth’ claimed to have 
found that the right to truth was an, ‘inalienable and autonomous right’, but its 
analysis conflated the historical and the legal bases of the right and failed to 
engage with the recognized sources of public international law at all. (Sweeney 
2018, 358) 
 
Despite the ambiguities of the right noted by Sweeney, in the context of the transitional 
justice legal scholarship advocates of the right to truth commonly agree that it plays an 
important role in international criminal tribunals’ and courts’ contribution to 
understanding past atrocities (Funk 2011; Groome 2011; Klinkner and Smith 2015; 
Pindell 2002; Sweeney 2018). The important point to highlight here in relation to the 
thesis is that the right to truth is encapsulated within legal and human rights norms. To 
recap from Chapter 1, transitional justice legal scholarship commonly advocates legal and 
human rights norms, here the right to truth, as an unambiguous response to mass human 
rights violations. This advocacy perceives international criminal legal institutions as a 
key process for societal transition, whereby these norms facilitate understanding of the 
reasons and causes that led to violations occurring. As Groome argues, legal responses to 
gross human rights violations increasingly employ the ‘concept of restorative justice 
which in part seeks to empower victims with an active role in criminal proceedings’ 
(Groome 2011, 189). In other words, according to Groome witness testimonies given in 
court go beyond the core role of a court, that is to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty. 
Witness testimony, facilitated through the court process, allows past rights violations to 
be understood in the present. Crucially, however, the thesis disagreeing with the claim 
that international criminal tribunals are able to produce a collective understanding of past 
atrocities: law should not be seen as a ‘bridge’ to move from a violent past to a more 
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peaceful future (see Chapter 2). The paragraphs to follow will outline that the subject 
position of witness and victims need to be understood as different identity constructs, 




The term ‘victim’ at the ICTR, unlike ‘witness’, is defined. The RPE defines victims as, 
‘[a] person against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly 
been committed’ (Rule 2 2010, 1). In relation to the above Rule, in the context of 
international human rights legal victims has a clear definition. This definition is split into 
two, direct victims and indirect victims. The former refers to a person who has suffered 
directly from a serious violation of human rights, whilst the latter means the immediate 
family or dependents of direct victims (United Nations Basic Principles 2005). However, 
the subject of the victim, like the witness, is socially constructed, thus understanding the 
victim as a social construct requires moving beyond the strict legalistic definitions.112 
Being a social construct, the victim is plural. In the context of transitional justice, victims 
have numerous discursive conditions, which importantly vary across the numerous 
transitional justice institutions and actors victims come into contact with (Hearty 2018; 
McEvoy 2013).113 Thus, importantly, understanding the victim subject as being plural 
foregrounds the importance of understanding victims beyond static legal notions of 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ victims.114 
Here the conceptual framing of victim and witness as separate subject positions 
can be empirically illustrated in the context of post-genocide Rwanda. Some individuals 
who testified as witnesses at the ICTR also appeared as victims at Rwanda’s two other 
legal transitional justice mechanisms, the Rwandan national courts and gacaca 
community courts (Palmer 2015, 4). Also, ICTR witnesses in some instances had 
appeared as alleged perpetrators at the national courts and/or gacaca. More crucially in 
 
112 Hearty has argued that in transitional justice the construction of ‘victims’ entails processes of 
hierarchies which act as a process of exclusion for individuals and groups who do not fit within certain 
categories (Hearty 2018). Also see Killean (2018); Moffat (2014). For a general discussion on 
victimology see, ‘Revisiting the Ideal Victim: Developments in Critical Victimology’ (Duggan 2018). 
113 The understanding of victim as socially constructed in the transitional justice scholarship is often 
referred to as victimhood (Hearty 2018; McEvoy 2012). 
114 For example, in the ICC ‘victim orientated approach’ in Central African Republic (CAR) an individual 
could be a ‘victim’ who is eligible for reparations including financial compensation. Simultaneously an 
individual could be categorised as a victim in local justice processes in CAR, importantly both these 
categories of victim would entail inclusions and exclusions of who can be ‘categorised’ as a victim 
(Hearty 2018, 901; Moffett 2014, 2017). 
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relation to the chapter’s argument is to highlight that the labels transitional justice assigns 
individuals are not static. In other words, who can be a victim and what they can do in a 
given transitional justice mechanism will be different to another mechanism responding 
to the same conflict/atrocity. Thus, importantly, the universality of the right to truth is 
problematic as it categorises victims as a singular entity as this singularity defines all 
victims as an unambiguous whole.  Here, recapping briefly from Chapter 3’s discussion 
on Foucault’s understanding of how identity is constructed is helpful. Subject positions, 
such as the witness, are not fixed identities, rather subjects are constantly reconfigured 
and reshaped into new configurations. (Foucault 1979, 52). Subject position, identity, is 
never self-evident, instead consideration must be given to the central role institutions, and 
actors, have in producing these identities (Foucault 1972, 201). Framing the subject 
positions of victim and witness as not being self-evident is crucial because it allows for 
this chapter, and thesis, to challenge claims in the legal scholarship that international 
criminal tribunals facilitate witness agency (Groom 2011; Klinkner and Smith, 2015). 
Therefore, a discursive deconstruction of victim-witnesses highlights the importance of 
understanding them as distinct identity constructs. Understood as distinct and discursively 
restricted subject positions brings into question the extent to which the right to truth is 
able to facilitate agency at international criminal tribunals. 
There are two main points to draw out from the discussion above in relation to the 
thesis. Firstly the victim subject and witness subject are different identities, which should 
not be conflated, and both subjects are plural, thus do not fit neatly within the singularity 
of the right to truth. Secondly, the conflation of victim and witness subjects in the right 
to truth lacks understanding of the ‘witness’ at the ICTR as being a discursive object of 
legal knowledge. The witness as a discursive object is a point that will be further 
developed in Chapter 6. For the purpose of this section, to be able to challenge the claim 
that the right to truth facilitates agency and collective understanding of atrocities it has 
been necessary to first foreground the important nuances between the witness and victim 
subject(s) and why the conflation of these subjects is problematic. This clarification now 
enables the following discussion to argue that understanding the ‘witness’ as being 
constituted within tightly controlled discursive conditions challenges the right to truth 
claim that international tribunals and courts facilitate witness agency.  
 
The discursivity of the ‘witness’ vs the right to truth: universality, agency and collective 
legal stories  
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In the transitional justice legal scholarship advocates of the right to truth commonly use 
the conflation of victim and witness subjects in claiming the benefits of judicial 
mechanisms to aid agency. This can be seen in Klinkner and Smith stating: 
 
one of the key reasons for victim participation [at the ICC] is that it ‘empowers 
them, recognises their suffering and enables them to contribute to the 
establishment of the historical record, the truth as it were of what occurred’ thus 
arguably enhancing the truth-finding process and the realisation of the right to 
truth. (Klinkner and Smith 2015, 23)  
 
The common claim in the legal scholarship, such as that of Klinkner and Smith, suggests 
that international criminal courts and tribunals do two things in relation to facilitating the 
right to truth: upholding the core principle of universality and giving victims a site from 
which they can tell their story (agency). Firstly, according to advocates (Klinkner and 
Smith, Groome, Sweeney) international criminal institutions are embodied with the 
universality of legal and human rights norms (Turner 2016). The universality of human 
rights, here the right to truth, is seen as a positive and fundamental component to 
international criminal institutions facilitating the right to truth for all victims. As Sweeney 
states, the right to truth, when considered in the context of the underlying values of each 
human rights treaty, can make a positive contribution to the individual and collective 
components of the right to truth (Sweeney 2018, 356). According to Sweeney, when the 
right to truth is considered in relation to each specific context, including international 
criminal tribunals and courts, it supports the ‘vindication of victims’ and their next of 
kins’ [sic] rights to know about pre-transition human rights abuses’ (Sweeney 2018, 356). 
However, this universality central to the right to truth fails to understand the discursive 
restrictions that produce tightly controlled discursive conditions that determine who is 
able to talk about past rights violations at the ICTR, and what knowledge of the past they 
can talk about. 
Disagreeing with claims by advocates that international criminal tribunals, 
through upholding the universality of legal and human rights norms, facilitate victim-
witnesses to hear, as well as tell, stories of rights violation, it is argued here that this 
universality in the context of international criminal tribunals is highly problematic. In 
short, prosecutors select only a fraction of victims of violations to testify in court. The 
fact that only a small portion of victims testify is problematic for scholars who advocate 
the ICTR can facilitate victims telling their story of atrocities. Telling victims that they 
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will be able to tell their stories is an aspiration destined to remain unfilled and therefore 
leave many victims disappointed and abandoned because most victims will not be called 
to testify in court (Megret 2018a; Moffett 2014). Legal counsel selected only the 
individuals that contribute to the narrow legal narrative they needed to tell in order for a 
legal judgment to be reached (Dembour and Haslam 2004). This narrow selection of 
individuals emphasises that the core role of trials is to reach a legal judgment of guilty or 
not guilty, and crucially, not to produce a comprehensive understanding of the past. 
Furthermore, the ICTR and the ICC being located thousands of miles away from where 
victim-witnesses live means in practice many individuals feel isolated and disconnected 
from trials (Clark 2018). The ICTR was located in Arusha Tazania, while the ICC is 
located in the Hague, Netherlands. More crucially, the universality of the right to truth 
fails to understand the discursive conditions and practices at the ICTR that substantially 
restrict who is able to be a ‘witness’. As foregrounded in Section 1, the ICTR foundational 
documents, United Nations Resolution 955, ICTR Statute and RPE, are important 
discursive components that shape who can be a ‘witness’. Relatedly, the messiness of 
investigations and motion/motion decisions also discursively ‘filter’ which individuals 
are constituted as witnesses. Thus, viewed through a discursive lens, these discursive 
processes contradict the claims made by advocates of the right to truth.  
Secondly, there is a need to challenge the claim that the right to truth at 
international criminal tribunals and courts facilitates victim-witness agency. For Groome, 
agency allows individuals who had directly experienced violations and have been left 
marginalised by the violations to feel part of the legal process of accountability for those 
violations (Groome 2011, 187). Importantly for advocates, the right to truth at 
international criminal tribunals also provides agency in the sense that it provides a site 
for individuals who had previously been silenced or marginalised to tell their story of the 
suffering they have experienced (Groome 2011; Klinkner and Smith 2015). In other 
words, the common advocacy within the legal transitional justice scholarship for 
international criminal tribunals to contribute to uncovering the truth of past rights 
violations assumes victims-witnesses as self-evident. However, as argued in the first 
section of the chapter, the discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing is highly 
restrictive. Thus, the claim that the right to truth provides agency is significantly 
misguided. Here, drawing upon the above discursive analysis of the data, the creation of 
the ICTR, Resolution 955, the Statute and RPE, shape and orientate which individuals 
may be able to testify at the ICTR. That being, the individuals according to the ICTR 
134 
 
mandate who can be indicted and the crimes the tribunal has jurisdiction over. In the 
context of the right to truth’s claim of agency the ICTR ‘foundational documents’ restrict 
which individuals might be interviewed by investigators. Those individuals who 
experienced violations which are not defined as crimes within the ICTR jurisdiction will 
not be considered as potential ‘victim-witnesses’ by the ICTR. Put more crudely, the 
claim of agency in the right to truth fails to understand that the act of creating the ICTR 
has already begun the process of withdrawing agency from individuals that are not 
relevant to the core legal purpose of reaching a legal determination of guilt or innocence. 
Relatedly, agency is further restricted by the discursive conditions of investigations and 
indictments. The messiness of investigations, including lack of professional investigators, 
lack of local expertise and knowledge and prosecutors following a dominant narrative of 
who was guilty, discursively constituted the restrictions on who could potentially be a 
‘witness’. Klinkner and Smith, who conceptually do not recognise the discursive 
restrictions of investigations and indictments, put forward the positive aspect of 
investigations in relation to the right to truth:  
 
[F]or the purpose of conducting its investigation into alleged offences, 
international criminal law mechanisms, unlike their human rights counterparts, 
operate within the territories of the abusing States, and as such, have first-hand 
access to evidential materials, including those which might assist in answering the 
many questions that victims and their families have in the aftermath of atrocities. 
(Klinkner and Smith 2015, 17) 
 
Moreover, as evidenced in Section 1, indictment and motion/motion decisions are further 
discursive layers in how the ‘witness’ is constituted. Motions are a key site for the 
discursive battleground between prosecution and defence counsel, and judges in 
‘filtering’ which witnesses can be removed or added to the indictment as well as 
restrictions on what they will testify about. To give a further example here of how motions 
are discursively restrictive in the Nizeyimana Case a prosecution motion in relation to 
‘witness review’ states: 
 
On 6 and 7 September 2010 the Prosecution conducted a review of its List of 
Witnesses and the statements of the various witnesses in comparison to the Second 
Amended Indictment filed Friday, 31 August 2010. One result of that witness 
review was that the evidence of 17 witnesses was identified as being excessive to 
prove the same facts as the evidence of other witnesses on the list. That overall 
assessment was based on the assumption that the evidence submitted pursuant to 
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Rule 92bis, in the form of written statements, will be received by the Trial 
Chamber.  
 
Motions such as this are common throughout ICTR trials. Importantly here, read through 
a discursive lens, motions are part of the discursive conditions of who can be a witness at 
the ICTR. In short, motions restrict who can occupy the subject position of the witness. 
This is crucial in challenging assumptions of legal witnesses as self-evident (Groome 
2011). All subject positions, including the witness, are restrictive and include processes 
of inclusion and exclusion (Foucault 1991). Understanding how some individuals who 
experienced the genocide against the Tutsi are bestowed the right to speak requires 
consideration of individuals that are not rendered with the right to speak: individuals not 
constituted as a witness subject. As Foucault reminds us, ‘[n]othing in man – not even his 
body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding 
other men’ (Foucault 1987, 87-88). When claims of agency are made, such as by 
advocates of the right to truth, it is assumed witnesses are self-evident. However as has 
been argued in this section, no identity, including legal witnesses, is ever self-evident. 
Rather they are formed with the discursive conditions of the ICTR and its legal actors. 
Specifically, to more fully understand what agency witness subjects have, or do not have, 
necessitates the need to understand the discursive conditions in which the witness 
subjected is constituted. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the subject position of the witness at the ICTR is 
discursively constructed, and has argued that the witness is formed within tightly 
controlled discursive conditions. Showing these discursive conditions allowed the chapter 
to go on to challenge claims of witness agency in the right to truth. The opening section 
outlined how the three organs of the ICTR: Registry, Chambers, and OTP, are all 
important sites in analysing how the witness subject is discursively constituted. Building 
on from this the discussion then, engaging with the analysis, Statute, RPE, and 
Indictments, argued that these ‘foundational documents’ are a crucial component of 
understanding how the witness is constituted. Specifically, read through a discursive lens 
the ICTR ‘foundational documents’, through the crimes the ICTR has jurisdiction over 
and the messiness of investigations, discursively restrict who can occupy the subject 
position of the witness. Section 2 then used the analysis of the data to challenge the claim 
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that the ICTR facilitates witness agency and is able to produce a collective memory of 
atrocities. This challenge was made using the illustrated example of the right to truth. 
This argument was developed across three interconnected points. Firstly, the witness 
subject and victim subject are different identity constructs, secondly the discursivity of 
legal witnesses is at odds with the claim of agency in the right to truth, and thirdly the 
legal story the ICTR produces lacks plurality. Therefore, this chapter’s argument 
contributes to answering the thesis’s subsidiary question, ‘how is the witness discursively 
constituted?’ Specifically, the discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing at the 
ICTR significantly restricts which individuals can occupy the subject position of the 
witness. It has been shown that an important part of these conditions are the legal actors, 
such as judges, legal counsels, and investigators, who shape in important ways the 
conditions determining out of all the individuals who experiences the horrors of 1994 




Chapter 5 – Memories of Violence and the Limitations of Law 
 
This chapter considers the way in which violence is remembered during the legal 
construction of memory at the ICTR. This consideration is made in relation to parts of the 
legal transitional justice scholarship advocating legal proceedings as the primacy of 
transitional justice mechanisms (Dixon and Tenove 2013). Scholars who advocate this 
legalistic orientation of transitional justice argue that tribunals contribute towards a 
collective narrative of why and how violations occurred (Groome 2011; Klinkner and 
Smith 2015). This chapter critiques and challenges this position. The chapter argues that 
the multidimensional experiences of violence are incompatible with the legal 
scholarship’s claim that legal mechanisms are able to account for individual diverse 
experiences of violence (ICTR 2013; Osiel 2012). In particular, it discusses the 
limitations of the way in which violence is constructed and shaped by law during the legal 
processes (pre-trial) at the ICTR (Felman 2002; Fujii 2009; Viebach 2017, 2019). 
Through engaging with the work of Lee Ann Fujii, the chapter begins by outlining the 
variety of the manifestations of violence during the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi; 
the diverse individual and personal characteristics of violence; and individual 
perpetrators’ rationale for participation during the genocide (Fujii 2009).115 For the 
purpose of this chapter what is useful about Fujii’s research is her focus on the social 
dynamics of genocide, particularly the complexities in understanding experiences and 
behaviours.116 This engagement with Fujii is in order to contrast the varieties of forms of 
violence evidenced by Fujii’s research, and the form of violence in indictments that 
witnesses are required to remember which contributed to legal determinations. The 
chapter concludes by discussing witnesses’ accounts of violence given in court, arguing 
that the narrow depictions of violence such as these, camouflage the absence of memories 
relating to the wider manifestations and complexities of genocidal violence.  
The primary focus of the previous chapter was to understand the discursive 
conditions of how the ‘witness’ is constituted. This chapter focuses on how discursive 
conditions shape what witnesses can talk about. Specifically, it shows how the discursive 
 
115 See Elain Scarry The Body in Pain (1985); Jenny Edkins Trauma and the Memory of Politics (2003); 
Cathy Caruth Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (2010). In the context of narratives 
of trauma in post genocide Rwanda see Julia Viebach Of Other Times: Temporality, Memory and Trauma 
in Post-genocide Rwanda (2019). 
116 For further discussions on the Genocide against the Tutsi see Eltringham (2003); Strauss (2006); 
Mamdani (2002); Melvern (2004). 
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conditions of the ICTR shape and restrict the construction of knowledge of mass right 
violations. In particular, it shows how the crimes within the ICTR’s jurisdiction act to 
discursively restrict the complexities of the multidimensional experiences of violence. 
The ICTR constructs legal memories of violence that contribute to the factual bases of 
decisions for a legal judgment being reached. Crucially, however, understanding memory 
as process, as this thesis does, means the construction of legal memory of violence at the 
ICTR is embedded within the tightly controlled discursive conditions of a discourse of 
witnessing (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). In short, the process of legal construction of 
memory at the ICTR is produced through and by the discursive conditions and practices 
of the tribunal. Thus it will be argued that the rigidity of crimes within the ICTR 
jurisdiction and the ICTR legal processes are unable to understand the complexities and 
fluidity of the violence. To be clear, it is not being argued here that the ICTR should have 
been more flexible in its interpretation of the crimes within its mandate or included 
additional crimes within its jurisdiction. Rather, it is the temporality and rigidity of legal 
categories of crimes that is incapable of comprehending the messiness and complexities 
of violence during mass atrocities. Therefore, it is the aim of this chapter to challenge the 
claim that through the testimonies of witnesses the ICTR is able to tell stories of the 
diverse individuals’ experiences of genocidal violence. 
The following two sections will outline the complexity of individual experiences 
of violence during the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi and how these complexities 
are at odds with the legal codification of the crime of genocide. The chapter then argues 
that the discursivity of legal practices at the ICTR acts to camouflage the absence of 
memories relating to the wider complexities of the violence. For this the chapter engages 
with Ricoeur’s (2004) concept of ‘manipulated memory’. The arguments made in this 
chapter directly relate to answering the thesis’s subsidiary research question: ‘How do 
discursive conditions shape the way violence is remembered at the ICTR?’ This section 
begins by briefly summarising the claim by advocates, such as Osiel, that legal institutions 
responding to mass atrocities can account for the individual experiences of violence 
(Osiel 2000). These claims will be contrasted with the legally codified and temporally 
bound categories of crimes within the ICTR jurisdiction, including the crime of genocide. 
The discussion will then outline the diverse individual experiences of genocidal violence 
in Rwanda engaging with the research of Fujii (2009). It is Fujii’s foregrounding of 
genocidal violence in Rwanda as a dynamic process that is of specific relevance. This 
supports the section’s claims that the crimes within the ICTR’s mandate serve the specific 
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legal purpose of reaching a legal determination and should not be used as a tool to claim 
that law can make sense of past atrocities in the present.  
 
Law, Genocide and Legal Memories of Mass Violence  
In the legal transitional justice scholarship a common understanding is that through 
witness memories the testimonial evidence given in court can contribute to understanding 
the individual reasons for and experiences of the genocide (Keyner 2019; Klinkner and 
Smith 2015; Osiel 2000; Sikkink 2011). However, it is the aim of this chapter to challenge 
this claim that law can produce detailed knowledge of the diverse experiences of 
genocidal violence. For supporters of this claim such as Osiel, criminal tribunals 
addressing mass atrocities contribute to understanding the reasons and causes that led to 
the atrocities occurring, including individuals’ experiences of violent events. For 
example, according to Osiel, atrocity ‘show trials’ position administrative massacres 
centre stage, shining a spotlight on individuals affected by mass violence to share their 
personal experiences of the reasons and causes that led to the atrocities occurring (Osiel 
2012, 4) (see Chapters 2 and 6). The claim that atrocity trials can aid individual agency 
was challenged in the previous chapter in relation to the right to truth (see Chapter 4). 
Osiel’s understanding is framed by a conceptual insight in liberal thought. The crux of 
Osiel’s liberal framing of memory argues that memories belonging to individuals can be 
‘recovered’ through trials (Osiel 2012, 4).  However, in the context of this section arguing 
that law is incapable of understanding the complexities of genocidal violence, there is a 
need to contrast claims such as Osiel’s against the discursive conditions of crimes in the 
ICTR jurisdiction. In short, crimes the ICTR prosecutes, including Genocide, are part of 
the ICTR discursivity which restricts what knowledge of violence is constituted at the 
tribunal. 
 
The ICTR and the crime of Genocide 
The ICTR Statute, article 2(2010) defines the crime of Genocide as: 
 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
3. The following acts shall be punishable:  
(a) Genocide;  
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;  
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;  
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;  
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
 
However, genocide can be defined in at least two ways, the legalistic conceptualisation 
of genocide, as defined in the ICTR statute, and the ‘social’ definition (Anderson 2017, 
4). Genocide, as ‘socially defined, is necessarily broad, attempting to incorporate all 
aspects of genocide and genocidal behaviour… The legalistic conceptualization, or 
codification, of genocide is far more focused, individualized, and restrictive’ (Anderson 
2017, 6-7).117 Read through a discursive lens, the legal definition of the crime of genocide 
at the ICTR can be seen as being part of the discursive conditions that ‘filter’ and shape 
knowledge about the genocide violence. To be able to legally prove an individual is guilty 
of Genocide, prosecutors have to demonstrate very specific criteria have been met 
(Schabas 2008), specifically, the requirement to demonstrate that an individual had 
specific genocidal intent to destroy a group in whole or in part (Schabas 2008). In meeting 
this criteria international criminal law requires fixed and temporally bound sets of events, 
actions and agents that directly relate to demonstrating ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that 
an individual intended to destroy the ethnic group, Tutsi. In other words, the purpose of 
the legal codification of the crime of genocide is not to understand the variety of genocide 
related violence (Anderson 2017; Drumbl 2011; Schabas 2006).118 However, crucially, 
this narrow legal framing of violence is in contrast to the diverse and changing nature of 
genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994, as will be outlined in the following paragraphs 
engaging with the work of Fujii (2009). The crimes the ICTR is mandated to prosecute, 
 
117 The recently released report (June 2019) by Canada’s National Inquiry into missing and murdered 
indigenous women and girls drew heated debated centring on the report’s conclusion that violence against 
indigenous women and girls constituted genocide. Oszu suggests in the context of the Canadian inquiry, 
that while the legal codification of genocide is clunky and historically contingent, however the crime of 
genocide can be central to ‘illuminating some of the structural forces underlying and animating a range of 
events that may otherwise appear unrelated’. Ozsu argues that central to the debate around the report’s 
conclusion is the relation between law and society, particularly the way in which legal definitions are 
applied and made sense of within different social conditions (Ozsu 2019).  
118 Also see, Meiches 2019; Bachmann 2019; Akhavan 2012; Moses 2016. As one ICTR judge (see 
Eltringham 2019, 136-137) stated in relation to the very specific information they needed from witnesses 
to determine if an individual is legally guilty of genocide: 
What I need to know is whether someone committed acts with the intention ‘to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. What I want to hear is that this member of the 
Interahamwe was called up by this specific person on 8th April who gave them car keys and guns and 
said ‘go to this place and this place and kill Tutsi.’ 
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including Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, are part of the discursive 
‘foundational documents’ that form the discursive conditions that produce a singular and 
narrow knowledge about the past.119 It is the repeatability of certain ‘statements’, such as 
the crime of Genocide, that constitute a dominant form of knowledge about mass rights 
violations. As Foucault reminds us, it is the discursive practices of institutions and actors, 
here the ICTR: judges, registrars, legal counsels, investigators, that determine how certain 
‘statements’ come into play in various strategies in which knowledge is produced 
(Foucault 1979, 101). Dominant ‘statements’ (series of signs) are fundamental to the 
ICTR’s production of knowledge about the horrors of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. 
A dominant series of signs is a representation allowing for the making of truth and false 
claims that become over time normalised accepted social practices (Foucault 1972, 98-
101).  
In the context of the claim that law is able to tell individual stories of past violence, 
this understanding of Foucault is relevant as it foregrounds that legal knowledge 
construction of past atrocities is highly restrictive. Crucially, it is the definition of crimes 
in the ICTR jurisdiction as well as witness statements in indictments that discursively 
contribute to the production of a narrow and singular knowledge of genocidal violence. 
Indictments, being a crucial site of the discursive restrictions for the production of 
knowledge, will be unpacked further in the latter part of this chapter. To give one example 
here, indictments detail crimes the prosecution aims to prove, which often include 
summaries of what witnesses will testify about in court. In the Amended Second 
Indictment in the Nizeyimana Case, under the subheading of ‘Training and distribution 
of weapons’, it summarises what some of the witnesses will testify about: 
 
 
119 Schabas (2008) has suggested that considering that legally the Crimes of Crime Against Humanity and 
Genocide are very similar, particularly the inclusion in both of extermination and length of sentences that 
can be issued, globally it is likely that if prosecutors focused on the Crime Against Humanity rather than 
Genocide successful prosecution may be more likely because the Crime Against Humanity does not 
require prosecutors to demonstrate an individual had specific genocidal intent to destroy a group in whole 
or in part. In part Schabas locates the continued focus on prosecuting Genocide in its powerful symbolic 
representation in popular discourse, Genocide is known as the ‘crimes of all crimes’ (Schabas 2008, 17). 
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute states, the  
Crimes against Humanity The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) 
Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 




From 7 April 1994 until mid July 1994, IIdephonse Nizeyimana distributed 
weapons to lnterahamwe, including Bourgmestres and civilians at ESQ who were 
members of the joint criminal enterprise referred to in paragraph 5 herein, and 
authorised, ordered or instigated ESQ soldiers to train civilians such as Burundian 
refugees and University students at various locations including in a valley below 
ESQ, at Butare Hospital and in a forest near the Butare University. In particular, 
in accordance with instructions of the Accused, Sous-Lieutenant Jean-Pierre 
Bizimana trained youths at Butare Hospital and Sous-Lieutenant Ezechiel 
Gakwerere, commander of the first company in Nouvelle Formule at ESQ, 
utilized a number of subordinate FAR soldiers and students from ESQ to facilitate 
the training and cooperation with Interahamwe. These acts of training and 
distributing weapons were done in furtherance of the purposes of such joint 
criminal enterprise. (Nizeyimana Second Annotated Indictment 2010) 
 
It is the detail provided relating to the accused’s involvement in genocide preparations 
why this part of witness accounts has been included. In short, from a discursive position 
this summary of witness statements is part of the legal evidence prosecutors use to show 
the legal threshold of the crime of genocide has been met. Prosecutors select parts of 
specific and often small amounts of witness statements to include in indictments directly 
related to crimes. The essence of including detail of witness statements in indictments is 
to contribute to a legal determination of guilt or innocence being reached. Discursively 
this is very important, as prosecutors only include in indictments parts of witness 
statements that directly contribute as evidence to prove the accused committed the alleged 
crimes. Other details given in statements that do not speak directly to the alleged crime 
are not included. In short, indictments are part of the discursive condition that contribute 
to law being incapable of understanding the complexities of genocidal violence. 
In order to support the section’s claim that the ICTR is unable to tell stories of 
individual experiences of violence, the following paragraphs will summarise Fujii’s 
research that highlights the complexity and diversity of the violence during the 1994 
genocide against the Tutsi. Building on this summary, the section engaging with the 
primary data will argue that the complex accounts of individuals’ experiences of violence 
are incompatible with law’s need to produce an authoritative singular account of 
atrocities. 
 
Genocidal violence: Layers and fluidity of events, actions and agents 
Experiences of violence during the genocide against the Tutsi, unlike the legal 
codification of the crime of genocide, were fluid and multifaceted (Fujii 2009). The 
crimes within the ICTR’s jurisdiction needed clearly defined categories of events, actions 
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and agents. However, experiences of genocidal violence in Rwanda did not unfold within 
neatly defined legal categories. As Fujii highlights, attempts to understand genocidal 
violence in Rwanda by using systems of categorization rigidifies actions and people in 
ways that do not mirror the realities of genocide: ‘genocides are dynamic, while 
categories are static’ (Fujii 2009, 8). Fujii stresses the point that ‘If we were to base 
theories of agency on only one set of actions—the set that most easily fits an existing 
analytic category, our theories would be at best, partial, and at worst, wrong’ (Fujii 2009, 
9). In the context of this section, challenging the claim that the ICTR can produce a 
collective memory of individual diverse experiences of violence, Fujii’s insights are 
instructive. Specifically, the ways in which violence was enacted, who perpetrated the 
violence and the reasons for their participation were dynamic processes. Understood as a 
dynamic process, ‘genocide ceases to be a clearly demarcated temporal period of mass 
slaughter, [unlike legal categories], and becomes instead a messy agglomeration of 
actions taken and not taken, decisions made and unmade, perceptions reinforced and 
transformed’ (Fujii 2009, 84). Thus individual experiences of violence cannot be reduced 
to the legally codified definitions of ICTR crimes. Crucially, framing the genocidal 
violence in Rwanda as a ‘dynamic process’ is here deliberately used to contrast with the 
rigid categories of crimes that law is reliant on in order to reach a legal judgment.  
Following Fujii, the key actors in understanding genocidal violence in Rwanda as 
a ‘dynamic process’ are local leaders, their collaborators and a group Fujii calls ‘joiners’ 
(Fujii 2009, 15). In particular, ‘joiners’ are key to understanding the process of genocidal 
violence, as it was ‘joiners’ who carried out much of it (Fujii 2009, 15-16). Fujii defines 
‘joiners’ as the ‘lowest-level participants in the genocide’, who had no ‘prior military or 
police training but went about their task in [an] organized fashion’ Fujii 2009, 15-16). 
‘Joiners’ had the most to lose and the least to gain through their actions, as they were the 
ones who would feel the direct impact of the annihilation of their communities (Fujii 
2009, 15-16). In short, it is particularly ‘joiners’ representing the messiness of genocidal 
violence that are relevant to this section challenging the claim that the ICTR can produce 
a collective memory of violence.  
For example, ‘joiners’’ rationale for participating in violence was often complex 
and layered. As one ‘joiner’ Fujii interviewed noted, ‘some of us participated because we 
were forced to by local leaders; there were those who participated willingly, and some 
unwittingly’ (Fujii 2009, 155). According to interviewees, Fujii notes that many of those 
who said they were forced to participate did so because the alternative would have been 
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to be killed by those who were recruiting them (Fujii 2009, 155). Interestingly, Fujii also 
points out that ‘joiners’ who self-identify as ‘willing’ participants stated they did so with 
a large amount of external pressure: 
 
All three categories bespeak situational exigencies, which others in the 
community emphasized as well. A war was waging. Soldiers were shooting. 
People were fleeing. Some were getting shot and raped. Authorities were calling 
on residents to protect their community. Then the awful news: the RPF-Inkotanyi 
shot the president’s plane down from the sky—testimony to the rebel army’s 
power and its ultimate goal of taking the country by force. Given these 
circumstances, even those who participated willingly did so under powerful 
external pressures (Fujii 2009, 156). 
 
Importantly, Fujii emphasises the need to not reduce participants’ actions in the violence 
to situational exigencies. Situational explanations perceive participation as based only on 
circumstance, which Fujii argues against. Whilst circumstance played a role, 
understanding participation as only situational circumstance cannot get to the 
complexities of individuals’ participation in the violence. On this point of participant 
agency Fujii argues: 
 
Joiners did make choices, even if they were not completely conscious of the 
calculus by which they were making them. By their own explanations, Joiners 
tend to straddle categories, rather than fitting neatly into one. For example, 
Eugène, the Tutsi Joiner who said he joined the Interahamwe to save himself, fits 
the category of ‘forced’ participant since as a Tutsi, he had no choice but to try to 
save himself. Yet, given his precise circumstances when he joined the 
Interahamwe (the fact that he had a stamped document stating he was Hutu, not 
Tutsi), he also fits the category of a ‘willing’ participant. With the stamped 
document he obtained from Paul, Eugène had another option. He could have tried 
to save himself by fleeing the area, as many other Tutsi did. But he did not take 
that option, which makes Eugène both a ‘forced’ and ‘willing’ participant. (Fujii 
2009, 156). 
 
Understanding genocidal violence as a ‘dynamic process’ is also useful as it casts light 
on the fact that acts of violence during the genocide against the Tutsi were not exclusively 
carried out by a homogenous group with a pre-defined agenda (Fujii 2009). Specifically, 
this contrasts with legal categories of genocide in which a group follows clearly defined 
orders and attacks specific targets based upon a pre-conceived plan. It is a fact that there 
were large groups who acted out orders to kill with the intent of destroying the ethnic 
group Tutsi based upon orders from political and military leaders (Fujii 2009). It is indeed 
145 
 
these neat categories that are central to prosecuting the crime of Genocide (Akhavan 
2019). Notwithstanding this, there was also a significant amount of genocidal violence 
experienced by individuals who do not fit within the law’s need for temporally fixed 
events, actions and agents. Importantly, it is the diverse justifications for participation, as 
discussed above, that support this section arguing that the law is unable to understand 
individuals’ experiences of violence. As Fujij argues:  
 
[E]thnic masses do not act as a single unit, but as a variety of groups and groupings 
that do not always follow ethnic lines … [There is a need to] investigate how 
violence interacts with ethnicity and how ethnicity, in turn, interacts with 
violence, without assuming that each exists separately from the other in premade 
or stable form. We need to investigate how exactly the conflict or violence is, or 
becomes, ethnic, rather than assuming it to be such from the start (Fujii 2009, 5, 
10) 
 
Important here is Fujii’s foregrounding that genocidal violence was ethnic, but ethnic 
violence was one amongst other acts of violence performed and experienced during the 
genocide against the Tutsi. The legal crime of genocide, as well as the Crime Against 
Humanity, is concerned with ethnic violence. Particularly, ethnic violence provides law 
with clearly defined and legal codification, such as events, actions and agents that are 
fundamental to legal processes. However, the claim that law can tell stories of diverse 
individual experiences of violence relies on, or is insurmountably tied up within, these 
static categories: stories of violence at the ICTR are those that fit within the static legal 
categories. Crucially, it is the ‘dynamic process’ of genocidal violence defying legal 
categorisation that cannot be part of the collective legal story.  
In summary, what is particularly helpful in Fujii’s work in relation to this section 
is understanding that experiences of violence, who enacted that violence and why they 
decided to participate was an extremely complex and fluid process. It is this fluidity that 
is in contrast to legally codified categories. Fujii refers to participants’ complex reasons 
for enacting violence during the genocide against the Tutsi as a script. This ‘script’ 
consisted of a wide variety of diverse performances (Fujii 2009, 13). There were actors 
who followed the text precisely, 
such as when killers [went] after Tutsi and only Tutsi. Some [strayed] from the 
text as when killers target Hutu as well as Tutsi for killing. Some may abandon 





Local ties were key to these diverse performances. It was often existing ties that ‘shaped 
how people saw and reacted to their situation. In certain circumstances, they enabled 
Joiners to continue to see Tutsi as friends, not targets, and some Hutu as targets, not 
friends’ (Fujii 2009, 20). These localised dynamic relations do not fit within the legally 
codified categories of the crime of genocide. For the purpose of this chapter, 
understanding the violence as a ‘script’ is useful as it draws out and shows that within the 
legal story of events, agents and actions the ICTR needs to tell, there exists a multitude 
of events, agents and actions that are beyond the comprehension of law.  
In short, the genocidal violence enacted and experienced during the genocide 
against the Tutsi was dynamic. This view is in contrast to the rigid and temporally fixed 
legal categories law is reliant on. Having highlighted the complexities and multi-layered 
nature of violence, the remainder of this chapter, engaging with the primary data, will 
argue that the ICTR is only capable of producing a single and narrow story of violence.  
 
Beyond Law: The Plurality of Violent Memories 
 
Discursive restrictions of witness memories 
It is the crime of genocide as part of the ‘foundational documents’, discussed above, that 
discursively restricts how individual experiences of violence are understood at the ICTR. 
Indictments, including statements and summaries of what witnesses will testify about, are 
also important to understanding the discursive conditions in the construction of 
knowledge of past violence. The Rukundo amended indictment also includes a summary 
of evidence that each witness will testify to. These summaries were drawn directly from 
the statements witnesses gave to investigators. These summaries include footnotes that 
indicate which part of the witnesses statement the summary is discussing. Importantly, it 
is the technical legal criteria of the specific crime that discursively conditions which 
witness statements or summaries will be included in the indictment and the specific parts 
of the statements. In the Rukundo second amended indictment the prosecution explained 
the charges against the accused and included the names, or pseudonyms, of the witnesses 
who would give evidence related to each specific charge. Taken from the Emmanuel 
Rukundo Amended Indictment page 5 (28th September 2006): 
 
Between 12 and 15 April 1994, Emmanuel Rukundo, dressed in military uniform, 
armed and accompanied by soldiers, stopped at a roadblock around Imprimerie de 
Kabgayi, near the S1. Leon Minor Seminary, to talk to and observe the activities 
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of soldiers who were checking the identity cards of persons who passed through 
the roadblock. Several Tutsis were arrested by soldiers and interahamwe at this 
roadblock and killed nearby. Emmanuel Rukundo presence at this roadblock 
provided encouragement to these soldiers and interahamwe to carry on with the 
killing of Tutsis at this location. Emmanuel Rukundo thus instigated or aided and 
abetted the killing of Tutsis at the Imprimerie de Kabgayi roadblock  
 
It is these specific summaries of witness statements that relate to proving the accused 
committed the crimes mandated with the ICTR that the prosecution counsel select to 
include in the indictment. In the Nizeyimana Second Amended Indictment the 
prosecution includes within it which witnesses will speak in court and what they will talk 
about:  
 
Butare University  
14. From on or about 16 April 1994, Ildephonse NIZEYIMANA ordered and 
instigated soldiers from the FAR, ESO, Ngoma Camp and Butare Gendarmerie 
Camp, and Interahamwe who were members of the joint criminal enterprise 
referred to in paragraph 5 herein to kill many Tutsi civilians at Butare University, 
with words to the effect that no Tutsi should remain. In greater particular: (i) under 
the authorization of the Accused, Chief Warrant Officer Damien Ntamuhanga 
engaged a number of subordinate FAR soldiers from his platoon, including 
Sergeant Major Innocent Sibomana and others, and exercised his command to 
target the civilian victims, using lists and identity cards to assist with that purpose; 
Witness ZT Witness AZM Witness ZBH WitnessMCM Statement signed 
0310712010 at page 4; K0514404, paras 2& 6 Witness AUR WitnessTQ Witness 
GFL Witness ZCB Witness ZCA  
 
It is the listing here of witnesses in relation to the specific detail of the crimes of Genocide 
and Crimes Against Humanity that are discursively important. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
indictments are part of the discursive conditions that constitute who can be a witness. 
Importantly, indictments also discursively ‘filter’ what the subject of witness can talk 
about. In the extract above, prosecutors select from all the witnesses who gave statements 
to investigators only witnesses that relate to the legal categories witness memories must 
speak to. In interview with Nathan chief prosecutor Jallow states this explicitly: 
 
We thought we needed to reduce the number of witnesses as well because they 
were running into hundreds, close to 100 in some cases. Pick the best witnesses, 
proof them, prepare, I mean confirm them, make sure they are ready for court even 




It is the discursive conditions of indictments that restrict what witnesses can talk about at 
the ICTR. The discursive conditions of indictments are central to law telling a story of 
atrocities. However, law can only tell a narrow and singular story, plurality is beyond the 
capability of law. The discursive conditions shaping what the witness subject can talk 
about are further evident in motions. It is motions and motion decisions where 
prosecutors, defence and judges debate which witnesses listed in indictments can testify 
in court, and what part of their statement they will talk about. That motions are an 
important part of the discursive conditions of what knowledge of past horrors are told at 
the ICTR is something that will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
In addition to the discursive conditions of indictments are pre-trial briefs. Pre-trial 
briefs are submitted before the commencement of a trial, outlining the evidence 
supporting the prosecution’s case and list of witnesses including summaries of the 
evidence witnesses will speak about in court (ICTR Rule 73bis). These briefs are 
submitted by prosecutors after indictments and therefore have another layer of 
discursivity. Pre-trial briefs, like indictments, include summaries of what each witness 
will testify to, the content of each summary is drawn directly for the statement’s witnesses 
gave to investigators. This can be seen in the summary of witness Marie Claire 
Mukamusoni: 
 
The witness will testify that in the camp there was a group of soldiers who 
Nizeyimana used as a killing squad. The killing squad included cadet soldiers, 
Fulgence Niyibizi and Jerome who were ruthless killers and very close to 
Nizeyimana. They used two sites for killings: Cares and Rwasave. She saw 
Jerome taking the three persons away and when he came back he was covered in 
blood. She will testify that during the genocide a group of five or six Interahamwe 
came to the came almost everyday to talk and eat with Nizeyimana. She was afraid 
of this group Towards the end of April 1994, she saw the cars of some 
bourgmestres in the camp and weapons were loaded into their cars. The weapons 
were mostly AK-47. She saw the bourgmestre of Shyanda come to ESO to collect 
guns in exchange for some sacks of beans. In relation to rapes, she was not out in 
the field, but most of her male colleagues who returned from killing often told 
them they raped women in Hotel Faulcon and Ibis. A traumatized soldier once 
told her that he had raped a woman old enough to be his mother in Hotel Faucon. 
(Prosecutor’s Pre-trial Brief 2010) 
 
The detail in the summary of what the witness will testify about is framed within the 
discursive legal categories of what kind of violence is needed to be heard in order to 
successfully prosecute the accused, that being violence that fits within the temporally 
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bound legal categories of events, agents and actions. This can be seen again in the 
summary of witness BYO:  
 
BYO, a Tutsi, will testify that on or about 30 April 1994, a group of people 
comprising civilians and armed soldiers from Ngoma Camp, attacked Benebikira 
Convent in search of Inyenzi. The witness will testify that these people, who were 
under the supervision of Ildephonse Hategekimana, proceeded to separate the 
nuns from the civilians and separated Hutus from Tutsis. She will testify that the 
Karenzi children including Solange, Malik and a third young boy had sought 
refuge at the Convent after their mother and father were killed. She will [testify] 
that on or about 30 April 1994, the Karenzi children were forcibly removed along 
with the others identified as Tutsi and driven off from the convent to be killed. 
(Prosecutor’s Pre-trial Brief 2010, 13-14) 
 
Both of the witness summaries above are temporally bound events, agents and actions 
within the legal codification of ICTR crimes. In BYO’s witness summary the event is the 
targeted killing of individuals based on the ethnic identity, Tutsi. This fits within the crime 
of Genocide, telling a story of ethnic violence. The agents are Hutus whose intentions are 
to kill Tutsi; that is Tutsi are seen as the enemy of Hutus because of their ethnic 
difference.120 The action is the separating out and targeted killings of Tutsi, and only 
Tutsi. Viewed through a discursive lens this summary has been included in the pre-trial 
brief because the violence it describes fits within the legal codification of the crimes of 
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity. It is precisely this neatly categorised violence, 
and only this violence, that law can comprehend.   
To be sure, it is not being argued here that witnesses in court never spoke about 
things outside of the evidence legal counsels needed for a verdict of guilty or not guilty 
to be reached. However memories of witnesses about the ‘fluidity’ of violence were not 
commonly part of witness memories told in court (Eltringham 2019, 138-139). Legal 
counsels commonly focus on a small part of a witness’s experience and this can come as 
a surprise to witnesses as to why legal counsels are focusing on such a tiny and for the 
witness unimportant part of their story (Eltringham 2019). Understanding the ‘fluidity’ 
of violence during the genocide is used here to foreground that legal counsels were 
primarily focused on witnesses whose memories aligned with the crimes as stated in the 
statute. This relates directly to the discursive restrictions of what memories the witness 
 




subject can tell because legal counsels select witnesses to include in indictments and pre-
trial briefs that spoke to this. Witnesses who may have memories not directly related to 
the crimes were not commonly included.  
Here it is worthwhile noting that the two witnesses quoted above in the pre-trial 
brief were not mentioned in the judgment transcript. Judgments usually include a 
summary of all of the testimonial evidence given by witnesses. After the submission of 
the brief neither witness was found in any of the online documents searched for in the 
research for this thesis. This included searches for the two witness in transcripts and 
exhibits for all ICTR cases. The ICTR archive online search facility has a specific 
function for identifying witnesses, allowing for searches of a specific witness(es) 
mentioned in transcripts and exhibits. The names of witnesses can also be searched for 
by conducting a general ‘content’ search of all documents in the online archive. While 
currently it is not possible to be sure of the reason why these two witnesses do not appear 
in the judgment, there are a few possibilities that are worth speculating on. One possibility 
is that given the ICTR archive is still in a process of digitising documents, it is possible 
that documents that mentioned these witnesses exist in the physical archive but have not 
yet been digitised. Another possibility is that the Prosecutor decided that they already had 
similar evidence from other witnesses and thus these two witnesses were not necessary. 
The defence team might have brought a successful motion stating the inadmissibility of 
these two witnesses. Again, if such motions exist, they are not currently available on the 
online archive. Moreover, it is possible that the witnesses themselves decided they no 
longer wanted to testify. What is known is that current searches of the online archive 
show that these two witnesses gave statements to investigators and summaries of these 
statements were included in the pre-trial brief. However for whatever reason after the 
submission of the brief these two witnesses were not mentioned again in this specific 
case.  
The following paragraphs will extend the discussion above on the discursivity of 
pre-trial briefs by comparing the statement of witnesses summarised in pre-trial briefs 
and what witnesses testified to in court. This will help further illustrate the scope and 
limitations of what memories the witness subject can talk about at the ICTR. Here it is 
worth noting a difficulty of working with the ICTR online archival material. Some 
documents are not yet digitised, or/and are not currently available for legal reasons (see 
Chapter 7). This is the situation for transcripts and audio-visual recordings of witness 
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testimonies given in court in the Nizeyimana and Rukundo cases. The online archive does 
include some audio-visual recordings of witness testimonies in the Nizeyimana case, 
however these need to be requested and to date a request I have filed is still waiting to be 
fulfilled. In absence of transcripts of witness testimonies in the Nizeyimana case, the 
discussion will now engage with the Gregoire Ndahimana case (ICTR-2001-68-PT), and 
witness YAU. 
The Ndahimana pre-trial brief stated that witness YAU testimonial evidence relates 
to the crime of genocide part of the indictment. The pre-trial brief’s summary of YAU 
statement states, 
The witness and her family fled to Nyange parish in order to escape violence that 
followed the assassination of the President. She will testify that upon arrival at the 
parish she saw the Accused and other members of the JCE holding a meeting; that 
members of the JCE transported Tutsis to the church; that while she was at the 
church members of the JCE disarmed the Tutsi refugees; that members of the JCE 
such as Kayishema and Kanyarukiga refused to give the refugees food or allow 
them to obtain it themselves; and that a major attack occurred against the refugees 
on 15 April 1994, which was led by the Accused and members of the JCE. 
(Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief 2010, 6-7).  
 
Testifying in court, YAU is asked questions that directly related to their witness summary 
in the pre-trial brief regarding a specific location and who was there: 
 Q. Now, just in terms of approximation, can you tell the Court what is the 
distance -- or how long would it take you to walk from the parish secretariat to the 
church, for example?  
 A. The distance between the secretariat and the church would be similar to 
the distance between this camera, the camera behind the Judges, and the 
interpreters' booth.  I don't know if it is a booth or there are cupboards.   
 Q. Madam Witness, just so that the record is absolutely clear, can you point 
out again the distance.  
 A. The distance similar to the distance between that camera over there and 
the booth which is on that side.  But I don't know whether they are booths or 
cupboards.  I have to say, however, this is an approximation.  This is just an estimate 
because I did not measure the actual distance between the church and the secretariat.  
[…] 
 Q. What did they do, or where did they go?  
 A. Kanyarukiga and Fulgeance Kayishema continued looking for Tutsi 
refugees in the neighboring hills so that they could bring those refugees to the 
church.   
 Q. How do you know that Kayishema and Kanyarukiga continued to look for 
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Tutsis that were brought to the church?  How do you know this?  
 A. I was at the church. So I could see those Tutsi refugees arrive at the church.   
 Q. Can you tell the Court, please: how did they arrive?  
A. They were transported in Kanyarukiga's vehicle.  That vehicle went to get 
them on the hills where they lived 
It is the specific detail of who was at this location on these specific dates that frames the 
questions that the witness, YAU, needs to respond to. On the witness stand, techniques 
deployed by legal counsels during witness’s examination are very different to 
conversations in everyday life (Ngane 2015, 162-165). Witnesses are in the position of 
receiving and answering questions posed by legal counsels, and questions are usually 
prepared in advance (Ngane 2015, 162). The rigid sequences of turn-taking for some 
witnesses can come as a surprise as they assumed being called to give evidence would be 
their opportunity to tell in full what they have experienced (Schabas 2006). 
The prosecutor continued to direct the flow of questions asked to YAU in keeping 
with the content of the witness summary in the pre-trial brief. This time the witness 
responding to the prosecutor’s questions on being forcefully deprived access to food. 
 Q. So, Madam Witness, what did you do for food at Nyange church?  
 A. We were not eating.  And I even recall that on one occasion we even gave 
money to Fulgeance Kayishema and to Gaspard Kanyarukiga asking them to go 
and fetch us some food, but, unfortunately, they never brought any food for us.   
 Q. Madam Witness, were there other -- okay.  Let me rephrase.  On which 
day did this occur?  
 A. On the second day.  It was, therefore, not a Tuesday.  It was the second 
day.   
 Q. And if you recall, how many days in total did you spend at the Nyange 
church?  
 A. I spent three days there.   
 Q. Now, focusing your attention on the second day, the day you said that you 
asked Kayishema and Kanyarukiga to get you food, did you, in actual fact, receive 
any food from them?  
 A. No.  They did not bring any food to us.  Contrarily, a sister known as 
Mama Jean tried to bring us some food, but Kayishema and Kanyarukiga poured 
the food she intended to bring to us on the ground.121   
 
 




The main point to highlight here is the importance of the pre-trial processes, such as the 
pre-trial briefs, in filtering what memories witness subjects can talk about in court. As 
was argued above, the summaries of witness statements included in pre-trial briefs are 
chosen because of specific detail the prosecutor needs to contribute to their legal 
narrative. Thus the testimonies given in court are already narrow in scope, primarily 
because the questions asked to witnesses are directly shaped by the witness summary in 
the brief. It is proposed here to think about pre-trial briefs as an important part of the 
discursive conditions that restrictive memories of past violations witnesses can speak 
about in court. 
Witness testimonies are a key component of the legal story for those in the legal 
scholarship who advocate that law is able to understand the reasons and causes of mass 
violence (Sikkink 2011; Byron 2008; Keydar 2019; Osiel 2000). However, as discussed 
above, the discursive conditions of crimes within the ICTR jurisdiction, indictments and 
prosecutors’ pre-trial brief are part of the discursivity of a discourse of witnessing that 
shape what story of violence law tells. For advocates of international criminal tribunals 
and courts (ICTR) being able to tell a collective story of genocidal violence, it is the 
universality of legal and human rights norms that are central (Byron 2008; Klinkner and 
Smith 2015; Osiel 2012). It is these norms that make it possible for a collective 
understanding of past mass violence to be publicly known (see Chapter 1). These 
advocates ascribe primacy to international trials and the testimonial evidence of witnesses 
they facilitate, which they argue is vital for societies to be able to move from a violent 
past to a more peaceful future. In short, for advocates, international trials and the 
collective legal stories they tell are a prerequisite for societies to be able to transition to a 
peaceful future (Dixon and Tenove 2013; Sikkink 2011). However, importantly, the 
following paragraphs drawing upon the thesis’s conceptual framework, ‘grey zone’ 
(Agamben) and plural memories (Ricoeur), argue that legal witnessing is not, as 
advocates claim, a ‘bridge’ to move from a violent past to a peaceful future. Building on 
from this the discussion will foreground that the production of a legal collective story is 
absent of heterogenous memories.  
 
The ‘Grey Zone’ of Legal Witnessing 
The discursive conditions of a discourse of witnessing restricting who can be a ‘witness’ 
and what they can talk about is in direct contrast with the common claim in the legal 
scholarship that witnesses are central to law being able to understand a violent past in the 
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present. Specifically, the following discussion using the conceptual tool the ‘grey zone’ 
challenges the claim that witness testimonies are a key component in allowing societies 
to move from a violent past to a peaceful future. To briefly recap from Chapter 2, the 
‘grey zone’ is the illusion of a break in violent or suppressive action. Here we can think 
of the universality of legal and human rights norms as the illusion. This break has the 
appearance of rupturing the status quo and signalling positive change. The status quo is 
violations of human rights in Rwanda, and law is the positive change. Law perceives itself 
as the primary response to its own demise (Turner 2016), although this rupturing is the 
illusion of change, not actual change. This fallacy of change carries with it hope and 
progression for a better future facilitated by and through legal and human rights norms 
(Agamben 1999, 26).  
In the context of the ICTR it is legal and human rights norms, and the witness 
testimonies it facilitates, that has the illusion of a linear progression to a brighter horizon. 
Here the illusion is the claim of advocates that law makes past atrocities understandable 
in the present and thus makes a society’s transition to a peaceful future possible. It is 
suggested here that understanding legal witnessing as being located in a ‘grey zone’ 
allows this claim to be exposed as unhelpful and misguided.   
Understanding legal witnessing as a ‘grey zone’ is crucial to challenging the claim 
in the legal transitional justice scholarship that law is the primary response to mass 
atrocities, not only in addressing impunity but also in making sense of past violence 
(Turner 2016). Understanding legal witnessing as being located in a ‘grey zone’ casts 
light upon the fragmented and very limiting process of who can be a ‘witness’ and what 
they can talk about at the ICTR. In other words, law is unable to provide a linear 
progression from a violent past to a more peaceful future. For example, advocates claim 
that law has transformative benefits that are upheld through the universality of legal and 
human rights norms (Sikkink 2011). This claim is linear and can be explained thus. The 
horrors of genocide against the Tutsi were allowed to happen because legal and human 
rights norms were ignored. The response to this, indeed the only response, is law. The 
ICTR represents the re-establishing of legal and human rights norms. Law having been 
re-established through the creation of the ICTR is able to make sense of past atrocities. 
Having made sense of past rights violations via witness testimonies law has facilitated an 
essential component of transition, understanding of social and political reasons for the 
violence occurring (see Chapter 1, section 3).  
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However, the claim described above is a self-filling prophecy of law. This 
prophecy is at the crux of the claim that international criminal law, and international 
criminal institutions such as the ICTR, are the most suitable response for making sense 
of mass violence in the present. To be clear, this criticism is specifically of claims that 
international criminal law and institutions are a necessary prerequisite for ‘successful’ 
societal transitions (Sikkink 2011). It is not a direct criticism of ‘semi-legal’ approaches 
to aiding societal recovery, such as the gacaca courts (see discussion below) (Clark 2010; 
Doughty 2015; Thorne and Viebach 2019). This circular prophecy of law is the failure of 
law, law being restored, and law facilitating progress via the testimonies of witnesses. It 
is by identifying the discursive conditions discussed above, and which will be further 
unpacked in Chapter 6, as highly restrictive in terms of what knowledge of past violence 
the ICTR constructs that understanding legal witnessing in a ‘grey zone’ is insightful. 
Importantly, law through the universality of legal norms has the illusion of breaking the 
status quo of violations of human rights and provides positive change to a brighter future. 
This is the essence of the ‘grey zone’ of legal witnessing: an illusion of change, not actual 
change. Crucially, in the context of this chapter understanding the way violence is 
remembered at the ICTR, it is the ‘grey zone’ that helps foreground the story of violence 
the tribunal tells is singular.  
It is understanding legal witnessing as being located in a ‘grey zone’ that 
foregrounds the contradiction in the claim that the ICTR can understand the complexities 
of mass violence. In short, the ‘grey zone’ of legal witnessing challenges the claim that 
law, through the testimonies of witnesses, facilitates positive progress. Particularly it 
exposes law’s incapability to produce a collective memory of the individual and diverse 
experiences of violence.  
 
The plurality of memory  
Extending the argument above on the ‘grey zone’, the following discussion argues that 
the construction of legal memories at the ICTR lacks plural memories (Ricoeur 2004). 
Specifically, engaging with Ricoeur’s conceptual insights on the plurality of memory, it 
is argued that the discursive conditions of the ICTR are commonly unable to engage with 
plural memories. These memories are an essential component for communities sharing 
stories about the past. To briefly recap from Chapter 2, firstly, the thesis intentionally 
does not use the term collective memory. This term can suggest, both conceptually and 
in popular discourse, that a pinnacle of a shared understanding of the past can be reached, 
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which this thesis disputes. Secondly, the construction of memories entails both 
individuals and communities, which is crucial for plural understandings of the past 
(Ricoeur 2004). Ricoeur refers to the sharing of plural memories of the past as being close 
with others. It is the sharing of memories with individuals who may not approve of an 
individual’s actions, but do not reject the individual’s experience. A shared understanding 
of a violent past is centred on stories individuals tell each other about their experiences 
of past events. Crucially it is the plural stories and heterogeneous experiences of 
individuals communally shared that are essential to the production of memory (Ricoeur 
2004). 
In the context of the claim that the ICTR can produce a collective memory of past 
violence, Ricoeur’s concept of the plurality of memory allows the thesis to critique this 
claim (Klinkner and Smith 2015; Osiel 2000). The ICTR produces a narrow and singular 
memory for the specific purpose of reaching a legal judgment. The discursive conditions 
that constitute what witnesses can talk about do not include individuals sharing 
heterogenous memories of shared past events with their community. As previously 
discussed, the crimes in the ICTR mandate discursively restrict what story of past 
violence needs to be told. In other words, plural memories of the dynamics of genocidal 
violence are absent from the legal story. Witness memories that are included in 
indictments and pre-trial briefs also lack plurality, instead they need to fit within the 
singular legal categories of ICTR crimes.  
Importantly, what is also absent from the narrow legal memory the ICTR produces 
is the remembering ‘with others’ that is a key part of memory (Ricoeur 2004). The ICTR 
does not facilitate a platform for individuals to externalise their memories of shared past 
experiences with each other. In fact, it is not the purpose of international criminal 
tribunals and courts to be a platform for communities exchanging personal experiences 
of a violent past with each other. On a related point, even the singular and narrow memory 
the ICTR produces is out of reach for most Rwandans, in consideration of the 
geographical distance of the court from Rwanda. For most Rwandans the ICTR being 
located hundreds of miles away in Arusha, Tanzania, has meant court proceedings where 
witness memories are externalised is something they have not experienced (Palmer 
2015).122 . Moreover, the ICTR archive, like the court, is not located in Rwanda but 
 
122 The ICTR did have an outreach program intended to inform Rwandans about the courts work and 
updates of trials however it has been criticised as an ‘add-on’, or after thought, to the ICTR and was 
significantly underfunded and struggled to engage with Rwandans in a meaningful way (Peskins 2008; 
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Tanzania (see Chapter 7). This legal distancing from the context of the violence goes 
beyond just geography. It also represents the view of advocates that international criminal 
and human rights law should be distant from the events it is judging so as not to be 
‘contaminated’ by what is seen and heard on the ground (Clark 2018). Despite the ICTR’s 
rhetoric that their outreach programmes have helped make the workings of the court 
known to Rwandans, the reality for most Rwandans is that the ICTR remains in all senses 
distant (Clark 2018; Schulz 2017). This distancing of the ICTR adds to the evidence that 
the tribunal lacks the core component of memory, individuals telling plural experiences 
to their community. In short, even the narrow and singular legal memory the ICTR 
produced lacks communal remembering, which is essential for the sharing of 
heterogenous experience of past violence (see Chapter 7).  
To further illustrate the ICTR’s shortage of plural memories, the following 
discussion will briefly use the example of the Rwandan gacaca courts, which in contrast 
with the tribunal did facilitate plural memories (Clark 2010; Doughty 2015; Palmer 2015; 
Thorne and Viebach 2019). The gacaca courts (2002-2012) were used before and during 
colonialism as a community-based conflict resolution mechanism and were adapted and 
modernised to try crimes including Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (Clark 
2010). Central to gacaca was its restorative element that included participation of the 
whole community (Clark 2010). Legal and human rights norms are central to the claim 
that the ICTR can produce a collective memory of violence. Interestingly, as gacaca did 
not adhere to these norms, human rights groups concluded that gacaca was a failure 
(Thorne and Viebach 2019).123 Importantly, it is precisely the localised understanding of 
justice at gacaca that allowed for communities to share diverse individual stories of 
violence (Doughty 2015; Thorne and Viebach 2019). The decision by the Rwandan 
government to use this traditional justice mechanism is what facilitated community 
dialogue about diverse experiences of genocidal violence (Clark 2010, 320). A key part 
 
Schulz 2017). Schulz has argued that the ICTR outreach program did aid a more in-depth understanding 
by some Rwandans of the ICTR, but this increase in understanding did not ‘translate into more favourable 
perceptions towards the ICTR or the Tribunal’s contribution to reconciliation’. Schulz points towards the 
difficulties of the ICTR’s outreach program has contributed to lessons learnt for outreach programs at 
other international criminal tribunals and courts (Schulz 2017, 359). 
123 Viebach and I (2019) have argued that reports produced by rights groups (Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International) have concluded gacaca as a failure because it did not adhere to western standards 
of legal and human rights reports. Crucially, these human rights reports tell a story that leaves little room 
for different interpretations or meanings attached to gacaca and therefore it is not able to understand the 
positive impact gacaca has for many Rwandans. Instead these reports produce a very limited 
understanding of gacaca which is rooted in the radical exclusion of context, subjectivity, sociality and 
material belonging (Thorne and Viebach 2019). 
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of gacaca’s mandate was community reconciliation through victims, witnesses, 
perpetrators and members of the community being able to ask questions about the past. 
In part, it is precisely because gacaca did not adhere to legal and human rights norms, that 
are so entrenched at the ICTR, which allowed for the communal sharing of individual 
plural experiences of genocidal violence (Doughty 2015). In other words, the example of 
gacaca illustrates that the absence of plural memories at the ICTR is explicitly related to 
its discursive conditions and legal and human rights norms. In contrast, gacaca for many 
Rwandans, not all, allowed the sharing in communities of individual experiences of 
genocidal violence through localised understandings of justice. 
In summary, Ricoeur’s insights on the plurality of memory have been used to 
argue that the ICTR lacks plural memories of violence. This conceptual lens challenges 
the claim that the ICTR is able to produce a legal collective memory of mass violence.  
 
Manipulated Memory: Disguising the Absence of Plurality  
It is suggested here, that in the context of the ICTR legal and human rights norms and the 
legal authority upon which knowledge of genocidal violence is constituted acts to 
disguise, or camouflage, the absence of plural memories of experiences of violence. As 
Ricoeur reminds us, ‘manipulated memory’ is the institutionalised construction of 
knowledge about the past in which certain facts and experiences are included/excluded 
through a process of dominant norms and power relations between institutional actors 
(Ricoeur 2004, 82). To be sure, ‘manipulated memory’ is not being used here to suggest 
that the ICTR intentionally created false stories about the past. Rather, it is a conceptual 
tool used to argue that the perceived ‘neutrality’ of legal and human rights norms and the 
legal authority of the ICTR acts to camouflage the discursive practices in which a singular 
knowledge of the past is constituted. ‘Manipulated memories’ entail institutions (ICTR) 
bringing together dominant norms that regulate what is perceived to be accepted social 
behaviour and relations. Here, we can think of law and human rights as a dominant norm. 
It is institutional use of a dominant norm that regulates the production of collective 
knowledge of the past. The regulation of the past by dominant norms is a powerful 
representation of the past ‘as it was’ (Ricoeur 2004, 80). In the context of the ICTR the 
tightly controlled discursive conditions that are founded upon legal norms regulate the 
construction of knowledge, as discussed early in this chapter. Importantly, it is the 
‘neutrality’ of legal and human rights norms that gives legitimacy to the legal stories the 
ICTR tells. Here, legitimacy of legal and human rights norms understood as ‘neutral’ is 
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founded upon the assumption that these norms are able to disconnect from and transcend 
the ‘real’ social and political world (McEvoy 2007, 421; Turner 2013, 201). The dominant 
norms and legal authority deflect the absence of plurality in the legal story. It is suggested 
here that we need to think of the singular legal story the ICTR produces in terms of 
‘manipulated memory’. Understood in this way the legal memory the ICTR produces can 
be deconstructed showing how the discursive conditions, discussed above, significantly 
restrict what knowledge of the past the subject of ‘witness’ can talk about. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on how discursive conditions shape the way violence is 
remembered at the ICTR. It was argued that the variety of experiences of genocidal 
violence in Rwanda was incompatible with claims by legal and human rights advocates 
that criminal tribunals can account for the reasons and experiences of violence relating to 
the genocide against the Tutsi. The chapter began by outlining the multifaceted nature of 
experiences of genocidal violence, engaging with the research of Fujii (2009). This 
outlining was used to explore how the crime of genocide as stated in the statute 
discursively shapes and restricts how law constructs memories of violence. Developing 
the discussion, examples from the primary data – witness summaries, indictments, pre-
trial briefs – were used to illustrate how the discursive conditions restrict what memories 
of witnesses are included. The discussion then drew upon the thesis’s conceptual tool of 
the ‘grey zone’ in challenging the claim in the legal scholarship that witness testimony is 
a core component to allow society to transition from violent past to a more peaceful 
future. Extending this discussion the conceptual tools of ‘plurality of memory’ and 
‘manipulated memory’ were used to argue that remembering at the ICTR is absent of 
sharing experiences of the past with others which is a core component of memory. In 
making this argument the illustrative example of memory at the gacaca courts was used. 
This chapter, exploring how the discursive conditions shape the way violence is 
remembered at the ICTR, concludes that understanding these discursive restrictions 
matters because it shows that the singular story the ICTR tells about genocidal violence 




Chapter 6 – Critiquing Law and Collective Memory 
 
This chapter extends the discussion from Chapters 4 and 5, particularly focusing on the 
discursivity of motions and motion decisions and their relation to the materialization of 
the act of testimony within trials at the ICTR. From this it will be suggested that 
witnessing produces counter-memories, challenging the dominant memory constructed 
by the ousted regime, that become institutional normative memories of past violations, 
which comprises of the diverse fragments of the past converging around the subject 
position of the witness. Building on from this discussion, the second section offers a 
conceptual insight for understanding legal witnessing during transition. Specifically, 
using the thesis’s original conceptual framework and analysis of the data, it provides a 
critique of Mark Osiel’s conceptualisation of law and collective memory. The chapter 
begins by discussing the various ways in which legal actors – legal counsels, registrar, 
judges, investigators – engage with memory, assembling diverse fragments of the past to 
be able to perform legal proceedings at the ICTR. Accordingly, these fragments of 
memory are assembled to perform a specific legal function of contributing to legal 
determination. However, through the discursive formation of discourse and the language 
it constitutes, the diverse fragments of the past are naturalised within the subject of 
witnesses.  Therefore, the assemblage of fragments of memory has no inherent unity with 
the root political and social causes of violations as liberal institutional perspectives within 
transitional justice perceive them to have (Osiel 2000, 2019). In other words, the narrative 
legal counsel constructs is not to tell a story of the reasons and causes that led to the 
violations occurring. Nor are these memories pre-existing objects that are existentially 
related to the subject who remembers. Nonetheless, as the previous three chapters have 
shown, legal witnessing is a tightly controlled discursive field entailing a privation of 
plurality. Thus, what is proposed here is to acknowledge during transition a detachment 
of witnesses from an inherent pre-existing interiority, allowing to make visible and 
disentangle the relation between law’s need for closure and to bear witness to human 
action whose reach is beyond that of law. As such, in showing the necessity for 
understanding the witness in a lacuna between law and truth is positioning the witness in 
the lacuna of ‘judgment’, absent of interiority but importantly distinct from ethical and 





Legal Actors as Memory Producers 
As foregrounded in Chapters 4 and 5, indictments and pre-trial briefs are part of the 
discursive restrictions of what memories witness can talk about at the ICTR. The 
following discussion expands upon this, particularly focussing on motions and motion 
decisions as another important layer of the discursive conditions of witnessing at the 
ICTR. Specifically, the following discussion focuses on three examples of how legal 
actors play a crucial role in the production of legal memory during the process of motions: 
in the ‘interest of justice’, disclosure, and rape and sexual violence. The section argues 
that a discourse analysis of motions and motion decisions relating to these three examples 
highlights the crucial role the ICTR’s legal actors - Prosecutors, Defence, and Judges, 
have in the construction of the narrow and singular legal story.  
 
Testifying in the ‘Interest of Justice’ 
The ICTR RPE state provisions for preliminary motions (Rule 72), and motions (Rule 
73) after the initial appearance of the accused.124 Motions are an application made to a 
trial chamber by prosecution and defence counsels requesting the chamber to make a 
decision on a given issue, such as the admissibility or inadmissibility of witness evidence. 
Motions of these kind were common in the documents analysed for this thesis (see 
Appendix 2 for a full list of data). Viewed through a discursive lens motion and motion 
decisions are a key discursive battleground where contestation over, or the definition of, 
who can occupy the subject position of witness and what memories they can talk about 
takes place. Particularly, the discursive statements of in the ‘interests of justice’ and 
‘judicial economy’ were commonly used by legal counsels and judges negotiating which 
witnesses will give their testimony in court. The terms ‘interest of justice’ and ‘judicial 
economy’ are not defined in the RPE. At ICTR it seems that ‘interest of justice’ or 
 
124 Rule 72 on Preliminary Motions states  
(A) Preliminary motions, being motions which:  
(i) challenge jurisdiction;  
(ii) allege defects in the form of the indictment;  
(iii) seek the severance of counts joined in one indictment under Rule 49 or seek separate trials 
under Rule 82 (B); or  
(iv) raise objections based on the refusal of a request for assignment of counsel made under Rule 
45 C  
Rule 73 states 
(A)  Subject to Rule 72, either party may move before a Trial Chamber for appropriate ruling or 
relief after the initial appearance of the accused. The Trial Chamber, or a Judge designated by 
the Chamber from among its members, may rule on such motions based solely on the briefs of 
the parties, unless it is decided to hear the motion in open Court. 
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‘judicial economy’ were not technical legal regulations or measurements of some kind, 
as is the case at the ICC.125 Rather they were used to bolster a given line of argument 
made by legal counsels in motions, or as part of judges’ justification in motion decisions. 
As Foucault reminds us, statements are a core part of the discursive field and certain 
statements that become repeatable ‘allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves 
or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme 
of appropriation or rivalry’ (Foucault 1972, 126). The statement in the ‘interest of justice’ 
acts to discursively restrict who can be a witness subject, as can be seen in the chamber’s 
motion decision in the Nizeyimana case on the Prosecutor’s request to vary the witness 
list: 
 
Rule 73bis (E) permits the Prosecutor to ‘move the Trial Chamber for leave to 
reinstate the list of witnesses or to vary his decision as to which witnesses are to 
be called’ after the commencement of trial, if the Prosecutor believes it to be in 
the interests of justice. Trial Chambers have allowed either party to vary its 
witness list upon a showing of good cause and where the requested variance is in 
the interests of justice. Relevant factors include the materiality and probative 
value of the testimony in relation to existing witnesses and allegations in the 
Indictment; the complexity of the case; prejudice to the opposing party; 
justifications for the late addition of witnesses; and delays in the proceedings. The 
Chamber recalls that the rebuttal evidence is strictly limited in scope, namely ‘in 
response to the alibi defence for the dates of the morning of 21 April 1994 to the 
late afternoon of 22 April 1994 and from 26 April 1994 to on or about 17 May 
1994’. In other words, the rebuttal evidence is to focus solely on the presence or 
absence of the Accused from Butare on the specific dates alleged. Moreover, the 
Chamber does not find that the Prosecution has provided sufficient justification 
for the late addition of Witness D to the rebuttal witness list, when TBE Defence 
witnesses had already mentioned his name during the proceedings. The Chamber 
therefore exercises its discretion to deny the Prosecution motion (Ildephonse 
Nizeyimana 2011, 2-3). 
 
It is the discursivity of the statement ‘interest of justice’ and its repeatability as 
dominant statement that restricts what memories of past violations the witness subject 
can talk about. Particularly, it is the prosecution and defence deploying the term 
‘interest of justice’, as stated in the RPE (Rule 73bis (E)), who are part of the process of 
constructing a legal memory. That being, the prosecutor chooses fragments of witness 
memories that contribute to the narrow legal narratives they need to tell in order to 
 
The ICC statute Article 53 (1C) and 2 (C) states, ‘Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice’. For discussion on differing interpretations of the ‘interests of justice’ at 
the ICC see De Souza Dias (2017). 
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demonstrate ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ the guilt of the accused. Legal counsels are not 
concerned with witnesses externalising their memories of traumatic experiences 
(Eltringham 2019, 135). Eltringham critiques the claims, such as Combs’s (2010), that 
culture was the main impediment to the way witnesses’ stories were elicited at the 
ICTR. Eltringham argues that impediments to witnessing at the ICTR were cultural 
factors as well as ‘legal culture’ that played an important role. For example, legal 
counsel focused on just a tiny part of a witnesses’ experience that the counsel needed in 
order to tell their legal narrative. Sometimes this tiny piece of information that was so 
vital to the lawyer seemed an unimportant part of the story for the witness. As one ICTR 
prosecution lawyer told Eltringham,  
 
[w]e only need ten or fifteen minutes out of their whole lifetime. We’re only 
interested in a tiny little part. We’re not interested in the before or the after. They 
can’t understand why this miniscule incident is so important … They want to talk 
about other things. Therefore, they’re frustrated, they’re not fulfilled because they 
haven’t told their story (Eltringham 2019, 135). 
 
Counsels selected specific objects of knowledge from witnesses that contributed to the 
legal outcome they are pursuing. For example, in the above quote the Prosecutor brought 
a motion for the inclusion of a particular witness due to the witness’s memory being 
related to very particular and small but important detail relevant to the Prosecutor’s legal 
narrative. Other memories related to these events that are possibly much more relevant to 
the witness are however of no relevance to the Prosecutor’s legal narrative and as such 
are not included. Cruvellier (2010) has noted how ICTR legal counsel ‘invented’ creative 
uses for the term ‘interest of justice’. Cruvellier points out that: 
 
[i]n principle, this expression is imposing by virtue of its solemnity. In practice, 
lawyers use it to get out of a bind without having to justify themselves. When they 
invoke the interest of justice, it generally means they have run out of arguments 
(Cruvellier 2010, 110).  
 
It is suggested here that in addition to getting lawyers ‘out of a bind’ the term ‘interest of 
justice’ has as much more significant role. When viewed through a discursive lens the 
term goes beyond the technical ‘gymnastics’ of legal argumentation and instead becomes 
central to the construction of objects of knowledge of the past.  
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The ‘interest of justice’ and ‘judicial economy’ is evident again in the Rukundo 
case where the defence motions to vary its witness list:126 
 
With respect to the Defence’s request to vary its witness list, the Chamber recalls 
that, in accordance with Rule 73ter (E), it has the discretion [to] grant leave to the 
Defence to vary its witness list if it considers it to be in the interests of justice. 
Trial Chambers in other cases before this Tribunal have taken the following 
factors into account in determining variations to the witness list: justifications for 
the late variation of witness list; the materiality and probative value of the 
testimony in relation to existing witnesses and allegations in the indictment; the 
complexity of the case; the potential prejudice to the opposing party; and delays 
in the proceedings … Finally, the Chamber also accepts the Defence’s submission 
to withdraw Witnesses MCD, GSD, CNE, SLC, SJB, BCC, NYE, RUB and TMF 
from the witness list as being in the interests of justice and for reasons of judicial 
economy (Rukundo 2007, 4-5). 
 
The above two quotes, as examples of legal actors shaping the construction of memory, 
can be understood in the context of the thesis’s conceptual tool of manipulated memory 
at the ICTR. Powerful actors within institutions are key to the way in which particular 
individuals and their experiences are used or discarded depending on the objectives and 
motivation of those actors that have the power to construct memory (Ricoeur 2004, 80-
85). Legal actors, such as lawyers, as powerful individuals in the process of memory 
production relates to the legal demand for trials of mass atrocities to make public what 
was previously personal private memories (Felman 2002; Ricoeur 2004, 220). As Felman 
reminds us, law is incapable of telling stories of mass violence but that is exactly what 
law must do (Felman 2002). Law making public what were previously private individual 
memories is the process whereby powerful actors, such as legal counsels and judges, 
justify certain outcomes that shape and influence what memories become part of the 
publicly told legal story. Manipulated memory, as an important part of how the ICTR’s 
legal actors shape the construction of memory, will be further discussed in Section 2’s 
critique of Mark Osiel’s conceptual frame of collective memory. Furthermore, the claim 
that memory is constructed by legal actors in the narrow single narrative relates directly 
to the discursive condition of a discourse of witnessing. As stated in Chapter 2, Ricoeur’s 
 
126 Rule 73bis (E) states that ‘After commencement of Trial, the Prosecutor, if he considers it to be in the 
interests of justice, may move the Trial Chamber for leave to reinstate the list of witnesses or to vary his 
decision as to which witnesses are to be called’. Likewise for the defence Rule 73ter (E) ‘After 
commencement of the Defence case, the Defence, if it considers it to be in the interests of justice, may 
move the Trial Chamber for leave to reinstate the list of witnesses or to vary its decision as to which 
witnesses are to be called.’ (Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2007, 94-96). 
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concept of manipulated memory is interpreted by the thesis using discursive conditions 
rather than ideology (see Chapter 2). Understood in this way, it casts light upon how 
memory can become rigid and fixed within the discursive conditions of the ICTR. 
 
The discursive practices of Disclosure 
A common focus of motions were disclosure issues and legal counsel accusing their 
counterpart of not sharing or sometimes hiding witness evidence that would help their 
case.127 What is suggested here is that if we look at disclosure issues through a discursive 
lens it is a further example of how ICTR legal actors are an important part of the legal 
construction of memory. Specifically, before testimonial evidence is given on the witness 
stand legal counsels shape in important ways what legal memory is produced at the ICTR. 
The ICTR RPE Rule 68 (A) states ‘[t]he Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose 
to the Defence any material, which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest 
the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution 
evidence’ (Rule 68 2007).  
 Legal scholars and lawyers have been critical of the process of disclosure at the 
ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. As the ICTR defence lawyer for Jerome Bicmumpack 
(joinder case) Larochelle argues in interview with McKay and Friedman (2008), 
prosecutors wilfully accepted fabricated testimonial evidence from witnesses GFA and 
GTA in the Bicmumpaka case: 
 
What is even more worrying, is tools, legal tools such as corroboration. Well, if 
you take that against the accused, it becomes very dangerous because, a-ha, 
corroboration, we won’t put one, will get two, so and the guy actually states, that 
they explained to be more credible, will take two of you, dealing with the same 
event, putting you in the same place at that exact moment… that witness who gave 
like 8, 9 statements and at some point, boom, Bicamumpaka appears on his 
statement on the seventh statement. Then one day after, a completely foreign 
individual, boom, Bicamumpaka appears in the statement. Same investigator you 
can see it from the signatures. 
 
Larochelle goes on to say the false testimonies exposed in the Bicamumpaka case had 
been accepted as admissible evidence in four previous cases: 
 
127 De Los Reyes (2005) argues that the common difficulty at the ICTR for defence counsels to obtain 
witness evidence through disclosure Rule 66 eroded the fair trial rights of the accused. De Los Reyes 
suggested a useful way forward to resolve this issue could be the use instead of Rule 68. Also see Pozen 
2005. In the context of the ICC Swoboda (2008) highlights the shortcomings of disclosure rules in the 




the two I have been talking about, we’ve just had the luck to be the fourth person 
against whom they are testifying against. The first one, he was found guilty, on 
the basis amongst the other evidence of these people, we were just lucky enough 
to have a long trial which made it so that had the benefit of all the other previous 
statements, and, to show to a certain extent that you know the contradictions there 
in and all that (McKay and Friedman 2008).  
 
Producing a Legal Memory of Rape and Sexual Violence 
The judgment in the Akeyusu case, including for the first time a guilty verdict of rape as 
a weapon to commit genocide, is commonly hailed by scholars and legal advocates as a 
landmark moment for international criminal justice and an important legacy of the ICTR 
(Obote-Odora 2005, 136-137). As Obote-Odora states the ‘ICTR took the first step in 
breaking down the international legal community’s ambivalence toward rape and sexual 
violence as crimes under international law’ (Obote-Odora 2005, 137). In interview with 
Utter and Horowitz, former ICTR Judge Erik Mose advocates one of the legacies of the 
ICTR was the tribunal’s particular focus on crimes of rape and sexual violence: 
 
Those who say that this tribunal has not sufficiently taken into account rape in this 
activity are simply wrong. There have been very many such cases and when this 
tribunal closes in a year or two, it will be seen how many of our cases that actually 
at the end of the day included this horrible aspect of the Rwandan genocide 
(Horowitz and Utter 2008). 
 
Indeed, this judgment in the Akayesu case provided important legal precedent that such 
crimes are accountable to international law. However, the point being made here is not a 
criticism of legal credibility of the Akayesu or other ICTR verdicts on rape or sexual 
violence. Rather, it is to foreground beyond the language of legacy and contribution that 
there is an important question to ask about whose voices, or memories, are heard, and 
importantly not heard, when telling legal stories of mass sexual violence and rape. 
Estimations of the numbers of individual victims of rape and sexual violence do vary. 
However, during the genocide against the Tutsi approximately 100,000 to 250,000 people 
were raped or experienced sexual violence, the majority of which were women and girls 
(United Nations Outreach Programme 2014). Most of these victims were not called to 
testify at the ICTR. This shows the importance of analysing the process before testimony 
is given in court to help understanding how legal counsel and judges shape, edit and 
restrict the production of memories of sexual violence and rape.  
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 The difficulty in prosecuting rape at the ICTR is evident in the case of Musema, 
who was found guilty of rape which was overturned on appeal. The original verdict of 
being guilty of rape was largely founded on the evidence of five witnesses (Musema 
Appeal Judgement 2001). In custody waiting for his appeal decision Musema, via the 
information of a fellow prisoner, became aware of a witness whose account of events 
supported that of Musema (Cruvellier 2010, 100). Following a defence motion for the 
release of exculpatory evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession, three witness statements 
came to the attention of Musema’s defence team, which contradicted testimonies of key 
prosecution witnesses (Musema Appeal Judgment 2001, 68-73). The Appeal Judgment 
stated: 
[h]aving considered the additional evidence admitted into the record on appeal, 
the Appeals Chamber finds that had the testimonies of Witnesses N, CB and EB 
been presented before a reasonable tribunal of fact, it would have reached the 
conclusion that there was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Musema in respect 
of Count 7 of the Amended Indictment. Consequently, the Trial Chamber’s factual 
and legal findings in relation to the rape of Nyiramusugi are incorrect and 
occasioned a miscarriage of justice (Musema Appeal Judgment 2001, 73). 
 
Redwood (2018) has argued that in the rape case of Akayesu the tribunal did allow 
witnesses testifying in court to develop a detailed account of the sexual violence 
committed against them. Witnesses were able to shape the process of testimony in court, 
in this particular case (Redwood 2018). Redwood does acknowledge that after the 
Akayesu case the tribunal did not allow witnesses in rape cases the same space to narrate 
their experiences (Redwood 2018). While Redwood does provide insightful analysis on 
these few witness testimonies given in court, it does not fully account for the discursive 
restrictions of the voices not heard of individuals who experienced rape or sexual 
violence.  
The ‘interests of justice’, discussed above, as part of the discursive conditions in 
how legal counsels construct memory, was also part of the discursive conditions in cases 
relating to rape and sexual violence. This can be seen in the case of Pauline 
Nyiramauhuko, the only woman indicted by the ICTR and which included the charge of 
rape. For example, the prosecution motion for the withdrawal of 30 witnesses as it was in 
the interest of justice: 
  
Counsel for Nyiramasuhuko acknowledges that the proposed deletion of 30 
witnesses serves the interest of justice but argues that the deletion should not be 
conditioned on the addition of three new witnesses. To add the proposed 
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Witnesses FA and FCC is unnecessary insofar as many other witnesses have 
testified or will testify about the same alleged events that both witnesses would 
address. Concerning the deletion of witnesses from the Prosecution’s initial list, 
it is the Chamber’s opinion that the proposed deletion of 30 witnesses could 
significantly accelerate the proceedings and enhance judicial economy. 
Furthermore the Chamber notes that the Defence does not object to the deletion 
of witnesses sought by the Prosecution (Nyiramasuhuko Prosecution motion 
decision). 
 
Framed in the context of discursive restriction. the ‘interests of justice’ suggests that 
Redwood’s account of the Akayesu trial as a site that allowed witnesses to tell their stories 
and externalise their experiences of horrific events needs to be taken in the context of the 
wider process of memory production at the ICTR. To be sure, this is not to reduce the 
importance of the testimonies of these few witnesses in the Akayesu case, or any potential 
benefit witnesses may have got from telling their stories on the witness stand. Rather, 
when we consider the broader context of rape and sexual violence during the genocide 
against the Tutsi and the large quantity of victims of the crime of rape, the very limited 
stories of rape that are included in the way legal actors construct memory at the ICTR is 
foregrounded (De Brouwer 2015). In the Akayesu case prosecutors called a total of 28 
witnesses to testify in court, with the defence calling 13 witnesses including the accused 
(Akayesu Judgment 1998). In other words, all witness memories that are told on the 
witness stand are part of the restrictive process of memory production involving legal 
actors. These memories are the ones legal counsel deem relevant to reaching a legal 
verdict of guilty or not guilty. Considered this way there is a need to draw some distance, 
or more caution, between rape cases at the ICTR being positioned as ‘landmark’ for 
international criminal justice, and that these cases have made public the individuals’ 
experiences of these horrific crimes. In short, the memory legal actors produced that 
allowed the important legal verdict of guilty to be reached, sometimes comes at the risk 
of totalising the stories of a few witnesses given on the witness stand as representing a 
totality of experiences of rape during the genocide.  
De Brouwer (2015) has argued that in contrast to claims by some at the ICTR that 
victims of rape and sexual violence did not want to talk about their experiences, in fact 
many did want to. De Brouwer points towards human rights researchers during the early 
years of the ICTR who conducted hundreds of interviews in Rwanda with victims of rape 
and sexual violence. Part of the reason so many individuals were willing to testify to these 
researchers was the sensitive and delicate approach they took to interviewing (De 
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Brouwer 2015, 652). According to Brouwer, ‘many victims of sexual violence have been 
willing to testify before the court’ and, in fact, ‘victims in Rwanda have been more willing 
to testify than has often been depicted despite the stigma attached’ (De Brouwer 2015, 
654). The general willingness of many victims to talk about their experiences is in contrast 
to ICTR claims of difficulties to get these victims to testify. De Brouwer argues this was 
partially due to the lack of integrity and professionalism in how ICTR investigators 
engaged with victims of sexualised violence (De Brouwer 2015, 654). One such ICTR 
staff member who did claim that it was very difficult for investigators to find victims of 
rape and/or sexual violence willing to talk about what had happened to them was ICTR 
Registrar Adama Dieng. In interview with Friedman and Horowitz, Deing states, ‘one of 
the difficulties, is, even until today, people who have been victims of rape they tend to 
not speak out. Sometimes it’s very difficult to get the victim of a rape, even in our national 
jurisdiction, to come out and say that she has been raped’ (Friedman and Horowitz 2008).  
These contrasts in views about whether victims were willing to speak about their 
experiences, in one sense, can be read as reflecting that who the witness is talking to and 
for what purpose their story is being used for contributes to whether individuals are 
willing to talk. According to De Brouwer, sexual violence being explicitly tied in with 
the ICTR mandate prosecuting only senior figures involved in the genocide, has resulted 
in knowledge of rape and sexual violence during the genocide against the Tutsi being 
limited to victims whose experience can be used as evidence to prosecute a relatively 
small amount of individuals who perpetrated sexualised violence (De Brouwer 2015, 656-
660). Furthermore, as mentioned above the lack of professionalism by legal counsel 
investigation teams may have impacted on the lack of witnesses willing to talk that goes 
beyond the claim of difficult subject matter made by ICTR Registrar Dieng. ICTR Legal 
Officer Suzanne Chenault highlights that the lack of a professional approach to 
investigating rape, particularly in the first years of the tribunal, resulted in a significant 
amount of potential witness evidence being lost. In interview with Nathan and Horowitz, 
Chenault states: 
 
I think [there is a] need to understand the vulnerability of the survivors and what 
that would mean I believe if you’re going to prosecute this crime in the hope then 
that you’re going to deter its continued commission of the crime, you’re going to 
need much greater sensitivity and that would mean that the investigators not be 
these hulking policemen who don’t speak either English or French, as even a 
second language. Because if you’re going to get a testimony, you need to talk to 
the victim and usually you need to have somebody who can speak in the language 
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of the victim. What we had initially as I understand we had people who were 
brought in as investigators and very often they weren’t hired necessarily by the 
UN. They might have been a gift from one of the nations that wanted to help and 
so there was no way of monitoring, if you will, or giving a program to or giving 
information to those who went out and investigated. And I’m not saying a great 
deal of harm was done but I would say a great deal of evidence that could have 
been preserved was not because of the way the investigations were conducted 
(Nathan and Horowitz 2008). 
 
The role of legal actors in the construction of legal memories of rape and sexual violence 
at the ICTR entails a further process of ‘filtering’. In analysing the discursive conditions 
of motions and motion decision, what is not there or what is absent is as important as 
what is there (Foucault 1972). What is absent from motions are witness memories relating 
to male victims of rape and sexual violence. Specifically, the memory legal actors produce 
that relates to individuals’ experience of rape and sexual violence are female victims’ 
experiences. Male victims of rape and sexual violence are not relevant to the ICTR legal 
memory (Buss 2009; De Brouwer 2015). Brown (2014) has foregrounded that during the 
genocide against the Tutsi, woman were not only victims of rape they were also 
perpetrators of it on male victims (Brown 2014, 459).128 According to Brown, one of her 
interviewees, Charles, who was gang raped by a group of women said that there were 
many other male victims of rape during the genocide against the Tutsis. However, one of 
the main difficulties is trying to find victims willing to talk about their experiences 
(Brown 2014). Brown argues that the lack of voices of male victims relates directly to 
‘notions of masculinity that dominate Rwanda’s gender paradigm and perpetuate the 
belief that rape is something that is experienced exclusively by women’ (Brown 2014, 
459-460).  
The ICTR was the first international criminal institution to define rape as a 
weapon to commit genocide. The ICTR jurisprudence of rape stemmed from the Akayesu 
case, specifically the prosecutor seeking leave to amend the indictment following 
extensive detail of rape given in six witness statements (Akayesu Judgment 1998). 
Following the Akayesu case the ICTR’s prosecuting rape produced what Buss refers to 
as a ‘script’ of who could be a victim of rape and who could be a perpetrator of rape (Buss 
2009, 155). These categories, ‘scripts’, significantly shaped what memories of sexualised 
 
128 For a discussion on the need for transitional justice mechanisms to develop policies and processes for 
male victims of sexualised and gender based violence during atrocities see Schulz (2015). Also see 
Schulz (2018) ‘The “ethical loneliness” of male sexual violence survivors in Northern Uganda: gendered 
reflections on silencing’. 
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violence legal counsel needed to construct. As Buss states, the crime of rape at the ICTR 
created a ‘script’ of male Hutu as perpetrators and Tutsi women as victims (Buss 2009, 
155-156).129 This ‘script’ resulted in the ICTR focusing on shared patterns and 
experiences which came at the cost of variance and differences (Buss 2009, 155-156). 
The ICTR’s narrow depiction of rape meant that male victims were almost entirely 
invisible at the ICTR. This invisibility impacted, or limited, ‘what [could] be known about 
sexual violence and its role in the genocide’ (Buss 2009, 160; De Brouwer 2015, 645). In 
the context of the current discussion, male victims of rape and their almost entire absence 
from the ICTR is a further example of how memories legal actors produce relating to rape 
is very narrow. Specifically, the ICTR’s legal categorisation of rape and who counts as 
rape victims and perpetrators meant that memories of male rape victims were not relevant 
to legal counsel’s story. This is a further example of how legal actors, prosecutor and 
defence counsels, play an important role in what memories are included in the legal 
memory the ICTR produces.  
In summary, legal actors, play an important role in how memories of rape and 
sexual violence are constructed at the ICTR. Building on this, next, the chapter puts 
forward a critique of liberal legality in relation notions of collective memory. 
 
Liberal Legality and Collective Memory: A Critique  
This section uses the arguments from the analysis in Chapters 4-6 and the conceptual 
framework to critique and challenge conceptual claims made by Osiel (2000) that 
criminal trials addressing mass atrocities can and should produce a collective memory. 
Osiel’s book, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law is one of the few works that 
explicitly and in extensive detail focuses on the legal construction of memory in atrocity 
trials, and thus is seen as a leading voice in these discussions. This section focuses on 
critiquing two conceptual points made by Osiel: his conceptual framing of collective 
memory, and the liberal legality position he advances in claiming the individual and 
societal benefits of a legal collective memory (see Chapter 2, Section 2). It is argued that 
a conceptual critique of Osiel, supported by the discourse analysis of the data, foregrounds 
that the far reaching and idealised role of law advanced by Osiel is ultimately 
 
129 De Brouwer (2015) has argued that ICTR investigators were ill-prepared to deal with male victims of 
sexualised violence. ‘Investigators' lack of knowledge or discomfort with the issue is a major obstacle for 
the effective prosecution of these crimes, probably even more so than for cases involving female victims 
of sexual violence’ (De Brouwer 2015, 658). 
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unconvincing. The essence of what a trial is there to do is to reach a legal determination 
and it is arguments such as Osiel’s that claim law can contribute to ‘reconciliation’ and 
‘peace’. The section concludes by suggesting there is a need for more humility and 
restraint by those making such demands of international criminal law and institutions.  
To be clear, the following critique of Osiel is specifically of the augments he 
makes on collective memory and liberal legality in atrocity trials and does not engage 
with or critique Osiel’s extensive body of work. Indeed, it is this thesis’s view that Osiel 
has provided significant insights on a number of issues relating to international criminal 
law and armed conflict.130 Thus, the following critique is framed within his discussion on 
collective memory during atrocity trials.  
 
A critique of advocacy for a legal collective memory of atrocities 
For Osiel, the public demand for knowing what happened during mass violence 
can be aided by trials and particularly the stories of past wrongs they tell. Following Osiel, 
these trials: 
 
influence our underlying notions of what memory is about, what it is for… that 
the cumulative effect of such trials, from Nuremberg and Buenos Aires to the 
current proceedings in the Hague [ICTY], is that ‘the process of how people are 
made to vanish has become a distinctive feature of postwar conceptions of what 
memory is […]  Criminal trials must be conducted with this pedagogical purpose 
in mind (Osiel 2000, 2-3). 
 
Osiel’s framing of collective memory in atrocity trials is shaped by his legal critique of 
traditional liberal thought and his advocacy for liberal legalism. According to Osiel, 
convincing traditional liberal critiques made within ordinary criminal law when applied 
to international crimes become overstated and lose relevance (Osiel 2009; Robinson 
2013). For example, the sphere of individual culpability which may well be relevant for 
isolated crimes is misguided when considering mass atrocities which often entail complex 
group dynamics (Osiel 2009).131 Osiel argues that traditional liberal theory being 
embedded within individualistic notions of moral choice and agency, becomes 
overwhelmed by the context of international criminal law, such as collective criminality 
 
130 For examples of Osiel’s extensive writings see, Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War 
(1999); The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War (2009); The Right to Do Wrong: 
Morality and the Limits of Law (2019). 
 
131 Also see Drumbl (2005, 2011). 
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(Osiel 2009). In the context of atrocity trials, and as an alternative to traditional liberal 
thought, Osiel suggests that liberal legality supports his argument that law can produce a 
collective memory of mass atrocities. For Osiel, it is the ‘ground rules’ of liberal legality, 
such as due process, culpability and fair trial, that facilitate discussions between 
perpetrators and victims about past wrongs, which Osiel refers to as ‘civil dissensus’ 
(Osiel 2000, 44; Bloxham and Pendas 2010, 636). According to Osiel, ‘civil dissensus’ 
creates an equal space for competing parties to share their side of the ‘story’ without one 
side been given preference over the other (Osiel 2000, 39-41).132 Through liberal legality 
societies affected by a traumatic past ‘can greatly benefit from collective representation 
of that past, created and cultivated by a process of prosecution and judgment’ (Osiel 2000, 
39). It is the level playing field that liberal legality provides that Osiel argues stimulates 
a distinct punctuation with the past by providing a given society a collective 
understanding of the atrocities and guiding moral principles for the future (Osiel 2000, 2-
3; Ranck 2000, 204). As Osiel states,  
 
[Atrocity trials] present moments of transformative opportunity in the lives of 
individuals and societies, a potential not lost upon the litigants themselves. 
Prosecutors and judges in these cases thus rightly aim to shape collective memory 
of horrible events in ways that can be both successful as public spectacle and 
consistent with liberal legality (Osiel 2000, 2). 
 
According to Osiel, collective memory consists of the stories a society tells about:  
 
momentous events in its history, the events that most profoundly affect the lives 
of its members and most arouse their passions for long periods… When a society’s 
members interpret such an event in common fashion, they drive common lessons 
from it for the future (Osiel 2000, 19).  
 
Osiel points out that such trials provide important learning experiences about contested 
moments of a society’s past and thus defends the claim of the transformative benefits of 
legal collective memory (Osiel 2000, 65-66). This defence is founded on the ability of 
legal collective memory and the lessons it can teach a society based upon the ‘liberal 
nature of the stories being told’ (Osiel 2000, 66). This justification is based on collective 
memory’s capacity to make for telling a better story about where the society should be 
heading (Osiel 2000, 65-66). In telling ‘better stories’ the collective memory produced 
 
132 Alverez (2008) engages with Osiel’s ‘civil dissensus’ in arguing that legal debates force parties to 
inhabit the same legal space which can facilitate an understanding of opposing views. 
174 
 
through law is a ‘congenial public opportunity for collective mourning of the victims of 
administrative massacre. It provides a ritual that is helpful for family members and a 
sympathetic public in coming to terms with melancholia in even the most traumatic cases’ 
(Osiel 2000, 67). Important for Osiel is the rules of evidence, procedural and ‘trial ethics’ 
that facilitate trial actors to publicly narrate past horrors (Osiel 2000, 40-42). As Osiel 
states, through ‘such “rules of engagement” each party comes to learn, at the very least 
what its opponent actually thinks and most deeply cares about. Through this process 
dangerous misconceptions about “the other” are overcome’ (Osiel 2000, 42). It is the 
linear procedural rules and regulations of trials, ‘civil dissensus’, that allows for a 
conversation to happen that would not otherwise occur (Osiel 2000, 46). Without these 
rules and regulations those conflicted actors ‘would refuse to sit down together, or when 
they did, would quickly descend to vitriolic name-calling, theological incantation or 
outright violence’ (Osiel 2000, 46-47). In short, Osiel argues that it is law and only law 
that is able to facilitate conflicted actors the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue 
about the past.  
 
Plural vs Collective memory 
Osiel claims that collective memories allow for different stories and perspectives to be 
told and is transformative by allowing for a shared understanding of a society’s past which 
thus can positively shape its future. However, as has been stated from the beginning of 
this thesis the term collective memory is problematic. Rather, memory is understood here 
as plural and as a process of construction, rather than a ‘thing’ recovered as suggested by 
Osiel’s framing of collective memory. Memory understood as a plural process then stands 
in contrast with Osiel’s claim that collective memory produced through law allows for 
the production of a broad understanding of the past. For Osiel collective memories consist 
of detailed stories of different experiences to be heard. However, the institutional 
production of memory, such as in the ICTR, is understood here as manipulated memory. 
That is to say, a process of memory construction that allows for the admission of certain 
‘facts’ while simultaneously omitting others (Ricoeur 2004, 80). Here, a particular focus 
on critiquing Osiel’s framing of collective memory is the extensive emphasis he puts on 
law being able to facilitate conversations about different experiences and understandings 
of the past. It is the storytelling ability facilitated through law and its contribution to a 
collective memory that manipulated memory illustrates as misguided. As proposed in 
Chapter 2, discursive conditions and institutional actors significantly restrict not only who 
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can tell their stories but what stories they can tell in the context of the trial. Furthermore, 
as argued in Chapter 5, legal memory at the ICTR is absent of sharing plural experiences 
of the past with others, which is a core component in this thesis’s understanding of 
memory (Ricoeur 2004).  
This thesis’s conceptual understanding of memory being framed by a 
poststructuralist lens is an understanding of memory that Osiel argues against. According 
to Osiel, poststructuralist understandings of memory are too preoccupied with 
understanding and allowing for the micro-narratives to be given equal ‘airtime’ (Osiel 
2000, 52). For Osiel this ‘relativist obsession’ fails to understand the need to draw 
together micro-narratives in order to facilitate a collective agreement on past events (Osiel 
2000, 52). However, it is not the case that a poststructuralist framing of memory resists 
collective consensus of shared experiences. What it does resist is the ability of 
international criminal law to produce such a consensus of shared experiences. For 
example, as was proposed in Chapter 5, semi legal institutions such as gacaca have the 
potential for the plural sharing of memories with others. In other words, it is not as Osiel 
claims that a poststructuralist framing of memory is incapable or uninterested in shared 
experiences of the past. Instead, a poststructuralist framing of memory resists the idea of 
a legal collective memory because the tightly controlled discursive conditions within 
‘atrocity trials’ is unable to facilitate this sharing of stories that is claimed by Osiel. 
Another component of Osiel’s advocacy for a collective memory of atrocities is 
that the narratives told in court are ones that would not otherwise be heard and facilitate 
the experiences of victims being heard by the society affected (Osiel 2000, 22). However 
when we draw upon the discursive analysis from Chapters 4-6 showing the discursive 
restrictions that ‘filter’ what memories witnesses can talk about, this casts doubt on 
Osiel’s claim. For example, as argued in Chapter 5 the ICTR statute, particularly the legal 
codification of the crime of genocide, is part of the discursive condition that restricts what 
memories of experiences of genocidal violence can be heard. Specifically, the crime of 
genocide requires a temporally bound set of actors, agents and events. It is this 
temporality of the legal codification of genocide that witness memories must fit within. 
Witness memories that do not fit within the temporality of the crime of genocide are not 
commonly included as part of the legal collective story the ICTR tells. Moreover, as 
argued in the first section of this chapter, defence, prosecutors and judges are an important 
part of the legal production of memory at the ICTR. For example, while the ICTR did 
create legal precedent through its judgment on the ‘rape cases’, there is a need to resist 
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the urge to advocate that law can facilitate diverse stories of horrendous violence to be 
heard. The witnesses who testified about sexual violence and rape were only a fragment 
of the total number of victims of sexual violence and rape during the genocide against the 
Tutsi. Contrary to Osiel’s claim that atrocity trials facilitate victim experiences of 
violence to be heard, the discursive conditions, such as the legal codification of the crime 
of genocide, significantly restrict what experiences of violence the ICTR needs to tell. 
The experience of violence the tribunal requires are ones that fit within the narrow legal 
narrative counsel tell in order to reach legal determination of not guilty or guilty. 
Osiel’s liberal framing of collective memory argues witnesses/victims are an 
important part of the conversations that atrocity trials facilitate. In Osiel’s liberal frame 
witnesses are self-evident beings. The emphasis for Osiel is not on questioning what 
witnesses are, but rather what witnesses are is assumed as obvious and focus instead is 
on how institutional processes can aid witnesses telling stories of their experience (Osiel 
2000, 40). Osiel identifies the legal rules and regulations, ‘civil dissensus’ as important 
processes that facilitate conversation about different actors’ experiences of the past (Osiel 
2000, 42). However, two points here need to be critiqued in challenging Osiel’s liberal 
legality understanding of law and collective memory: what witnesses are is obvious, and 
legal rules and regulations facilitated the telling of stories. A central argument advanced 
by this thesis is that legal witnesses are not self-evident. Instead subjectivity needs to be 
placed centre stage and in doing so allows us to understand how discursive conditions 
and practices shape, reshape, edit, distort, restrict the discursive construction of identity 
of the witness. Taking Osiel’s assertion that what witnesses are is obvious and placing it 
in the context of the ICTR is helpful in critiquing Osiel’s advocacy for legal collective 
memory. There were tens of thousands of people who witnessed the horrors of 1994. 
However out of all those individuals only a fraction were able to become a witness at the 
ICTR. As Agamben reminds us, subjectivity entails potentiality and impotentiality, the 
idea not to assume the identity of a group, such as witnesses, encompasses all individuals 
(Agamben 1997). In short, potentiality highlights the need to not collectivise groups as 
all-encompassing. 
Legal rules of procedure and regulation, Osiel argues, are very important in 
helping the law to facilitate conversation about contested pasts. However, the discursive 
analysis here and in the previous two chapters has shown that the ICTR’s RPEs and 
regulations, are not as advocated by Osiel ways of inducing dialogue. Rather they 
significantly restrict who can be a witness and what witnesses can talk about. For 
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example, as evidenced in Chapter 4 and 5 the ‘foundational documents’ such as statute 
detailing the specific crimes within the ICTR’s jurisdiction discursively restricts what 
knowledge of the past legal counsels require to contribute to their legal narrative. 
Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 5, pre-trial briefs and the summaries of witness 
statements are often only a very small and specific part of witnesses’ experience. 
Moreover, it is also the summary of witness statements detailed in the brief that directly 
orientate the questions prosecutors ask those witnesses in court. In other words, viewed 
through a discursive lens, and as evidenced in the last three chapters, rather than 
facilitating diverse conversations about the past, regulations and processes before 
witnesses testifying in court significantly restrict what memories of the past are told. 
  
A Conceptual Alternative 
This concluding discussion will offer an alternative to Osiel’s collective memory, and 
scholars who, like Osiel, advocate law’s ability to tell a collective understanding of the 
past (Douglas 2001; Keydar 2015, 2019), drawing upon the thesis’s conceptual 
framework. This conceptual alternative is aimed to inform empirical understandings of 
legal witnessing in international criminal tribunals and courts. As Sharp (2019) 
insightfully argues, there is a need for a more integrated approach in transitional justice 
between conceptual critiques and the ‘real world’ (Sharp 2019, 17). For Sharp, conceptual 
critiques are very useful for drawing attention to blind spots and contours. However, there 
is a danger that if these critiques only focus on identifying blind spots without considering 
how these critiques can actually have a benefit in the ‘real world’ their insights may not 
be fully accomplished (Sharp 2019, 18). As Sharp states, ‘[p]erhaps the most radical thing 
of all at this stage would therefore be to figure out how to better translate critical theory 
ideals into actual practice without being stripped of substance in the process’ (Sharp 2019, 
21). Therefore the following discussion offering a conceptual alternative, and Chapter 7 
exploring the potential for archival material to aid memory in Rwanda, is informed by 
Sharp’s call for conceptual critique and the ‘real world’ to be brought closer together.  
Firstly, the thesis’s conceptual understanding of memory as something 
constructed and entailing community and ‘with others’ (Ricoeur 2004) is discussed. This 
conceptual understanding is proposed here as a way for scholars researching legal 
collective memory to think about law’s relationship with memory that could facilitate 
more restraint in the prescriptions they offer. Osiel argues that atrocity trials provide a 
congenial space for opposing parties to tell their side of the story (Osiel 2000). However, 
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what is proposed here instead of thinking of these legal spaces as a suitable site for 
individuals to externalise their memories, is to think about them as sites of restriction and 
absence (Ricoeur 2004). What is restricted is what memories can be talked about, and 
what is absent is remembering with other people and sharing experiences of the past 
(Ricoeur 2004). Memory entails sharing memories with other people. In order to 
understand past shared experiences requires memories of individuals and groups to be 
worked through and negotiated. This conceptual understanding of memory (Ricoeur 
2004) can inform important questions scholars advocating, or investigating, legal 
collective memory should ask when thinking about spaces of legal memory construction, 
and what these constructions can, and importantly cannot tell us about the past. For 
example these questions could include, who is speaking, what are they speaking about, 
for what purpose, where are they speaking, and who is asking the questions? Also, where 
is the society affecting within a given process of legal memory construction? The ‘where’ 
question is crucial because if individuals are remembering in absence of the community, 
then, as argued in Chapter 5, there is an important part of the process of memory that is 
missing.  
Advocates of legal collective memory, such as Keydar (2015, 2019), argue that it 
is the vast quantities of witness testimonies in trials, such as the Bemba trial at the ICC, 
that are ‘an integral, and substantively beneficial, component of the law’s response to 
atrocity crime’ (Keydar 2019, 554). For Keydar international criminal turbinals (ICTR, 
ICTY and ICC) facilitating ‘mass testimony is an integral part of the law’s response to 
the mass scale of atrocity crimes and their ungraspable nature’. In other words, for Keydar 
the ‘ungraspable nature’ of atrocities becomes graspable precisely because ‘large quantity 
of witnesses serves crucial functions in addressing such grave human rights violation’ 
(Keydar 2019 556). The core contribution of large quantities of witnesses ‘extends 
beyond the limits of proving the crimes of the accused to narratively reconstruct the 
experience of atrocity[/ies]’ (Keydar 2019, 566-567). However, what is suggested here 
is, instead of assuming that quantity equates with substance as advocates like Keydar 
seem to do, it would be more fruitful to think through the questions suggested above. For 
example, rather than taking the purported quantity of witnesses participating in the legal 
process as an indicator that international criminal tribunals can produce a comprehensive 
understanding of atrocities, to consider, or ask, to what extent witnesses are in 
conversation with each other during the legal processes. In other words, are these 
individuals, and importantly their community, sharing memories with ‘each other’ 
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(Ricoeur 2004)? If scholars, such as Keydar, were to consider to what extent individuals 
(witnesses) were engaging with people from their community during the legal 
construction of memory it is likely that they might be more cautious in advocating 
quantity as a means to achieve a legal collective understanding of past horrors. Advocates 
should move away from using indicators of quantity to inform perceptions of whether a 
collective legal understanding of the past has been achieved: that more witnesses means 
more memory. Instead, they should ask are witnesses at international criminal courts 
negotiating shared past experiences with other people? The answer to this question, as 
argued thus far in this thesis and particularly in Chapter 5, is no, and therefore if scholars 
asked this question then potentially this would aid a more cautious approach to thinking 
about laws (in)ability to mediate social change.  
Scholars, such as Osiel (2000), Keydar (2019), Funk (2010), Groome (2011), 
Klinkner and Smith (2015) argue that witnesses are a key part of the collective story told 
at atrocity trials. These scholars commonly take as their starting point that what witnesses 
are is self-evident and obvious (Osiel 2000; Keydar 2019, Klinkner and Smith 2015). 
From this assumed starting point, they investigate the ways witnesses could contribute to 
collective memory, such as through ‘civil dissensus’ and vast quantities of testimonies 
given in court. Instead, it is suggested here that a more nuanced starting point is to think 
about who is speaking, and importantly who is not speaking, and for what purpose? 
Specifically, the concept of subjectivity (Agamben 1997; Foucault 1972) when applied 
to legal witnesses highlights that the majority of individuals who experienced the horrors 
of mass rights violations will not be a witness at international criminal tribunals, such as 
the ICTR. This does require advocates of legal collective memory to understand the 
identity of witnesses as something produced by legal institutions and its actors through 
discursive conditions. The witness who gets to speak is speaking in proxy for the true 
witness, things they have observed up close but not experienced personally (Agamben 
1997). This does not reduce or dismiss any suffering they have experienced, rather it is 
to think about the witnesses who testify in court as only a small percentage of the 
individuals who experienced mass human rights violations. If advocates take as their 
starting point this idea that prior to testifying in court individuals are not witnesses, it 
opens up a number of things to consider that were previously obscured to them. 
Furthermore, the creation of the court or tribunal, including the crimes within the court’s 
jurisdiction, has already begun the process of reducing which individuals are relevant to 
the legal processes. The processes in which investigators gather witness evidence and 
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lack of local knowledge also results in reducing which individuals will testify. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, ICTR resistance to local expertise and knowledge during 
investigations is an issue that has continued at the ICC (Clark 2018). This discussion is 
therefore relevant to current and future research investigating the construction of legal 
collective memory at the ICC. For example, Keydar argues that the Bemba case at the 
ICC illustrates the potential of courts to produce a collective understanding of the past 
through the court engaging with large quantities of witness-victims (Keydar 2019). 
However, if scholars like Keydar were to instead take as their starting point those 
witnesses testifying in court, such as in the Bemba case, are the visible tip of a restrictive 
discursive process, this would expose to these scholars that below this visible tip is a 
significant process of ‘filtering’ out many individuals and their memories. 
The conceptual offering of the ‘grey zone’ is possibly a particular challenge for 
scholars advocating tribunals’ ability to aid individuals’ and societies’ understanding of 
the past because it pushes against some of their core values. In particular these values are 
justice as equated with judicial justice, and international criminal law as the most suitable 
responsible to mass atrocities. Nonetheless, there is a need for more restraint and humility 
by those advocating the ability of law to make sense of past atrocities, and the ‘grey zone’ 
provides a useful frame to help that endeavour. The ‘grey zone’ of legal witnessing is 
helpful because it challenges or casts light upon the assumption that witness testimonies 
facilitated through law act as a ‘bridge’ between a traumatic past and a path to a more 
peaceful future (Agamben 1997). Instead testimony is purely a judicial mechanism and 
has no particular transformative benefits, and is not an essential link, or ‘bridge’, to aid 
societies’ recovery from a horrific past. This is not to say that witnesses testifying in court 
never get any benefits from testifying. However, what is being argued is that it should not 
be claimed by scholars and advocates that testimony will do any more than serve as a 
judicial mechanism. If individual witnesses do experience a sense of catharsis then this is 
indeed a positive thing, however this should not be a stated claim of what testimony is 
likely to do. Its purpose should be seen as purely a contribution towards the function of 
tribunals: to reach a legal determination of guilty or not guilty. 
Related to the discussion above that witness testimonies is purely part of a judicial 
process and not a mode for social change, is the lacuna between law-justice. Agamben 
states that it is not the case that law and witness testimonies it facilitates means justice 
has been achieved (Agabmen 1999). Or put slightly more crudely, witnesses testifying in 
court is not a box to be ‘ticked’ indicating justice has been reached. Instead understanding 
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legal witnesses in the lacuna of law and justice is a way to resist law’s need for progress 
and singularity. Testimonial evidence witnesses give in court serves an important function 
of contributing to a legal determination being reached. However, testimony’s contribution 
should not be understood beyond its judicial contribution, as was argued in Chapter 4 
discussing the right to truth. The witness located in the lacuna between law and justice 
then means that testimony is not about contributing towards understanding of the past, 
and in reaching that understanding would be an important part of a society’s progress to 
a more peaceful future. Instead, the act of witnesses testifying in court becomes distinct 
from any notions of justice. The act of testimony distinct from justice is important because 
it resists transitional justice’s legalistic impulse to assume that international criminal law 
is transformative. 
The conceptual insights, drawn from the thesis’s original framework, offered here 
can be a way for those researching the role of memory construction at international 
criminal courts to think about the individuals who speak on the witness stand as the 
minority of those who survived mass rights violations. The memories that are spoken on 
the witness stand are for the specific purpose of legal judgement. Suggesting these 
conceptual insights may be a challenging, but necessary, reorientation that will help those 
advocating and researching the ability of courts and tribunals to produce a collective 
understanding of the past to understand some of the limitations of law. If scholars used 
the conceptual insights and questions suggested here then there would be potential 
benefits for those they are seeking to help, namely the affected society. One benefit would 
be that it could aid courts managing the expectations of victims and affected societies. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the claims made by legally orientated scholars, and courts such 
as the ICTR and ICC, about the restorative contributions of  the legal processes, including 
victims having the chance to share their stories of atrocities, inevitably results in victims 
feeling let down by the court (Moffett 2017). If scholars, and courts, were to engage with 
the conceptual insights and questions offered here, the advice and guidance given to 
victims and the wider affected society would reflect the restrictive nature of law and legal 
processes. Moreover, if scholars were to resist the impulse of equating law with justice 
this would also positively engage with the plurality of meanings of justice understood by 
those who are trying to make sense of and coming to terms with a traumatic past (Turner 
2016). In societies affected by mass rights violations there are numerous understandings 
of justice, including judicial, semi legal or hybrid such as gacaca, and non-legal processes 
including community therapy, and ritual and faith healing processes (Allan and 
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Macdonald 2015). This is reflected in the statement of one gacaca judge remarking on 
justice in Rwanda, 
In Arusha the big fish are there. The victims travel there, but in gacaca, everyone 
is already here: survivors, perpetrators, judges, they are all here in the community. 
That is the difference [...]. Those in Arusha haven’t asked for forgiveness, yet they 
have committed many crimes here. They should face us, the Rwandan family, but 
they avoid us by being there. (Clark and Palmer 2012, 12) 
 
The importance for scholars and courts to engage with local articulations of justice are 
also mirrored in the words of one Rwandan genocide survivor, 
 
This man is in Arusha and I am only hearing that he is being tried but it is very 
far away and it does not help. Can you testify against someone we do not see? To 
speak would reduce our suffering and I hope that he will be punished but no one 
has come to speak to us about what he did. How can they try someone if they do 
not hear our stories? If he came here, maybe he could ask for forgiveness, and 
perhaps we could have forgiven him. Over there, it does not follow the way of 
justice that we expect. (Clark and Palmer 2012, 12) 
 
Therefore if legally orientated scholars and courts themselves engaged with the idea 
international criminal law, and witness testimonies, do not automatically equate with 
justice this will allow for more robust and context specific understandings of justice. 
Conceptual insights and questions proposed here would also free up space for legal 
scholars to think outside the legalistic sphere of a ‘self-contained system with its own 
logic’ for how to respond to mass right violations (Zunino 2018, 109). Specifically, if 
they were to engage with the discursive conditions and restrictions of legal processes and 
the very narrow and singular narrative of the past it tells, this would give them opportunity 
to consider what alternative processes their advocacy and research could explore that 
might have a more positive impact on the individuals and communities are trying to help. 
To ask legal scholars to re-orientate their restorative justice research away from 
international criminal law, is a big ask, but vitally necessary.  
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that an analysis of motion and motion decisions showed they are an 
important discursive space that further evidences the important role legal actors play in 
the construction of legal memory. The latter part of the chapter, drawing upon the analysis 
from Chapters 4-6 and the original conceptual framework, provided a critique of Osiel’s 
conceptual understanding of law and collective memory and in doing so offered an 
alternative. The chapter began by discussing the crucial role discursive statements of 
‘interests of justice’ and ‘judicial economy’ have in discursively restricting who can be a 
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witness subject and what memories they can talk about. Developing on from this 
discussion it was suggested that the disclosure process was also discursively important. 
From this, the role of legal actors in editing, shaping and restricting what memories of 
rape and sexual violence witnesses were required to talk about was outlined. In particular 
in contrast to the claims by many at the ICTR and some scholars that an important legacy 
of the tribunal was convicting the crime of rape, it is concluded that prosecuting this crime 
also acted as a restrictive process of what memories were heard and importantly not heard, 
such as memories of male victims of rape and sexual violence. Foregrounding the 
singularity of legal determination this chapter has aimed to unshackle the fallacy of a 
transcendent synthesis at international tribunals (ICTR). That being, the conflation of 
legal determination and the capacity of law to contribute to making sense of the past in 
deeply divided societies: the law’s (in)ability to facilitate social change (Turner 2016). In 
illustrating the discursivity of witnessing at international tribunals, the thesis shows how 
the legal production of memory should not be assumed by the legal transitional justice 
scholarship as having the capacity of aiding transitioning societies of coming to terms 





















Chapter 7 – Fragments of Legal Memories 
 
This final chapter explores a potential way legal witnesses could contribute to the plurality 
of memory in post-conflict societies, which is not rigid and fixed within the tightly 
controlled discursive conditions of legal proceedings. Specifically, in relation to the 
thesis’s research question, ‘How do legal witnesses of human rights violations contribute 
to memory production in transitional post-conflict societies?’, the discussion explores the 
potential for fragments of witness memories contained in the ICTR archive to contribute 
to the post-genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. These fragments include witness 
statements and testimonies, along with other material including forensic reports, 
investigators’ dossiers, videos of investigation sites, diaries, letters and photographs from 
pre-genocide, genocide and post-genocide periods. To be clear, the argument made in 
Chapters 4-6 should not be understood as nihilistic; such an argument would reduce the 
entire ICTR legal process of memory construction to a black hole of nothing more than 
problematic and unhelpful stories. Rather, it has been necessary for the primary focus of 
this thesis to conceptualise and show that what it is legal witnesses are and the way in 
which they remember is formed within a tightly controlled discursive field. Having made 
this argument allows for the final chapter to conceptually explore what else the legal 
process of memory construction does: what else happens or is produced through the 
discursive practices at the ICTR. Therefore the discussion in this chapter extends the 
argument made in Chapters 4-6, by suggesting that the tightly controlled discursive 
process at the ICTR produces fragments of plural memories. The chapter begins by 
conceptualising the ICTR archives as a site where fragments of memories of legal 
witnesses exist; it does this by engaging with Emmanuel Levinas’s conceptual 
understanding of ‘relationality’ (the Other) and Ricoeur’s understanding of the plurality 
of memory (Levinas 2001; Ricoeur 2004). The use of the term memory ecology (Hoskins 
2016) instead of collective memory is deliberate (see Chapter 1, Section 5). Memory 
ecology, or post-conflict memory ecology, is understood here to mean the perpetual 
interactions between and across the numerous levels and layers of memory. Collective 
memory, both conceptually and in popular discourse, suggests a pinnacle of shared 
understanding of past events can be reached. In short, it is by conceptualising the ICTR 
archives, using ‘relationality’ and ‘plurality’, that the potential for legal archive material 
as a site of plural meanings of past atrocities can be explored. 
185 
 
 Using the conceptual frame discussed above, the concluding part of the chapter 
considers the empirical potential, and challenges, of proposing that legal witnesses can 
potentially contribute to the Rwandan memory ecology in the form of the ICTR archive 
material. The vast collection of material relates to the testimony of legal witnesses, along 
with images and audio material, which were gathered as part of the prosecutors’ and 
defence counsel’s investigations. Some of this was used during trials, but not all. The 
unused materials were not deemed relevant to the narrow legal narrative lawyers need to 
tell in contributing to reaching a legal determination of guilty or not guilty. However, this 
does not necessarily mean these materials are unreliable or not potentially meaningful 
and important to Rwandan communities and individuals. It is the fragmented and non-
linear space of legal archives that can contribute to the plurality of meaning in how 
societies make sense of mass violations of human rights.  
In summary, this chapter proposes that legal witnesses can potentially contribute 
to the post-conflict memory ecology during periods of transition, although crucially, this 
requires a conceptual reorientation in how we think about legal memory. Here, suggesting 
that legal witnesses can contribute to memory is not a retreat on this thesis’s core line of 
argument which challenges the claim that tribunals can produce a collective memory of 
mass rights violations. Rather, this chapter suggests that if we re-orientate our 
understanding of legal memory away from court proceedings and instead zoom-in on the 
legal archive, and the material it houses, this can potentially be a way that legal witnesses 
can contribute to the post-conflict memory ecology in Rwanda. This chapter offers an 
alternative way of thinking about transitioning societies’ relationships with legal memory. 
The chapter is one way not to be limited by law’s need for singularity and progress, and 
therefore puts front and centre the plural and multidirectional nature of remembering 
atrocities. 
 
Legal Archives: Plurality, Self and ‘Others’ 
The following discussion conceptually explores how ICTR archival material consists of 
relational fragments of memories and how these fragments could contribute towards 
Rwandan’s sharing experiences of the past. In order to do this the chapter engages with 
and interprets Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of relationality (the ‘Other’). Levinas’s 
understanding of relationality has as its essence the irreducible relation between oneself 
and other people, which Levinas refers to as the ‘Other’ (Levinas 2001, 33-40; Frost 2014, 
223). For Levinas, the self, or I, awareness of objects leads to the awareness of the ‘Other’. 
186 
 
It is this awareness of the ‘Other’ that is relational (Levinas 2001, 104-118). The ‘Other’ 
exists before the self, in fact it is the Other that constitutes the self. Importantly, as Frost 
argues, the Other constituting the self ‘does not drive the I into any particular outcome. 
Nor does the relation to the Other have any meaning apart from constituting the I, the 
Self’ (Frost 2014, 227). In short, Levinas’s concept of relationality is interpreted here as 
a way to think about archival material exists as individual fragments but in relation to 
other fragments, though importantly the relation is not pre-determined or presupposing 
the memory into a group or identity.  
This chapter interprets Levinas’s understanding of ‘relationality’ as a conceptual 
tool to suggest that fragments of memories have relations to each other, and, Rwandans’ 
relational existence to the past is a helpful way to be able to move beyond the trauma of 
1994. Specifically, relationality is being used in two interconnecting ways: fragments of 
experiences in the archive are connected but not determined into a dominant narrative, 
and Rwandans have relational existence to plural experiences of the past. Firstly, central 
to the relationality of experiences of the past is the relation to the Other. This relation is 
the interaction with Others, or the ‘face-to-face’ encounter, ‘the face speaks to me and 
thereby invites me to a relation’ (Levinas 2001, 198). For Levinas, this encounter with 
the Other emphasises that it is not ‘possible to conceptualise the world without reaching 
out to the Other’ (Levinas 2001, 201). Specifically, this face-to-face encounter involves 
not only being with Others but speaking to the Other and accepting the Other (Frost 2015). 
It is through an interaction with the Other that understanding and acceptance of the Other 
happens, although importantly without the I being reduced to the Other (Levinas 2001). 
Crucially the I exists in relation to the Other but is not encapsulated within it. This is 
particularly important when we think about how remembering the past entails not only 
individuals sharing their experiences with their communities but also accepting 
experiences of Other people, even if they do not approve the action carried out by the 
Other. In short, Levinas’ relationality is interpreted here as the irreducible relationship of 
individuals to Others, to experience the world of Other people and with Other people.   
Secondly, understanding fragments of memories contained within the diverse 
archival material as relational is a way of resisting a dominant singular legal narrative. As 
Levinas states, being in relation to Others does not mean that relationality acts to define 
that belonging, rather relationality is what constitutes existence (Levinas 2001). In the 
context of the archival material, the fragments of experiences, such as testimonies of 
witnesses, photographs and letters, exist in relation to each other but importantly do not 
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tell a collective singular narrative of the past. Each fragment of memory tells a story, 
related to stories of other fragments, but crucially without being reduced to a homogenous 
understanding of the past. In short, relationality is being used here as a way to show that 
the ICTR archive contains fragments of legal memories but that crucially these fragments 
are not constructed into the narrow collective memory the ICTR produces. These 
fragments of memories exist as legal memories as they were produced by the discursive 
practices at the ICTR. However they are not encapsulated within the tightly controlled 
discursive conditions of the ICTR. In summary, relationality is suggested here as a useful 
way to think about transitioning societies’ relationships with legal memory that highlights 
the existence of fragments of the past telling multiple stories. Legal memory in the form 
of fragments of experiences in the archive material, including witness testimonies, exist 
as relational fragments. Each fragment of memory exists in relation to other fragments 
but, unlike the narrow legal memory the ICTR produces, these fragments have not been 
defined within a dominant narrative of the past. 
 
Plural Fragments of Memory 
The following paragraphs will extend the above discussion by outlining Ricoeur’s 
understanding of plural memory and how this, along with relationality, is a useful 
conceptual tool to suggest that witness statements in the archive, along with other 
material, can contribute to the post-genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. According to 
Ricoeur, memory entails both individuals and groups and therefore entails multiple stories 
of past experiences (Ricoeur 2004, 54). Importantly, individual memories communally 
shared with others does not mean that a comprehensive or complete memory of the past 
can be produced. Rather for Ricoeur, and this thesis, memory is a process (see Chapter 1 
and 2). To help illustrate Ricoeur’s philosophical insights on plural memories and how 
they are a useful way to think about fragments of memories of mass rights violations, the 
discussion will also engage with memory studies scholar Michel Rothberg’s concept of 
multidirectional memory. Rothberg uses his concept of multidirectional memories to 
explore how memories of the Holocaust interact with each other and historically 
connected events such as colonialism and slavery (Rothberg 2009). The thesis interprets 
Rothberg’s concept as a tool to illustrate how memories relating to Rwanda’s past interact 
and shape other memories.    
 As has been stated from the beginning of this thesis, memory is understood here 
as something produced in the present and not a thing from the past that is recovered. 
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Memory construction, and the knowledge and identities it produces, only occurs in the 
present. It is a process of construction and production and not one of recovery, which as 
discussed in previous chapters is a common perspective within the legal transitional 
justice scholarship (Combs 2012; Groom 2011; Keydar 2019; Klinkner and Smith 2015; 
Osiel 2000). Here, the resistance to the terms of recovery or freeing of memory is used as 
a frame to avoid an overly simplistic or idealistic characterisation of memory. 
Specifically, memory understood as something recovered or freed misses, or is 
conceptually unable to account for, the dynamics of memory and the crucial role 
institutions and actors have in the construction of memory. 
According to Ricoeur, memory is not a singular thing in which the more we 
remember the more knowledge and understanding about the world is accumulated. 
Rather, memory is a plural and dispersed process that takes place in the present (Ricoeur 
2004, 29). Specifically, memory entails individuals and groups across and between spaces 
and times. Memory production consists of dominant memories, such as those produced 
by the ICTR. However, importantly, a dominant memory is never autonomous and always 
exists in relation to other sites of memory. In short, within spaces of memory production 
there is always dominant memory where knowledge and identity are constructed, as 
Chapters 4-6 have argued in the context of witnesses’ memories at the ICTR. Crucially, 
however, dominant memory of the past is part of a process which can shift and change 
across time and space. These spaces can include legal and political institutions, news 
media, literature, film, documentary and social media (Rothberg 2009). It is because of 
the plural and fluid nature of memory that this chapter proposes witness statements and 
other materials in the ICTR archive are a productive way to think about transitioning 
societies’ relationship with legal memory.  
A key part of Ricoeur’s understanding of the plurality of memory is the absence 
of memory. In the context of remembering past phenomena and events, the absence of 
memories is often seen as a deficiency or limitation of remembering (Olick 1999). As 
Ricoeur states, ‘[m]emory appears to be caught from the outset in the nets of a 
transcendent authority, where the problems of credibility are held to be already resolved’ 
(Ricoeur 2004, 386). However, Ricoeur insists absence is not a weakness of memory. 
Rather, absence is a fundamental part of memory (Ricoeur 2004, 266). It is absences in 
the construction of memory that foregrounds the plural and multi-layered sphere during 
acts of remembering. As Ricoeur argues, memory is not something that can be fulfilled 
by trying to complete gaps in the narrative (Ricoeur 2004, 265). To try to alleviate the 
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memory of absences is an impossible task because what is not there or what is not heard 
is a crucial part of all memory and the stories told (Ricoeur 2004, 237). In short, memory 
is always partial and rather than trying to ‘complete’ or fulfil memory, remembering the 
past will always entail things said and heard and crucially also silences and gaps. In this 
sense, ‘loss [or absence] can reveal itself to be inherent in the work of remembering’ 
(Ricoeur 2004, 391). What is particularly helpful for this chapter in Ricoeur’s 
understanding of absence is that it provides a conceptual lens to think about the plurality 
of post-genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. Particularly, thinking of memory as 
absence, plural, it can be suggested as a way to think of the fragments of memory within 
the statements and testimonies of witnesses along with other material such as 
photographs, videos, letters, and diaries and how these fragments can contribute to 
multiple spaces of memory in Rwanda.  
To help illustrate how Ricoeur’s conceptual understanding of the plurality of 
memory is a useful way to think about memories of mass rights violations within the 
ICTR archive, Rothberg’s concept of multidirectional memory is drawn upon. In the 
context of traumatic memories Rothberg argues that we need to think about how past 
trauma is transmitted across diverse places and times (Rothberg 2008, 29).133 Memories 
of traumatic events are communicated publicly and interact with other memories of the 
same event, as well as historically different but related events (Rothberg 2008, 272).134 
That is to say, memories relating to a given historical event are not contained in an 
impenetrable bubble separated from other historical events. Rather, memories of different 
historical phenomena interact and shape each other. In the Rwandan context we can think 
of memories relating to the genocide against the Tutsi interacting with and shaping 
memories of distinct but related events, such as memories of colonialism. The key point 
Rothberg makes is the way in which memories of shared events interact with each other 
across spaces, such as political and legal institutions, education, news media, literature, 
film, social media and are transmitted between generations. One example of spaces where 
memories of 1994 manifest is in photography and film. Cieplak (2017) has investigated 
how these two forms of art represent memories of the genocide against the Tutsi. He 
shows how memories of the horrors of 1994 depicted in imagery and film provide diverse 
narrative representations of the genocide and how some of these representations 
 
133 See Jay Winter ‘War and Remembrance’ (1999). 




demonstrate the limitations of imagery when confronted with the scale and complexity of 
mass atrocities (Cieplak 2017, 2018).135 These multiple spaces of memory transmission 
entail memories of those who experienced the genocide against the Tutsi as well as 
individuals who have no personal memories of the horrors of 1994, such as those born 
during or after the genocide. The intergeneration transmission of memory and the 
potential for archive material, including witness statements and testimonies, to aid this 
process will be unpacked in the discussion below (Rothberg 2008, 176-177).  
As Rothberg states, understanding traumatic memory as diverse plural 
interactions ‘draws attention to the dynamic transfers which took place between diverse 
places and times during the act of remembrance’ (Rothberg 2008, 29). The way in which 
individuals and communities attempt to come to terms with a traumatic past ‘always 
happens in comparative contexts and via the circulation of memories linked to what are 
only apparently separate histories’ (Rothberg 2008, 272).136 In other words, 
understanding memory as plural, multidirectional, helps to move beyond understanding 
memory of mass atrocities as a ‘zero-sum game’, whereby when a term such as the 
genocide against the Tutsi is used it defines a paradigm for what that term means and 
importantly what legitimate memories fit within it. Thinking of memory as plural helps 
to disaggregate understandings of past phenomenon of mass atrocities as ‘one thing’ 
(Rothberg 2009, 4). The plurality of memory helps to cast light on the different 
interactions of memories. Importantly, where there are tensions between memories this 
does not in fact restrict memories. Rather, tensions can produce more memory because 
they can foreground things that have been marginalised or under represented areas of 
debate (Rothberg 2009, 11). To help show how fragments of memories in the ICTR 
archive could contribute to the plural memory ecology in Rwanda, an illustrated example 





135 For further examples see Gilbert (2018); Hitchcock (2017) 
136 Rothberg’s framing of memory as a dynamic and multidirectional process relates to Landsberg’s idea 
of prosthetic memory, a memory space between the individual and collective. In this sense Landsberg’s 
thinking on memory also shares some similarities with Ricoeur’s. For Landsberg, prosthetic memories are 
neither exclusively individual nor completely collective but appear at the intersection of individual and 
collective experiences. ‘They are privately felt public memories that develop after an encounter with a 
mass cultural representation of the past, when new images and ideas come into contact with a person’s 
own archive of experience’ (Landsberg 2004, 19). Also see Hirst and Stone (2015). 
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Intergenerational Transmission of Legal Memories: Words and Images 
There is a generation of Rwandans born during or after the genocide against the Tutsi 
who thus have no personal memories of the events of 1994. This generation relies on the 
memories and stories of other people, such as family members and history told through 
the school curriculum (Benda 2019, 192). It is suggested here that archival material, such 
as witness statements and photographs, could be a productive way to stimulate 
intergenerational transmission of memories that engages with the diverse memory 
ecology in Rwanda. The intergenerational transmission of memories of past trauma is a 
two-way process (Pells 2018). Individuals who experienced the events of 1994 draw upon 
their personal memories as well as memories of other people’s experiences of the 
genocide against the Tutsi. Individuals who were born during/after the genocide bring to 
the transmission fragments of stories they have heard through encounters with other 
people. It is this two-way process during the intergeneration transmission of memories 
where witness statements/testimonies and photographs could have a useful role.  
For example, witness statements, summaries of witness statements and transcripts 
of witness testimonies could potentially be a useful starting point for conversations 
between parents and their children. Particularly so considering that some parents find it 
very difficult to discuss their personal experience of the genocide against the Tutsi as it 
can bring back very traumatic experiences (Pells 2018). Witness statements and 
transcripts of testimonies could potentially facilitate conversations as parents would not 
need to draw directly on their experience. In short, the words and memories in the 
statements and transcripts of testimonies could allow parents to share with their children 
memories of past trauma. Their children could also read the statements and testimonies 
before having a conversation with their parents as this would allow them time to consider 
how these memories of witnesses relate to other memories in the Rwandan memory 
ecology. Here, it is important to note that suggesting witness statements and testimonies 
could contribute to intergenerational transmissions of memories, the memories in the 
witness statements are not part of the singular and narrow collective memory the ICTR 
produces through court proceedings. Rather, they are part of the fragments of legal 
memories. The potential for witness statements and testimonies to contribute to the 
transmission of memories between generations includes children of genocide survivors 
as well as children of those who perpetrated the genocide (Benda 2019, 194-195). 
Children of genocide perpetrators can often live with both internal and social stigma 
because of the past actions of their parent(s) (Benda 2019; Pells 2018). Witness 
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statements could facilitate important conversations between perpetrators and their 
children, which could potentially allow them to better understand the circumstances and 
decisions around their parents’ participation and help them to move beyond the stigma. 
Photographs from the ICTR archive can potentially provide a further way for 
intergenerational transmission of memories to engage with the Rwandan memory 
ecology. The ICTR archives contain hundreds of photographs including family photos, 
photos taken by journalists during the genocide against the Tutsi and photographs taken 
by ICTR investigators. Many of the photographs are of places that the post-genocide 
generation would likely know and may also be part of their everyday reality: shops, 
football stadiums and churches. For example, photographs taken after the genocide by 
ICTR investigators of places where genocidal violence occurred, such as high streets and 
football stadiums, could be a way of facilitating a dialogue between generations.137 
Particularly, some of these images will be part of the post-genocide generation’s everyday 
lived reality, physical spaces that they know and interact with on a regular basis. Having 
familiarity with the places in these photographs means it is likely that individuals born 
after the genocide will have a collection of stories, or fragments of memories, associated 
with these places. These images could be used as a starting point to facilitate a 
conversation between those who experienced the horrors of 1994 and those with no 
personal memories. Particularly, as both individuals will have stories of these places it 
would allow for multiple meanings to be discussed. Photographs are not a site where 
meaning is given, rather spaces where meanings are sought and negotiated (Fairly and 
Orton 2019). In the Rwandan context, photographs from the ICTR archive offer an 
opportunity for meanings of Rwanda’s past to be sought and negotiated between 
generations. Photographs can stimulate dialogue about human experiences because 
imagery is explicitly orientated towards embracing complexity and the plurality of lived 
experiences (Azoulay 2012). Photographs carry with them the potential for perspectives 
to be explored, reinforced, challenged and altered, and is the beginning of a conversation 
(Fairly and Orton 2019, 299). Photographs as a tool for dialogue are ‘enmeshed in webs 
of power, resistance and agency through which we assert and explore a sense of self and 
relation to others’ (Fairey and Orton 2019, 299). Dialogue through photographs is a 
process of being with, and, being open to others, experiencing the world of and with other 
people (Fairly and Orton 2019, 301). ICTR archival photographs as a dialogue to engage 
 
137 For an example of the importance of photographs in how some Rwandans come to terms with and 
manage their past trauma see Cieplank’s documentary ‘The Faces We Lost’ (2017).  
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with other people and their experiences speak directly to Levinas’s idea of the Other and 
Ricoeur’s Plurality of memory.  
Proposing here that archival material, such as witness statements and photographs, 
could aid intergenerational transmission of memory is positioned as working alongside 
existing endeavours in Rwanda that aim to foster a dialogue about Rwanda’s past and 
future. For example, the Aegis Trust has produced a ‘Youth’ programme, including 
workshops and educational literature, which aims to teach the post genocide generation 
about the horrors of 1994, and lessons of compassion and tolerance. Incorporating 
difference is a purported part of the programme where children of genocide perpetrators 
and survivors and victims are encouraged into a dialogue. This dialogue is intended to 
allow this generation to understand different perspectives of the genocide and to help to 
reduce stigma for individuals whose family members participated in the genocide against 
the Tutsi. While programmes such as the Aegis Trust ‘Youth’ initiative aim to foster a 
dialogue about Rwanda’s past, the metanarrative the programme tells is a story that aligns 
with the Rwandan government’s depiction of the country’s history. Since coming to 
power in the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) have produced 
a narrative of the history depicting Rwanda’s traumatic past. Simplistically put, this 
narrative tells a story of how the RPF brought an end to years of repression and ethnic 
hatred (Gahima 2013). Since bringing an end to the genocide against the Tutsi the RPF 
have created an inclusive society void of ethnic division where individuals are defined by 
their identity as Rwandans, and not by ethnic groups. Through a long process of justice, 
forgiveness and healing, Rwandan society has been able to grow and prosper (Gahima 
2013). This narrative is tightly controlled by the government and the RPF is very sensitive 
to any attempts to deviate from the story it tells. It is the view of this thesis that the RPF 
narrative of the genocide against the Tutsi and a single Rwandan identity has helped to 
reduce violence in the country and has allowed for a degree of stability (Chemouni 2017; 
Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2019; Clark 2014; Doughty 2015).138  
 
138 Chemouni has argued that much of the scholarship on the Rwandan government’s decentralisation 
process has been overly critical in defining it as a destabilising and a negative process. Chemouni, states 
that actually decentralisation has allowed for popular participation which has had a stabilising effect. 
Notwithstanding this, to ensure long-term stability there is a need for the government to introduce 




However, the RPF narrative does not allow for the many different ‘threads’ of 
Rwandans’ past to be widely discussed and debated publicly.139 For example these 
‘threads’ include: some Hutus took no part in the violence and perceived themselves as 
survivors. However the term survivor is often prioritised for Tutsi, this can have 
implications in regards financial support ‘survivors’ may be entitled to (Burnet 2012, 
158)140; the complex reasons why some people participated in the genocide was for some 
individuals nothing to do with ethnic hatred but settling long-term personal grievances 
(Fujii 2009); those born of rape and/or orphaned during the genocide who live with social 
stigma and without emotional and financial support.141 A further ‘thread’ of Rwanda’s 
past is the role the RPF played in crimes committed during and in the aftermath of the 
genocide against the Tutsi. It is commonly accepted within the scholarship that the RPF 
did commit acts of criminal violence during and in the aftermath of the genocide, 
however, scholars are divided on the extent and scale RPF violence was planned and 
carried out.142 No members associated with the RPF were indicted at the ICTR, even 
though such alleged crimes did fall within its mandate.143 The RPF have acknowledged 
that a ‘few’ individuals, ‘some bad fruit’, committed criminal acts of violence during the 
genocide against the Tutsi (Jones 2009). These individuals have been prosecuted at 
‘closed doors’ Rwandan military courts (Ndahinda 2016, 167). According to former 
ICTR prosecutor Jallow, the Rwandan government had shown him details of up to 24 
senior military officers who had been prosecuted by the Rwandan military courts in 
 
139 There is a claim made by some Western scholars, De Lamb (2005) Combs (2010), that Rwandans have 
a culture of secrecy and silence and don’t talk, or don’t want to talk about the country’s past. While an 
element of Rwandan reservedness may exist, however, claiming there is a widespread culture where 
Rwandans do not share and debate political and social issues is an overreach (Clark 2010, 213-214; Clark 
2014; Sundberg 2014). 
140 The Rwandan government led Genocide Survivors Assistance Fund (FARG) provides the most 
‘needy’ survivors with financial supports and school scholarships. To be eligible for this financial aid 
individuals must be officially recognised by FARG administration which requires two supporting 
signatories from local survivor organisations. Burnet has argued that while in principle Tutsi and Hutu 
survivors should have equal access to support that in reality the scheme unevenly favours Tutsi survivors 
(Burnet 2012, 155-156) 
141 Denov and Kahn suggest that young Rwandans born of rape during the genocide against the Tutsi 
entail a complex notion of victimhood. They argue that individuals born of rape are victims, but currently 
in Rwanda they are not understood as such and this has resulted in exclusion and embedded social stigma 
(Denov and Kahn 2019).  
142 For examples of debates on RPF Violence during and in the aftermath of the genocide against the Tutis 
see Longman 2017; Jones 2009; Clark 2010; Burnet 2009; Doughty 2015.  
143 ICTR Defence Lawyer Charles Taku has stated that one of the shortcomings of the tribunal was not to 
prosecute crimes committed by the RPF. In interview with Friedman and Slye, Taku states: 
in spite of the fact Prosecutor himself has said so many times that, “We’re investigating the 
RPF, they will be indicted.” The fact that the Prosecutor is unable to do this, presumably due to 
other influences, and he can hide behind prosecutorial independence, I think it’s an abuse of the 
notion of independence (Friedman and Slye 2008). 
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relation to allegations against the RPF (Jallow 2009).144 One implication of this in terms 
of Rwandan memory ecology is that individuals who have traumatic memories of RPF 
violence or who lost loved ones at the hands of the RPF do not have a space to externalise 
their memories within the dominant RPF narrative of Rwanda’s past. The main point to 
highlight here is that while initiatives such as the Aegis Trust ‘Youth’ Programme do 
facilitate an important dialogue about memories of Rwanda’s traumatic past for 
individuals who have no personal memories of 1994, however this dialogue is unable to 
engage with many of the ‘threads’ of Rwanda’s past. It is suggested here that fragments 
of memories within archival material, such as witness statements and photographs, could 
facilitate a dialogue for plural meanings and experiences of Rwanda’s past to be 
discussed. Crucially, fragments of memories in the form of archival material are not 
telling a collective singular story, but instead allowing for plural memories and 
experiences of others to be worked through and negotiated.    
Here suggesting the potential of archival material to aid the post genocide memory 
ecology aims to embrace the relational experience of other people (Levinas 2001). In 
short, acknowledging the plurality of memory and working through experiences of the 
past with others. The dominant RPF narrative is indeed a significant part of the memory 
ecology in Rwanda. To be sure, it is not the purpose of fragments of memories in the 
ICTR archival material to dismiss or make redundant the dominant RPF narrative. This 
narrative is for a number of Rwandans an account of the past that they genuinely subscribe 
to beyond any state coercion (Sundberg 2014). Rather, the Rwandan memory ecology is 
more complex and dispersed than just the dominant RPF narrative and ICTR archival 
material has the potential to facilitate a dialogue about the different ‘threads’ of Rwanda’s 
past. 
This section has proposed that if we reframe legal memory in terms of ICTR 
archival material this could potentially be a productive way legal witnesses could 
contribute to the post-genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. Specifically, a conceptual 
lens using relationality (Levinas) and plural memory (Ricoeur) has been suggested as a 
useful way to think about fragments of memories contained in the archive material, and 
how this could contribute to the memory ecology in Rwanda. Fragments of memories in 
the archive could contribute to plural meanings relating to the events of 1994 as well as 
distinct but related events in Rwanda’s past (Ricoeur 2004). Using illustrated examples 
 
144 See Jallows statement to the UN Security council (2009) - https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6134 
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of witness statements and photographs from the ICTR archive it was suggested that these 
materials could aid the intergeneration transmission of memories. Materials housed in the 
ICTR archive, such as photographs, contain plural meanings and could facilitate 
dialogues about Rwandans’ shared past experiences. Conceptualising the ICTR archive 
as relational and plural acknowledges and is orientated towards the many ‘threads’ of 
Rwanda’s past. Archival material, fragments of memory, is suggested that can aid the 
plurality of the post genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. 
Having offered a conceptualisation of the ICTR legal archive and suggested how 
archival material can potentially contribute to the post genocide memory ecology in 
Rwanda, it is now necessary to explore the empirical potential and challenges of working 
with the ICTR archive. 
 
Legal Memory: The Empirical Potential and Challenges of the ICTR Archive 
This concluding section will explore how the ICTR archival material could potentially 
contribute to the post genocide memory ecology in Rwanda using the lens of relationality 
and plural memories. The ICTR archive consists of the publicly accessible online archive 
and the archive facility in Arusha, Tanzania. The archive contains material relating to all 
of the 93 cases at the ICTR. Firstly, having a diverse amount of material which is publicly 
accessible presents a very rich source of information (Ketelaar 2012; Wilson 2011). This 
rich material includes witness testimony, photographs before, during, and after the 
genocide against the Tutsi, videos, maps, sketches and drawings, letters and extracts of 
diaries of accused. In principle, anyone with access to the internet can search for and 
obtain material from the online archive. Having an online publicly accessible platform 
means that the fragments of memories, as discussed above, are available without having 
to gain permission.  
There are of course caveats to ‘publicly accessible material’, which are worth 
expanding upon here. The physical archive being located not in Rwanda but in Tanzania 
means the reality for most Rwandans is that the physical archive while in name is publicly 
accessible it is not accessible to them in practice. The physical archive contains more 
material than the online archive because the digitisation process is ongoing. Furthermore, 
the decision by the ICTR, now International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(IRMCT), to permanently locate the physical archive outside of Rwanda reflects long-
term tensions between the ICTR and the Rwandan government, particularly around the 
question of ownership of the archive (Redwood 2017). It is a fact that the material 
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contained in the ICTR archive belongs to the United Nations (Campbell 2013). However, 
while the ICTR may have legal ownership of the archive material, these materials are the 
experiences of Rwandans. In one sense this raises a question around ownership of 
memories or ownership of fragments of experiences. Particularly, if the ICTR physical 
archive contains fragments of experiences of individual memories, as suggested in 
Section 1, then to what extent can or should it be owned? If we understand fragments as 
being owned it is likely that this would have implications for these fragments of memory 
to contribute to the plurality of memory in the Rwandan memory ecology. One argument, 
which is that of the IRMCT, for the ownership of fragments of experiences is that it is a 
necessity to ensure the long-term safety and preservation of the archive material (ICTR 
2015). Primarily, the concern of the ICTR is that if the archive material was given to the 
Rwandan government, they may restrict access to it and possibly destroy material they 
deem to be sensitive.145 From the ICTR’s perspective it could be suggested that ownership 
of fragments of memories is justifiable on the grounds that they would otherwise be at 
risk. One thing here, if ICTR ownership of fragments of memory is necessary in order to 
ensure the safeguarding of the material, then ownership justified as means to protect 
memory comes at the cost of restricting the relationality of fragments of memory and their 
potential to aid the Rwandan memory ecology. It is the view of this thesis that the archival 
material should be as accessible as possible, and decisions around the necessity for 
ownership should include Rwandans in that discussion, which currently is not happening. 
There is then a need to think about what alternative options of ownership of fragments of 
memory are possible that would facilitate Rwandans having maximum accessibility to 
these legal memories. 
One alternative option is that the entire archive to be moved to Rwanda under the 
ownership of the Rwandan government. However, considering that the United Nations 
have built a new archive facility (2017) in Arusha, Tanzania it is currently very unlikely 
this will happen. As part of the research for this doctoral thesis I had planned to visit the 
archive facility in Arusha, however, during the planning of this visit I was informed by 
an ICTR (IRMCT) archivist that in fact the archive was empty and had been so since the 
facility ‘opened’. This was in Autumn 2017 and at that stage I was told that it would be 
 
145 Former ICTR (and ICTY) Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte previously opened an investigation into 
alleged crimes committed by RPF although the ICTR never issued any indictments against individuals 
associated with the RPF. Even though no indictments were issued it is possible the material obtained 




at least another 10 months if not more until the archive material would be transferred from 
its temporary storage unit to the archive. I was told the reason for this delay was that 
during the building of the facility the specific environment requirements for an archive 
storage space had not been followed and as such it was not safe for the material to be 
moved there. While it is necessary for materials to be stored in an appropriate 
environment, there was no public communication about the facility being empty. Indeed, 
the limited information available on the IRMCT website stated that the facility was open 
and welcoming visitors. 
The potential for the archival material, or at least some of the material, to be 
located in Rwanda may be possible in the future, which has been made more likely with 
recent thawing in relations between the residual mechanism and the Rwandan 
government. This could take the form of copies of all the material being made and given 
to the Rwandan state to create a ‘near’ original physical archive. In one sense, this would 
alleviate some of the ICTR’s concern around ensuring the safeguarding of material as 
they would still have the originals. It also allows for, in principle at least, the greater 
accessibility for Rwandans as materials would be physically in Rwanda. Although, there 
are questions that arise from Rwandan state ownership of the archive that draws the 
question of whether this option would actually make fragments of memory more 
accessible for Rwandans. For example, decisions would need to be made regarding 
whether all of the material in the physical archive in Arusha, including restricted and 
classified material, would be copied. Additionally, the practicalities of copying the 
archive material in terms of staff hours and cost may make the ICTR less keen to engage 
with this possibility. Relatedly, it can be suggested here that some concerns the ICTR 
may have around staff hours and costs could have been alleviated if there was earlier 
long-term planning. Specifically, the records and management section allocated 
significant resources to the digitising of audio-visual material of court proceedings. While 
the accessibility of these archival materials is important, based on discussions with a 
former ICTR archivist, this project almost entirely consumed the ICTR’s resources. In 
short, the sections decision to focus significant amounts of staff hours and costs on the 
audio-visual project potentially came at the detriment of copying and digitisation of other 
material that may have been more relevant to Rwandans. Furthermore, the idea of the 
Rwandan government having ownership of fragments of memories, archival material, is 
not unproblematic. Considering that the Rwandan government has produced a dominant 
memory of the horrors of 1994 it is very likely that it will not only use archival material 
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to contribute to that memory, but also restrict or suppress material that may challenge or 
may not fit within the narrative of the past they want to tell (Williams 2018). In other 
words, while ownership of fragments of memory by the Rwandan government would 
mean Rwandans are geographically closer to archival material there is potential concern 
that in practice Rwandans would have quite limited access. Another possible option for 
ownership of fragments of memory could be a consortium of archival organisations that 
have custody of the material. Such a consortium could manage the archive within Rwanda 
and work with the Rwandan authorities and other agencies. However, a consortium of 
external organisations and actors would entail significant long-term planning and 
financial investment and thus might not be suitable for the Rwandan context. 
In summary, fragments of institutionally (ICTR) produced memories are 
perpetually entangled in claims of ownership, and trying to envision fragments of legal 
memories without some kind of ownership at the least is highly problematic. If it is the 
case that ownership of legal fragments of memory is unavoidable it is necessary, then, to 
consider whether the digital archive has more possibility of relationality than the physical 
archive. 
The ICTR online archive consists of a newly (2018) reconfigured detailed search 
interface that allows users to search from numerous documents in a single ICTR case or 
across multiple cases. Based upon more than three years of personal experience with 
engaging with the online ICTR archive, this newest reconfiguration of the online search 
platform is a significant improvement regarding being more user-friendly and 
accessible.146 However, in the context of the online (digital) archive being a space of 
fragments of memories there are specific challenges in regard to the potential for this 
archival material to contribute to the Rwandan memory ecology (Ketelaar 2016). Firstly, 
as access to the online archive requires good internet connection this could raise 
accessibility issues for people in Rwanda. Notwithstanding the improvements to 
technology infrastructure in Rwanda, reliable internet connection is not guaranteed (ITU 
News 2018).147 Considering that many of the digitised archive materials are large files, 
 
146 For a discussion on how new technologies presents opportunities and challenges for archives and 
archivists see Ketelaar 2016. 
147 In their 2018 report FreedomontheNet stated that: 
Access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Rwanda has improved notably in recent 
years. Nonetheless, poverty continues to be the primary impediment to ICT uptake, especially the 
internet, with the majority of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture. Internet access is 




the possibility to download this material may be highly problematic. That said, the new 
platform does include a document preview option to allow you to view the material 
without the need to download. 
One of the challenges for the online archive material to contribute to the memory 
ecology in Rwanda is the particularity of the ICTR archive catalogue. The ICTR archive, 
unlike many archives, uses the online search platform as an alternative to a traditional 
reference catalogue. A traditional archive catalogue is a document that lists all material 
in a given archive, including material that is restricted (Foote 1990). In short, an itinerary 
of both physical and digital material in the archive. This is important as a fully transparent 
record of all the material not only allows users to know what material the archive contains 
but is also crucial to the credibility of the archive. One implication of this is the near 
impossibility to know to what extent the online ‘catalogue’ represents all of the material 
in the archive. For example, based on experience of using the online archive, there was 
material listed on the old search platform, which is no longer listed on the new search 
platform. In short, there is material, unrestricted, that exists in the ICTR archive that is 
not listed in the ‘catalogue’. Despite numerous requests I have made to the IRMCT for 
them to explain their decision to remove unrestricted documents from the catalogue or 
the opportunity to speak to somebody, these requests have remained unanswered. Partial 
and fragmented nature of the catalogue matters in relation to ownership of fragments in 
memory and how they could contribute to the memory ecology in Rwanda. Particularly, 
there is material, unrestricted material, which could be relevant to Rwandans that in 
essence nobody knows exists. This suggests that there is a need for more transparency 
and openness from the IRMCT. Part of the explanation for the reluctance of the archive 
to be more open currently relates to the archive being an afterthought, or add-on, to the 
tribunal. For example, a few years ago ICTR introduced a facility for the online archive 
whereby users could request documents which were unrestricted but would not be able to 
download the documents instantly. Based upon informal conversations I had with former 
ICTR archivists, the whole process of implementing the document request service was 
rushed and ill thought through. The archivist team thought it would be a useful feature 
for users to be able to request documents, however, they had not anticipated the huge 
volumes of requests and the practicalities in terms of resources and staff to respond to 
these requests. From the beginning of the feature being introduced they were unable to 
respond and properly maintain the service. Based on my own experience of using the 
request service this seems to be true. I have requested hundreds of documents, many of 
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which the wait is more than 18 months. Additionally when documents are requested users 
are told that they will be informed when documents are available. However this has not 
been my experience and many of the requests I have made went unfilled and it was not 
until to my own search for the documents a year later I discovered the documents were 
then available. Relatedly, the archive inherited problems from the judicial process at the 
ICTR, poor record management that further impedes accessing documents to be 
requested. During the first few years of the ICTR, the record management practices were 
very questionable (Nathan and Mckay 2008). Many documents submitted via the registry 
were incorrectly labelled as restricted, confidential or non-restricted (Nathan and Mckay 
2008).148 The archive has responded to this mislabelling of documents by creating the 
process of legal review. This process entails all documents that are unclear whether they 
are restricted or classified to be firstly reviewed by legal staff before they can be released 
to users. This is one of the reasons for the very long processing time for documents which 
have been requested. In other words, there are some issues of the archive’s own making, 
such as a complex and confusing catalogue system and ill thought through functions such 
as the document request service, and other issues that the archive has inherited from the 
legal process such as poor document management. All of these practical issues have 
implications for the relationality of legal archive material and their potential to contribute 
the post genocide memory ecology in Rwandan.  
 Notwithstanding the practical challenges discussed above, of using the archival 
material, it is argued here that their potential to contribute towards plural discussion of 
Rwanda’s past is significant. That said, it is necessary to acknowledge that proposing the 
usefulness of plural memory in Rwanda is not unproblematic. For example, genocide 
denial and revisionism are a continuing issue in Rwanda, and other post-genocide 
societies (Attallah 2019; Becirevic 2010; Eramian 2009; Lemarchand 2011). It is possible 
that those denying the Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi could use the fragments of 
memories in the archival material to advance their own distorted narrative. Denial and 
revisionism of the genocide against the Tutsi by those involved in the genocide or its 
 
148 In interview with McKay and Nathan, former Chief of Information and Evidence Ayodeji Fadugba 
discusses the poor practices of securing and managing ICTR documents in the early years of the tribunal. 
In the early days: 
there was no vault and documents came from the field, they were registered, there was one of 
the rooms in the Hotel Amahoro, … So what you would do really, you know, there was a 
bathtub in there that was cleaned and so that you could put packages there for documents you 
know, because it was the only secure place you could find. So I would say if you have to do this 




supporters continues to be a significant challenge even 25 years after the events, denial is 
the final stage of genocide (Melvern 2020, 2). However, proposing here the benefits of 
archival material is not to suggest that all uses of memories, such as those denying 
genocide, should be allowed. As Rothberg argues, the multidirectional nature of memory 
inevitably means that some memories will be misused by some individuals: the plurality 
of memory is not always something positive (Rothberg 2009). This thesis’s 
poststructuralist frame of memory construction does not argue that all memory should be 
permitted or plural memory is unproblematic. In short, suggesting the benefits of plural 
memories requires vigilance to the intentional distortion of the past. One significant 
advantage of this thesis’s poststructuralist frame of memory is that it embraces the 
complexities and pluralities of human experiences. All experiences are plural, in that how 
people who were at the same event and saw the same thing can experience it in multiple 
ways from the more micro everyday events to the massive life changing events, such as 
genocide. However, there is also a difference between plural experiences of the same 
event and intentional distortions and manipulated uses of plural experiences, which are 
very far detached from the genuine experiences. When memory is misused it should be 
challenged with factual counter point (Rothberg 2009; Attallah 2019). There is always 
going to be a tension between plural experiences and intentional manipulation of the past. 
Research, such as this thesis, which investigates issues and themes of dealing with the 
past needs to be constantly aware of the intentional distortion of the past, and this is 
something that has to be navigated. Although this should not restrict the potential of plural 
discussion of the past. The plurality of memory can be very useful in aiding dialogue 
about multiple perspectives of the past, and in doing so it is also vulnerable to abhorrent 
appropriations of the past (Rothberg 2009). In short, the fragments of memories in the 
archival material have great potential to be a very useful way to explore the complexities 
and nuances of Rwanda’s past, and aid conversations about its present and future. At the 
same time not all uses of the plurality of memory are justified and in such cases should 
be challenged.  
This section has discussed the empirical potential and challenges of working with 
the ICTR archive to contribute to the memory ecology in Rwanda. The question around 
ownership of the archive was explored and whether the online archive was more suitable 
to contribute to the plurality of memory in Rwanda. Despite a number of empirical 
challenges, it was suggested that the relational fragments of memory in the archive has 





This chapter has extended the arguments made in chapters 4-6 by exploring a potential 
way legal witnesses could contribute to the post genocide memory ecology in Rwanda. 
Specifically, it was proposed that if we re-orientate our understanding of legal memory 
away from legal proceedings and instead focus on the fragments of memories within the 
ICTR archive material, this could offer transitioning societies an alternative way to  
engage with legal memory, that embraces the plural and multidirectional nature of 
remembering atrocities. This exploration began by conceptualising the relationality of 
fragments of memory in the archive and how Rwandans have relational existence to 
experience of the parts. The conceptual frame engaged with Levinas’s concept of 
‘relationality’ and Paul Ricoeur’s insights the plurality of memory. This conceptual lens 
was then used to explore how fragments of memories within the archive could contribute 
towards the intergenerational transmission of memory. The discussion offered two 
illustrated examples, witness statements/transcripts and photographs, as a way to facilitate 
a plural dialogue between those who had experienced the genocide against the Tutsi and 
those who have no personal memories of the events of 1994. It was argued that 
conceptualising the fragments of memory within the legal archive material and using the 
illustrative examples indicated the potential for ICTR archives to contribute to the 
memory ecology in Rwanda. The latter part of the chapter considered the empirical 
potential and challenges of the ICTR archive. Ownership of the physical archive in 
Arusha was discussed, particularly in regards access issues and the impact of this on the 
relationality of experiences within the material. The online archive was discussed as a 
possible alternative that may better aid the sharing of relational experiences of the past. 
Although the online archive consists of a number of its own challenges, including 
transparency issues and poor document management practices the archive has inherited 
from the legal processes. Notwithstanding the challenges and ongoing issues with both 
the physical and online archive, it was proposed the archive material has significant 
potential to facilitate discussions about Rwanda’s traumatic past and also aid 






This conclusion chapter will outline the findings of this thesis including the contributions 
of theory, methodology, use of data and recommendations that have come from this PhD 
project. Notwithstanding the contributions discussed in this chapter, there are limitations 
to this PhD research. The following paragraphs will therefore discuss the implications of 
the findings, the parameters of the project, and give suggestions for future directions of 
research.     
This conceptually led thesis aimed to answer the question: ‘How do legal 
witnesses of mass human rights violations contribute to memory production in 
transitioning post conflict societies?’ To answer this question the research proposed an 
original conceptual framework, (Agamben and Ricoeur) as a lens to explore how the 
ICTR constructed the witness subject and memories. This theoretical lens was used 
alongside analysis of empirical data, legal documents from the ICTR online archive and 
interview transcripts of ICTR staff from the UoW online archive using a Foucauldian 
framework for discourse analysis.  
As stated from the start of this thesis, the findings outlined here are not a 
normative prescription of how processes of legal witnessing should be in order to improve 
the way international criminal courts and tribunals contribute to understandings of past 
atrocities. Nor are the conceptually framed arguments meant to offer a standardised 
framework that provides a ‘better’ approach to understanding legal witnesses and 
memory at international criminal tribunals and courts. Rather, these conceptually framed 
findings do offer one alternative understanding of the ways in which the ICTR constructs 
witness identities and memory. In doing so, the findings contribute to extending the legal 
scholarship’s understanding of legal witnessing at international criminal tribunal and 
courts. 
 
To enable the project’s research question to be answered - ‘How do witnesses of human 
rights violations contribute to memory production in transitional post-conflict societies?’ 
- the project asked the following subsidiary research questions: 
 
(i) How is the subject position of ‘witness’ discursively created? (The way social 
power relations produce identities and specific historically located meaning).  
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(ii) In cases of mass human rights violations, how does the construction of 
memory at the ICTR frame the manner in which violence is remembered?  
(iii) Does positioning memory within the discursive construction of witness mean 
memory becomes fixed and rigid? 
 
The thesis advances answers to these questions specifically in the context of the ICTR, 
which are discussed below. 
Key Findings and Significance of Findings 
Conceptualising the ways witnesses remember mass atrocities 
 Constructing an original conceptual framework using the concepts of ‘witness’ 
(Agamben) and ‘memory’ (Ricoeur) and applying it to the context of the ICTR results in 
important findings. Specifically, this conceptual framework made visible several 
important aspects of international criminal tribunals (ICTR) relating to the ways 
witnesses remember, which have been missed by traditional legal frameworks 
researching legal witnessing. Firstly, the witness who speaks in court is speaking on 
behalf, or in proxy, for the true witness. This shows that the knowledge of the past 
witnesses speak about is always partial. Related to this, what witnesses are is not self-
evident, and a term like witness does not encapsulate the entire group. A particular value 
of this finding is that it redirects focus away from assuming what witnesses are is self-
evident and instead focuses on how individuals become a witness. Secondly, witness 
memories are something constructed through a process of inclusion and exclusion by 
institutions, such as the ICTR and its actors. Furthermore, memory production is a 
dispersed process entailing numerous layers and levels, and entails people sharing past 
experiences with each other.  
These findings are important for extending our understanding of legal memory 
because they show the need to think about memory as a process of construction and 
perpetually containing gaps and silence. These findings show the importance that 
conceptual insights can have in extending our understanding of transitional justice 
processes. Particularly, conceptually led research into legal phenomenon, such as this 
thesis, offers an alternative to the inward facing and self-preserving logic of legal 
responses to transitional justice.  
 
The Discursive Creation of the Witness Subject 
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A major finding is that the processes before witnesses testify in court play a very 
important role in restricting who can be a witness and what memories they can talk about 
at the ICTR. The evidence presented in this thesis has shown that ICTR ‘foundational 
documents’, indictments, pre-trial briefs, motions and motion decisions are a crucial part 
of the discursive creation of the witness subject. Using Foucault’s idea of discursive 
statements, Chapter 4 showed that the ICTR statute, United Nations resolution 955, and 
RPE are more than legislative documents bringing the tribunal into existence: they 
discursively restrict who can be a witness subject. As argued in the first section of Chapter 
4, two important statements in the ICTR statute that ‘filter’ who can occupy the subject 
position of witness are crimes within ICTR jurisdiction and the tribunal mandated to 
prosecute only those most responsible. The analysis of the data also showed that 
complexities of investigations including lack of professional investigators, the approach 
to investigations, and lack of local knowledge and expertise were further discursive 
conditions restricting who could be a witness subject. For example, many of the archived 
interview transcripts with investigators and prosecutors show discursively the important 
role of gathering only relevant witness evidence has in the filtering process of who can 
and who cannot be a witness. Related to this, evidence was presented of the role of 
prosecutors following a narrative of collective guilt in restricting which witnesses were 
included in indictments. Through analysis of numerous indictment and interview 
transcripts it was shown that procedural irregularities, such as indictments lacking 
evidence including witness evidence, acted as a restriction on who could potentially bear 
witness in court.  
The findings also showed that ‘witness’ and ‘victim’ are two separate identity 
constructions entailing nuanced distinctions and therefore should be understood as such. 
Secondly, the discursive restrictions of the legal processes suggest that the claim agency 
made by advocates of the right to truth was misguided as many victims will likely feel let 
down. An analysis of motion and motion decisions, particularly in Chapter 6, shows that 
these legal processes are important sites in further ‘filtering’ out who could be a witness, 
as well as what memory they could speak about.  
Memories of violence and discursivity 
The memories of violence the ICTR needs in order to reach legal determination offer a 
narrow and very partial story of the genocidal violence in Rwanda. In particular, it was 
shown that the crimes within the ICTR jurisdiction such as the legal codification of the 
crime of genocide was an important part of discursively restricting what memory of 
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violence the ICTR needed to hear. This argument was developed throughout Chapter 5 
and the first section of Chapter 6. This argument was informed by the work of Fujii (2009) 
showing the complexities and ‘fluidity’ of genocidal violence in Rwanda. From this 
starting point, evidence from indictment and pre-trial briefs, as well as the ‘foundational 
documents’ such as the crime of genocide stated in the statute, were used. Through the 
discourse analysis it was shown that summary of witness statements were included in 
indictments and pre-trial briefs because they related explicitly to legally proving the crime 
of genocide. Memories relating to the wider complexities and fluidity of genocidal 
violence were not commonly included as evidence. Furthermore, summaries of witness 
statements in pre-trial briefs were compared to what witnesses testified to in court. This 
comparison was made in order to show that memories witnesses could talk about in court 
were directly shaped by the summary of their statements in the brief. 
 Discursive statements, such as in the ‘interests of justice’, was another discursive 
layer that restricted what memories of violence the ICTR needed. For example, as argued 
in Chapter 6, legal counsels frequently used the ‘interests of justice’ to shape and edit 
what memories of violence would be admissible in court. Moreover, the legal narrative 
prosecutors needed in order to prove the crime of rape had been committed was also a 
discursively restrictive process of what memories of violence could be heard at the ICTR. 
This is not to minimise the importance of the Akayesu verdict on rape, nor that in this 
particular trial a few witnesses were afforded the opportunity to narrate their story 
(Redwood 2018). However, the crime of rape acted to also restrict what memories of rape 
could be heard. The vast majority of rape victims during the genocide, approximately 
100,000-250,000, did not testify at the ICTR. Moreover it is likely that some individuals 
did not want to speak at the ICTR because of the lack of professional conduct in the 
manner in which investigators engaged with them. Also, memories of male victims of 
rape and sexual violence was something silenced at the ICTR. In other words, the thesis 
applied the original conceptual lens to ICTR and analysis of the archival material, which 
shows that memories of violence required by the legal process are very narrow, and 
therefore are not able to account for the complexities of individuals’ experiences of mass 
human rights violation. Even though the Akayesu case allowed a few individuals to testify 
about their experience of rape and the testimonies contributed to the successful 
prosecution of this crime. The memories of violence relating to rape at the ICTR was 
small percentage of those who experienced this crime. 
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The thesis has argued that the processes of memory construction before witnesses 
testified in court are an important part of the restrictions on who can be a witness and 
what memories they can speak about. Positioning the process of legal memory 
construction at the ICTR within the discursive field has shown that witness memories do 
become rigid precisely because of the singular and narrow legal narrative law requires in 
order to reach a legal determination. Within the discursive space of the ICTR witness 
memories are not something to be negotiated and worked through, rather very specific 
and tiny parts of memories were used as objects of knowledge as part of legal counsels’ 
narrative. Using the evidence from the analysis shows that memory becomes rigid and 
fixed within the discursive field. This leads to a critique and challenge to Osiel’s claim 
that atrocities trials can facilitate collective memory. This critique was important 
considering that Osiel’s understanding of collective memory is an influential frame for 
understanding how law can construct collective understandings of the past. 
 The thesis also acknowledged that the tightly controlled discursive conditions of 
a discourse of witnessing have an additional function relating to memory. Specifically, 
through the discursive practices at the ICTR the tribunal also produces plural fragments 
of memory in the form of archived material. The idea that the ICTR archive consists of 
fragments of memory that are not rigid and fixed was explored in Chapter 7. The focus 
of Chapter 7 was to extend the arguments and insights offered in the previous three 
chapters, by exploring the potential of fragments of memory in the archive to contribute 
to the memory ecology in Rwanda. The aim of this exploration was to argue that if we re-
orientate our focus away from legal proceedings and instead zoom in on the material 
within the ICTR archive, then this could potentially be a way that transitional societies 
could positively benefit from legal memory. In particular this focus on the ICTR archive 
was interested in conceptualising the relationality of fragments of memory within the 
different material and Rwandans’ relational experiences of the past. One concept of 
relationality (the Other) that was relevant for the purposes of Chapter 7 was that of 
Levinas. His concept, along with Ricoeur’s thinking on plurality of memory, was used as 
a way to conceptualise the material in the ICTR archive, and how these materials could 
potentially contribute plural conversations about Rwanda’s past, present and future. The 
illustrated example of intergenerational transmission of memory and the potential role of 
plural fragments within the ICTR archive was outlined. In particular, the important role 
witness statements, summary statements, and transcripts of testimonies along with 
photographs could have in aiding dialogue between those who experienced genocide and 
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those born during/after genocide with no personal memories of the events of 1994 was 
set out. Consideration was also given to the empirical potential and challenges of 
engaging with the ICTR archive. 
Identifying the important role before witnesses testify in court has in restricting 
who can be a witness and what memories they can talk about, contributes to filling a gap 
in the legal scholarship on legal witnessing. In particular, the existing small amount of 
critical research on legal witnessing has focused on the processes of what witnesses testify 
to in court (Dembour and Haslam 2004; Viebach 2017). The existing research shows that 
what witnesses can talk about on the witness stand is highly restricted. One important 
insight the thesis’s research adds to these discussions is the overall process of witness 
memory at international criminal tribunals is even more restrictive when extending our 
critical lens to include legal processes before witnesses testify in court. The significance 
of these findings also impacts the perceived importance for international criminal courts 
and tribunals to be a site where horrific past wrongs can be made sense of, and in doing 
so places victim-witnesses at the centre of legal approaches of transitional justice. As the 
findings highlight, the process of legal memory is highly restrictive.  
 
Contributions of the study 
Contribution to Knowledge 
Conceptual 
As stated at the start of the thesis, since the emergence of a discourse of transitional justice 
scholarship the ‘field’ has remained under theorised. This limited theorisation is 
particularly evident for the entwined relationship of transitional justice and memory 
within international criminal institutions. This thesis directly engaged with this lack of 
theory by creating an original conceptual framework. One of the innovative contributions 
of the thesis’s approach to theorising the way legal witnesses remember was to look 
outside of the dominant traditional legal framework. Seeking alternative conceptual 
insights and showing their relevance to researching legal phenomena, as this thesis has 
done, is an evidenced example of the necessity for the transitional justice legal scholarship 
to not only more directly engage with theory, but also break the cycle of thinking that law 
and legal frameworks have the answer to all transitional justice problematics. Moreover, 
the thesis taking a ‘tool-box’ approach draws extra attention to the importance of a given 
research problematic. Starting with the problematic and then identifying the most suitable 
conceptual components aids research to not be limited by a particular field or discipline. 
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There are a number of things that the toolkit approach to theory can show, as discussed 
above, which are missed by traditional legal frameworks.  
  
Methodological 
The methodological approach of the thesis whilst it is not entirely novel within 
transitional justice research; its innovation comes from applying it to processes of legal 
memory construction at the ICTR. This innovation has two components. Firstly, the 
thesis’s conceptual framework and data being framed by a poststructuralist lens, whilst 
having limitations as discussed below, enabled this research to deconstruct the way legal 
witnesses remember. Secondly, conducting a Foucauldian framework for discourse 
analysis of archived ICTR legal documents and UoW archived interview transcripts 
showed the relevance of text analysis in understanding legal institutions and their actors 
as part of the identity and knowledge producing process. These two innovative 
components of the thesis’s methodology contribute to existing methods for analysing 
international criminal institutions.  
 
Empirical Contribution 
The empirical contribution of this thesis to the scholarship on transitional justice comes 
from its novel engagements with legal archive documents and the legal archive itself. 
This contribution takes two forms. Firstly, the insights offered by the thesis go beyond 
the findings offered by traditional analysis of legal texts. Specifically, they demonstrate 
how legal material casts light upon the way legal processes construct identity and 
memory. Secondly, insights on what a legal archive is and can be used for extends current 
thinking within transitional justice. In particular, material within the ICTR archive 
contains fragments of many different experiences of Rwanda’s past. Understanding legal 
archives as consisting of fragments of memory has significant potential for contributing 
to post conflict recovery. The role of legal archive material to contribute towards two of 
the primary aims of transitional justice, namely reconciliation and peace, has received 
minimal attention from transitional justice researchers. This potential is discussed below 
when outlining the future direction of research.  
 
Limitations of the study 
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There are a number of things this thesis does not do. There are some limitations within 
what the thesis has achieved. Most of these limitations relate to epistemology, parameters 
of the research and data collected.  
Methodological 
 Whilst taking a Foucauldian poststructuralist methodology is very useful for 
deconstructing labels and assumptions, it does have epistemological limitations. 
Discourses are culturally constructed representations of reality rather than a true objective 
account of reality. From a poststructuralist position it is not possible to conduct research 
in order to attain a true understand of an existing reality. That said, international courts 
are themselves cultural constructions of reality, and therefore a poststructuralist 
investigation can cast new light on how they operate. Taking the ICTR as its case study 
the thesis is not unable to provide explicit insight about other courts and tribunals. Also, 
the legal actors at other courts such as the ICC would be different and how they engaged 
with witnesses and regulations are not necessarily exactly the same as at the ICTR. 
Furthermore, the two ICTR cases used for the empirical analysis cannot be used to claim 
that findings are representative of all the cases at the ICTR.  However, the ICTR does 
offer insights that are transferable to other international criminal courts and tribunals. The 
original conceptual framework offered by the thesis can be applied to other legal 
institutions, alongside a Foucauldian discourse analysis. Moreover, the similarity of RPEs 
at the ICTY and ICC provides a useful opportunity to investigate whether the procedural 
irregularities which shape who can be a witness are evident at these courts.  
 
Gaps in the Data 
The ICTR archive, as with all archives, contains gaps. There are gaps in the data, 
particularly with the ICTR archival material. This is partly due to the fact the thesis 
collected data only from the online archive and not also from the physical archive in 
Arusha. As mentioned in Chapter 7 I had planned to collect material from the archive in 
Arusha but practical issues with the archive meant it was not possible within the 
timeframe available for this PhD project. The gaps are also partly down to the fact that 
the online archive is still currently in a process digitising documents, and some documents 
are either restricted or are going through the process of legal review. The interview 
transcripts also contain gaps in the sense that they were not my interviews. I did not decide 
the questions that were ask, nor was I able to ask the interviewees to elaborate or clarify 
any of their responses. However, the UoW project was created with the purpose of 
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providing a wide range of topics, and therefore the questions were not directed at eliciting 
responses to a specific research problematic. Moreover, as the interviews were conducted 
while the ICTR was in operation this meant that a wide range of staff were interviewed. 
It is the case that transcripts from staff who worked in range of ICTR departments/organs 
has certainly enhanced the arguments made in the thesis. In a related point, it would not 
have been possible for this research project to conduct such a wide-ranging set of 
interviews due to the practical constraints such as cost, time and dispersed geographical 
location of all the interviewees.   
 
Possible Future Research Directions 
Building on from the thesis’s contributions, discussed above, there are fruitful avenues 
for future research. Going forward, the thesis’s original conceptual framework alongside 
a Foucauldian discourse analysis could be applied to other international criminal 
institutions, such as the ICTY and ICC, to see if similar patterns of discursive restrictions 
are evident. Considering that the ICTY used nearly identical RPEs, and that the ICTR’s 
statute and RPE is similar to the ICC, it is likely that similar discursive restrictions of 
legal witnessing would be evident. This thesis’s offerings have contemporary relevance 
considering that the ICC and legal advocates have a strong victim centric mentality in 
regards to the perceived purpose of the court and international criminal justice more 
generally. This can be seen in the current stance of the ICC prosecutor. Therefore, the 
conceptual framework and a Foucauldian framework for a discourse analysis using the 
context of the ICC cases could be used in order to argue for more restraint on what the 
court seeks to achieve, and also crucially in managing expectations in order for societies 
not to feel let down and disillusioned with the court. 
A potentially fruitful direction for future research is a continued exploration of 
legal archives at the ICTR and ICTY, particularly the prosecution archive. In addition to 
the ICTR archive discussed in Chapter 7, the OTP has its own archive that is 
autonomous from the ICTR publicly accessible archive. This archive’s potential 
alongside the continued digitisation of the main ICTR archive could shine further light 
on discursive practices. However, the OTP’s archive is not publicly accessible and from 
the experience of this research they seem reluctant to engage with access requests. For 
the purposes of this thesis I sent numerous emails to the ICTR OTP asking for more 
information about their access policy for the archive. However to date I have received 
no response to my questions. Notwithstanding this frustration, the future potential of the 
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ICTR and ICTY OTP archives is significant. This significance is not only in potentially 
furthering our understanding of the discursive practices relating to legal witnessing, but 
also the role they could have as plural fragments of memory in aiding dialogue in 
transitional countries, both in Rwanda, and states that were formerly part of Yugoslavia 
and ICC investigation countries. The role of legal archive material to aid memory 
ecology in a given society has significant potential far beyond the narrow and singular 
story told through the court proceedings. Legal archives as a site to contribute to 
transitional justice aims of reconciliation and peace has real potential. This potential 
could be further realised by exploring a more integrated approach to archives that 
contain material relating to the same atrocity. In the Rwandan context, there are 
numerous archives, in addition to the ICTR, that contain material relating to events 
before the genocide, the genocide, and post genocide. Drawing these archives closer and 
making this material accessible could further the role archive material could have in 
contributing to plural conversation about the past, as well as aiding dialogue about as 
societies present and future.  
This thesis makes a substantial and significant contribution to the transitional 
justice legal scholarship by extending current understandings of the scope and 
limitations of the legal construction of memory at the ICTR. The thesis’s original 
conceptual framework offers new understanding on how the ICTR, and its actors’, 
constructs witness memories. This conceptual contribution moves beyond existing 
understandings of legal witnessing in tribunals and courts which have been largely 
saturated by traditional legal frameworks. Specifically, by applying the original 
conceptual framework to the ICTR this thesis has made visible a number of important 
aspects of international criminal tribunals (ICTR) relating to the way’s witnesses 
remember. Apply the thesis’ conceptual lens to processes relating to the selection of 
witnesses redirects our gaze away from assuming what witnesses are is self-evident, and 
instead focuses on how individuals become a witness and what witnesses can talk about 
at the ICTR, which entails a process of construction and exclusion. This thesis also adds 
important value to the small amount of existing critical research on legal witnessing by 
focusing its critical lens explicitly on the pre-trial stage. Specifically, a central 
contribution of the thesis to these critical discussions is it shows that the overall process 
of witness memory at international criminal tribunals is even more restrictive when 
extending our critical lens to include legal processes before witnesses testify in court. 
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Furthermore, the thesis makes methodological and empirical contributions, including 
how archival data using textual analysis can cast new light on how international legal 
institutions contribute to shaping understandings of past atrocities, and how archival 
material has the potential to aid the post-genocide memory ecology in Rwanda.  
The strong legalistic orientation within the transitional justice scholarship has 
led to many scholars arguing that international criminal institutions have an important 
role to play in aiding social change following mass atrocities. However, the 
contributions of this thesis disrupt the perceived importance and ability of international 
criminal courts and tribunals to be able to produce a collective understanding of the 
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Case studies from the ICTR 
Ilndelphonse Nizeyimana (ICTR-00-55C) 
Nizeyimana was a captain and second in command of operations at the École des Sous-
Officiers (ESO) (school for non-commissioned officers), which was located in Buture. 
Nizeyimana was known to be a member of then president Habyarimana inner circle of 
advisors referred to as Akazu (‘the little house’). Nizeyimana was arrested in Uganda in 
October 2009 with assistance from US authorities. His charges included genocide, crimes 
against humanity, rape and murder (Nizeyimana Indictment 2000). This include attacks 
in the Cyahinda parish resulting in the death of thousands of many Tutsi refugees, the 
targeted killing of former Queen of Rwanda Fosalie Gicanda (Judgment 2012).During the 
trial, which was one of the shortest at the ICTR lasting 54 days, 77 witnesses were called 
to testify. In June 2012 the trial Chamber III sentenced Nizeyimana to life in Prison, which 
was reduced to 35 on appeal (Judgment 2012).  
 
Emmanuel Rukundo (ICTR-01-70) 
Before and during the genocide against the Tutsi Rukundo served as a catholic priest in a 
parish north of Kabgayi. At the request of the ICTR, in 2001 Rukundo was deported from 
Switzerland, where he had been living since 1999, to Arusha (Rukundo Judgment 2009, 
3-7). He was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, deprivation to life, 
infringement of physical integrity (Rukundo Indictment 2006). The trial duration was one 
year and three, months, form November 2006 until February 2008). In total 50 witnesses 
were called to testify, 18 by the Prosecutor and 32 for the Defence (For full trial details 
see Annex A in Rukundo judgment) (Rukundo Judgment 2009, 2). A pivotal question 
during the trial was did Rukundo’s action during 1994 including the killing of Madame 
Rudhunga, inflicting serious bodily harm on four other Tutsi including two of 
Rudhunga’s children and abduction and killing Tutsi refugees from the St Leon seminary 
constitute genocide? (Rukundo Judgment 2009). In a majority verdict on February the 
following year Rukundo was found guilty of crimes including, genocide, extermination 
as a crime against humanity and murder, and sentenced him to 25 years in prison which 







Ildephonse Nizeyimana (ICTR-00-55C) 





































































































































































ICTR-00-55C-0288   






























































 ICTR-00-55C-0054  
ICTR-00-55C-0055  
ICTR-00-55C-0273 
 ICTR-00-55C-0059  
241 
 
ICTR-00-55C-0060   
ICTR-00-55C-0061  
ICTR-00-55C-0064  




































 ICTR-00-55C-0266  
ICTR-00-55C-0268  















































































































 ICTR-01-70-0423  
ICTR-01-70-0130  
ICTR-01-70-0136/1   
 
Submissions from non-parties 
ICTR-01-70-0039 
ICTR-01-70-0139  













































Voices from the Rwandan Tribunal Interview Transcripts 
 
• VFRT Roland Adjovi, Senior Legal Advisor Interview Date: 13 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Donald J Horowitz Lisa P. Nathan 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_ADJOVI_Roland_fu
ll.pdf 
• VFRT Suzanne Chenault, Legal Officer and Juris-Linguist. Interview Date: 4 
November 2008 Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan 
Donald J Horowitz - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_CHENAULT_Suzan
ne_full.pdf 
• VFRT Adama Dieng Registrar. Date: 28 October 2008, 5 November 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Batya Friedman Donald J Horowitz - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_DIENG_Adama_full
.pdf 
• VFRT Ayodeji Fadugba. Chief of Information and Evidence. Date: 23 October 
2008 Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan John McKay - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_FADUGBA_%20Ay
odeji_full.pdf 
• VFRT Jean-Pele Fomete Program Director. Interview Date: 24 October 2008 






• VFRT M-L. Lambert, Associate Legal Officer. Interview Date: 23 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Donald J Horowitz John McKay - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_LAMBERT_ML_ful
l.pdf 
• VFRT Optatus Nchimbi, Information Network Assistant. Interview Date: 21 




• VFRT Everard O’Donnell, Deputy Registrar. Interview Date: 15 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewer: Donald J Horowitz - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_ODONNELL_Evera
rd_full.pdf 
• VFRT Alex Obote Odora, Chief of Appeals. Interview Date: 22 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan John McKay - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_ODORA_Alex_Obot
e_full.pdf 
• VFRT : Philippe Larochelle, Defense Counsel. Interview Date: 23 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan John McKay - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_LAROCHELLE_Phi
lippe_full.pdf 
• VFRT Claver Sindayigaya, Defense Counsel Interview. Date: 28 October 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Robert Utter Ronald Slye - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_SINDAYIGAYA_Cl
aver_full.pdf 
• VFRT Avi Singh, Legal Assistant. Interview Date: 24 October 2008 Location: 
Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Batya Friedman John McKay - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_SINGH_Avi_full.pdf 
• VFRT Charles Taku, Defense Counsel. Interview Date: 3 November 2008 





• VFRT Alfred Kwende, Acting Chief of Investigations. Interview Date: 28 
October 2008 Location: Kigali, Rwanda Interviewer: Lisa P. Nathan - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_KWENDE_%20Alfr
ed_full.pdf 
• VFRT Roger Pionana, Investigator. Interview Date: 15 October 2008 Location: 
Butare, Rwanda Interviewers: John McKay Batya Friedman - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_PIONANA_Roger_f
ull.pdf 
• VFRT David Wagala, Acting Chief of Investigations .Interview Date: 16 




• VFRT Dennis Byron, President and Judge. Interview Date: 28 October 2008, 5 
November 2008 Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewer: Robert Utter - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_BYRON_Dennis_ful
l.pdf 
• VFRT Erik Møse, Judge. Interview Date: 22 October 2008 Location: Arusha, 
Tanzania Interviewers: Robert Utter Donald J Horowitz - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_MOSE_Erik_full.pdf 
• VFRT Charles Adeogun-Phillips, Prosecutor. Interview Date: 6 November 2008 
Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan Robert Utter - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_PHILLIPS_Charles_
full.pdf 
• VFRT Hassan Jallow, Chief Prosecutor. Interview Date: 5 November 2008, 6 
November 2008 Location: Arusha, Tanzania Interviewers: Lisa P. Nathan 
Donald J Horowitz Batya Friedman - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_JALLOW_Hassan_f
ull.pdf 
• VFRT William Egbe, Senior Trial Attorney. Interview Date: 30 October 2008 






• VFRT Emile Short, Judge. Interview Date: 21 October 2008 Location: Arusha, 
Tanzania Interviewer: Robert Utter Donald J Horowitz - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_SHORT_Emile_full.
pdf 
• VFRT Innocent Kamanzi, Information. Interview Date: 16 October 2008 
Location: Kigali, Rwanda Interviewers: Batya Friedman - 
http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/transcripts/transcript_KAMANZI_Innocen
t_full.pdf 
